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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j) (1953 as amended) as an appeal from an order of a court over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the District Court err when it granted the Division of Family Services' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissed the wrongful death cause of action the Division of Family 
Services with prejudice because the Division was immune from suit pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-10? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Correction of Error. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(2); Ledfors v. Emory County School District, 
849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996). 
2. Did the District Court err when it dismissed the Breach of Contract and Breach of the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing causes of action because the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree entered in David C. et al v. Leavitt et al, 
Civil no. 93-C-206 W, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Correction of Error. Article I, §11 of the Utah 
Constitution; Article VIII, §5 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(1); Tracy 
Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982); RioAlgon Corp. v. Jimco 
Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. 
1 
App. 1988); State ex rel Bush v. Spurlock, 537 N.E. 2d 641(Ohio 1989). 
3. Did the District Court err when it granted the Monitoring Panel Appellees' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Negligence cause of action against the Monitoring 
Panel Appellees with prejudice because the Monitoring Appellees did not owe a duty of care 
to Breanna Loveless? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Correction of Error. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986); State ex rel Bush 
v. Spurlock, 537 N.E. 2d 641(Ohio 1989). 
4. Did the District Court err when it granted the Attorney Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissed the Negligence cause of action against the Attorney 
Appellees with prejudice because the Attorney Appellees did not owe a duty of care to 
Breanna Loveless? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Article I, §11 of the Utah Constitution 
Article VIII, §5 of the Utah Constitution 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(1) 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Breanna Loveless was born on May 22, 1995 to unwed parents. Her mother was 
Bobbie Dawn Widdison (referred to as "Ms. Widdison"), and her father was the Appellant, 
Ricky Sanders. Soon after Breanna's birth, Ricky Sanders and his mother, Meridean Sanders, 
began having frequent and extended visitations with Breanna. From August 1995 through 
December 1995, the Sanders took care of Breanna about one-half of the time. The Sanders 
immediately began seeing signs neglect, including medical neglect, which took place when 
Breanna was with Ms. Widdison. On September 1, 1996, when Breanna was about three 
months old, Breanna was brought to the Sanders with a terrible diaper rash and untreated 
yeast infection. Because of the continued and ongoing evidence of neglect, the Sanders 
called the Millard County Sheriffs office to report their concerns about Breanna. The 
Sanders specifically wanted to know if there was anything they could do to prevent Breanna 
from being returned to Ms. Widdison and to stop the neglect to which they believed Breanna 
was being subjected. The responding officer notified the Division and Pam Goodrich, a 
social worker with the Division, immediately came and met with the Sanders and the 
responding officer. The responding officer and Ms. Goodrich told the Sanders they had no 
legal recourse to prevent Breanna from being returned to Ms. Widdison and that there was 
nothing they could do for Breanna. 
This was not the first time Ms. Widdison had been reported to the Division for child 
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abuse. The Division had investigated Ms. Widdison only a few years earlier in Salt Lake 
City. When Breanna's half-sister, Juana, was about ten months old, her arm was broken by 
a twisting motion commonly associated with abuse. Even though both bones in Juana's arm 
were broken, Juana was not provided with medical treatment until her grandmother took her 
to the hospital about a week after the injury occurred. Ms. Widdison was reported to the 
Division who investigated and determined that the allegation of abuse was substantiated. 
Even though the Division was aware of Ms. Widdison's history of neglect and abuse, Ms. 
Goodrich failed to request a search of the Division's records as required by Division policy. 
As a result, Ms. Goodrich failed to discover Ms. Widdison's prior history of substantiated 
allegations of neglect and abuse. 
Over the next several months, Breanna continued to be brought to the Sanders with 
a severe untreated ear infection. The Sanders took Breanna to the doctors several times, but 
even after Breanna received medical treatment, the Sanders observed that Ms. Widdison 
failed to administer prescribed medications. As a result, Breanna's ear infections persisted 
for about four months and tubes were finally put into Breanna's ears on about January 3, 
1996. During this time, Ricky Sanders continued to have conversations with Ms. Goodrich 
in which he expressed his continuing concerns about Breanna's health and safety. Ricky 
Sanders encouraged Ms. Goodrich to take action to take custody of Breanna. Ms. Goodrich 
told Ricky Sanders that there was nothing she could do legally and told him hire his own 
attorney. 
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On January 12, 1996, Ms. Widdison brought Breanna to the Sanders with a severe 
nose infection, grotesque sores under her nose and a cut under her lower lip. The Sanders 
also noticed that the medication prescribed for Breanna on January 3, 1996 had not been 
administered by Ms. Widdison. In fact, the seal on the medication bottle had not even been 
broken. Breanna also had strange looking bruises on her face that looked like a hand print. 
The Sanders took Breanna to the doctor for treatment and Breanna was diagnosed with a 
nose infection, bronchitis, persistent diarrhea, and severe diaper rash. As the Sanders were 
leaving the doctor's office, one of the nurses said that the bruises looked like they were 
caused by abuse. The nurse encouraged the Sanders to take Breanna to the emergency room 
of the hospital and let the emergency room nurses look at the bruises. The emergency room 
nurses agreed that the bruises looked like they were caused by abuse and one of the nurses 
called Ms. Goodrich. Ms. Goodrich immediately came to the emergency room and met with 
the Sanders and looked at Breanna. Ms. Goodrich told the Sanders that she would go visit 
Ms. Widdison and call them later that day. 
The Sanders returned home to wait for Ms. Goodrich's call; however, the first call the 
Sanders received was from Ms. Widdison. Ms. Widdison called Mrs. Sanders and demanded 
to know whether the Sanders had sent Ms. Goodrich to her home. Because Mrs. Sanders 
thought Ms. Widdison already knew why Ms. Goodrich had gone to her home, Mrs. Sanders 
told Ms, Widdison about the meeting at the emergency room. Ms. Widdison became very 
angry and told Mrs. Sanders that she no longer had a granddaughter and that the Sanders 
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would never see Breanna again. Later that day, Ms. Goodrich called Mrs. Sanders and said 
she had been to Ms. Widdisonfs home. Ms. Goodrich said she had told Ms. Widdison that 
she had received an anonymous complaint about the cleanliness of Ms. Widdison1 s home and 
had not told Ms. Widdison about her meeting with the Sanders at the hospital. Mrs. Sanders 
told Ms. Goodrich she had already spoken to Ms. Widdison and that she had told Ms. 
Widdison about the meeting at the emergency room. She told Ms. Goodrich that Ms. 
Widdison had threatened that the Sanders would never see Breanna again and asked what 
Ms. Goodrich was going to do. Ms. Goodrich told Mrs. Sanders that there was nothing she 
could do because the house looked okay to her and that she had no legal basis to remove 
Breanna from Ms. Widdison. 
On January 19, 1996, Ms. Goodrich visited Ms. Widdisoris home and found that 
Breanna's nose sores were healing but found that Breanna was still sick. On January 25, 
1996, Ms. Goodrich contacted the doctor's office and was told that Ms. Widdison had not 
brought in a stool sample from Breanna as the doctor had requested nor had she taken 
Breanna back to the doctor for a follow-up visit. On January 30,1996, Ms. Widdison took 
Breanna to the doctor with injuries Ms. Widdison claimed were caused when Breanna got 
caught between the mattress and the springs under the crib mattress. The treating doctor 
observed that Breanna continued to have a runny nose, diarrhea, and drainage from her ears. 
On February 1,1996, Ms. Widdison told Ms. Goodrich that her ex-husband was taking her 
to court to get custody of her two older children and that Ms. Widdison wanted to make sure 
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she didn't have any reports of child abuse that he could use against her in court. Ms. 
Widdison also told Ms. Goodrich that Ms. Widdison had not let the Sanders see Breanna 
since January 12,1996, the day the Sanders had taken Breanna to the emergency room. 
On about February 7,1996, Ms. Widdison called Mrs. Sanders and said her electricity 
was going to be turned off. Ms. Widdison told Mrs. Sanders that she could see Breanna 
again if Mrs. Sanders would give her money to pay the past due power bill. Instead of giving 
Ms. Widdison money directly, Mrs. Sanders payed the past due power bill herself. Ms. 
Widdison then told Mrs. Sanders that she could not see Breanna unless Mrs. Sanders gave 
her an additional $20. The next day, Mrs. Sanders gave Ms. Widdison $20 and was able to 
take Breanna home for an overnight visit. When Mrs. Sanders saw Breanna, she was 
horrified by what she saw. She was hardly recognizable. Breannafs back was covered with 
bruises and she would not put weight on one leg. After Mrs. Sanders returned home with 
Breanna, Ms. Widdison called and asked if Mrs. Sanders had noticed the bruises on 
Breanna's back. Mrs. Sanders told Ms. Widdison that she had. Ms. Widdison told Mrs. 
Sanders that she had already taken Breanna to the doctor and that Breanna had got caught 
between the mattress and the springs under the crib mattress. Mrs. Sanders was relieved to 
find out that Ms. Widdison had taken Breanna to the doctor on her own and that there was 
an explanation for these injuries. The Sanders and even the treating doctor didn't leam until 
much later that the injuries were most likely caused by abuse and not as Ms. Widdison had 
explained. 
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Ms. Widdison made arrangements for Mrs. Sanders to pick up Breanna on the 
afternoon of Saturday, February 10, 1996 for an overnight visit. Ms. Widdison said she 
wanted to go out and celebrate her birthday. When Mrs. Sanders unexpectedly got off work 
early, she called Ms. Widdison to see if she could pick Breanna up earlier than had been 
arranged. Mrs. Sanders could hear Breanna screaming in the background. Ms. Widdison 
told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna wasn't ready and that she couldn't pick her up early. Ms. 
Widdison later told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna was crying because she was getting her diaper 
changed. When Mrs. Sanders got home with Breanna, Mrs. Sanders noticed that Breanna 
would cry every time Breanna was moved and she appeared to be in pain. The next morning, 
Mrs. Sanders saw that Breanna's shoulder was red and swollen when she removed Breanna's 
undershirt. Mrs. Sanders called the emergency room and described the injury to the 
emergency room doctor. The Doctor told Mrs. Sanders to bring Breanna in immediately. 
Mrs. Sanders was afraid to take Breanna to the emergency room without Ms. 
Widdison because of what had happened when had taken Breanna to the emergency room 
on January 12. Mrs. Sanders was afraid Ms. Widdison would get angry again and not let her 
see Breanna in the future. Mrs. Sanders couldn't get in touch with Ms. Widdison by 
telephone so she went to Ms. Widdison's house. Ms. Widdison told Mrs. Sanders that she 
needed to get ready and that she would take Breanna to the emergency room. Mrs. Sanders 
went to the hospital and waited for Ms. Widdison to arrive with Breanna; however, Ms. 
Widdison never came. After Mrs. Sanders described Breanna's injury to the emergency room 
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doctor, the emergency room doctor told Mrs. Sanders that he would call law enforcement if 
Ms. Widdison didn't bring Breanna in. Mrs. Sanders returned to Ms. Widdisoris home to 
find out what had happened. Ms. Widdison told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna had fallen asleep 
and that Ms. Widdison didn't want to wake up Breanna. After Mrs. Sanders told Ms. 
Widdison that the doctor was going to call law enforcement if she didn't take Breanna to the 
emergency room, Ms. Widdison relented and took Breanna to the emergency room. 
The emergency room doctor diagnosed Breanna with a broken collar bone and 
immediately notified Ms. Goodrich of Breanna's injury. Ms. Goodrich came to the 
emergency room and questioned Ms. Widdison and Mrs. Sanders. Ms. Widdison claimed 
that the injury happened while Breanna was with Mrs. Sanders. Ms. Goodrich had Ms. 
Widdison tested for drugs which came up positive for opiates and benzodiazepines. Ms. 
Goodrich told Mrs. Sanders that Breanna would be removed from Ms. Widdison while the 
Division conducted an investigation. Ms. Goodrich gave Mrs. Sanders the name of the 
person with whom Breanna would be placed and assured Mrs. Sanders that she could still 
visit Breanna at the foster placement. Mrs. Sanders went home believing that Breanna would 
be placed in protective custody by the Division. 
The next day, Mrs. Sanders asked one of the Emergency Room nurses how Ms. 
Widdison reacted when Breanna was taken away. The nurse informed Mrs. Sanders that 
Breanna was not taken from Ms. Widdison and that Breanna had gone home with Ms. 
Widdison. Mrs. Sanders was completely stunned and went to see Ms. Goodrich to find out 
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what happened. Ms. Goodrich told Mrs. Sanders that her boss told her that she didn't have 
the authority to remove Breanna from Ms. Widdison. When Mrs. Sanders expressed her 
disbelief, Ms. Goodrich assured Mrs. Sanders that she would go to Ms. Widdison's home 
twice a day to visit Breanna and to make sure Breanna was all right. 
Ms. Goodrich went to Ms. Widdison's home and saw Breanna on February 12 and 13, 
1996; however, beginning on February 14,1996 Ms. Widdison refused to let Ms. Goodrich 
see Breanna. Ms. Goodrich made an additional attempt to visit Breanna on February 20, 
1996 but Ms. Widdison again refused to let Ms. Goodrich see Breanna. Despite Ms. 
Widdisonfs previous history of neglect, the overwhelming evidence of Breanna's neglect and 
abuse, Ms. Widdison's positive drug test, and Ms. Widdison's refusal to let Ms. Goodrich see 
Breanna, Ms. Goodrich did not take custody of Breanna even though the law clearly gave her 
authority to do so. 
Just before midnight on the evening of February 20, 1996, Ms. Widdison's live-in 
boyfriend called 911 and said that Breanna was not breathing. When the ambulance arrived, 
Breanna was dead and the early stages of rigor mortis had already set in. Breanna was taken 
to the Emergency Room of the hospital where she was pronounced dead upon arrival The 
state medical examiner conducted an autopsy of Breanna's body and determined that the 
immediate cause of Breanna's death was pneumonia. The medical examiner also found that 
Breanna suffered from myocarditis, an illness that also may have been sufficient in and of 
itself to be fatal. 
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The Course of Proceedings 
Ricky Sanders, individually and in his capacity as the Personal Representative of the 
estate of Breanna Marie Loveless filed suit against the following defendants in the Third 
District Court on February 20,1998: 
1. Bobbie Dawn Widdison and Travis Widdison for Wrongful Death; 
2. The State Appellees and the Division for wrongful death, Breach of Contact 
and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
3. The Monitoring Panel Appellees for Negligence; and 
4. The Attorney Appellees for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Contract and 
Negligence. 
The causes of action against all appellees except for the Division arise from a 
Settlement Agreement that was entered in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah in a matter entitled David C. et al v. Michael O. Leavitt et al, Case No. 93-C-206W. 
David C. is a class action lawsuit filed by the Attorney Appellees against the State of Utah 
on behalf of a class of individuals that included "all children who are or will be known to 
[the Department of Human Services] by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect." Mr. Sanders 
claims that Breanna Loveless was a member of the class of individuals being represented by 
the Attorney Appellees and was a third party beneficiary of the Settlement Agreement. The 
Monitoring Panel Appellees is a group that was established pursuant to the Settlement 
Agreement to monitor compliance with the Settlement Agreement. 
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The Widdison Defendants failed to respond to the plaintiffs Complaint and a default 
certificate was entered against them. All other Defendants moved for summary judgment. 
Disposition of Case in the District Court 
The District Court took the following actions in this case: 
1. Default certificates were entered against the Widdison Defendants. Default 
Certificates of the Widdison Defendants (R. 234-235); however, the District Court has 
reserved the holding of a hearing on damages pending the resolution of this appeal. 
Transcript of December December 20, 1999 District Court Hearing (R. 750 at 31-32). 
2. The Wrongful Death cause of action was dismi ssed with prejudice against the 
State Appellees on July 15, 1998 for failure to file a Notice of Claim as required by Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-12. District Court Order dated July 15,1998 (R. 239). This matter is not 
being appealed. 
3. The Breach of Contract and Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claims against the State and Attorney Appellees was dismissed without prejudice on 
July 15,1998 because the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to enforce the 
Settlement Agreement. District Court Orders dated July 15, 1998 (R. 236-237,239-241); 
Transcript of December December 20, 1999 District Court Hearing (749 at 53). 
4. The Attorney and Monitoring Panel's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
granted and the negligence causes of action against the Attorney and Monitoring Panel 
Appellees were dismissed with prejudice on July 15,1998 because the District Court ruled 
12 
that these Appellees did not owe a duty of care to Breanna Loveless District Court Orders 
dated July 15,1998 (R. 236-237,241); Transcript of December December 20,1999 District 
Court Hearing (749 at 51). 
5. The Division of Family Services' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted 
and the wrongful death cause of action against the Division of Family Services was 
dismissed with prejudice on February 14,2000 because the District Court ruled that Division 
of Family Services has immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(2). The District 
Court certified this as a final order under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
District Court Order dated February 14, 2000 (R. 733-737). 
Statement of the Facts 
1. The Attorney Appellees filed a federal action in the United States District Court, 
District of Utah, titled David C, et al, v. Michael Leavitt, et aL, Case No. 93-C-206W. 
David C was certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure on May 7,1993. The class included "[a]ll children who are or will be known to 
[the Utah Department of Human Services] by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect." Order 
dated August 29, 1994 (R. 197-200). 
2. Breanna Loveless became a member of the plaintiffs class in David C because she 
was known to the DHS by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect. State Appellees 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 22); Department of Human Services 
Fatality Review (R. 413-415). 
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3. The Attorney and State Appellees entered into a Settlement Agreement in David C. 
on or about May 17,1994. Settlement Agreement (R. 49-104); Order dated August 29,1994 
(R. 197-199). 
4. The provisions of the David C. Order and Settlement Agreement apply to and are 
binding upon the Parties to the action, including all members of the certified Plaintiffs 
classes, and their employees, heirs, successors-in-interest, and assigns. Order dated August 
29,1994(R.m). 
5. The Governor of the State of Utah, the Executive Director of DHS, the Director of 
DFS, and representatives of the Utah Attorney General all signed and agreed to be bound by 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Order dated August 29, 1994 (R. 198). 
6. The Settlement Agreement created a Monitoring Panel and established a mechanism 
for monitoring and oversight of the implementation of the provisions of the Settlement 
Agreement. Order dated August 29, 1994 (R. 198); Settlement Agreement (R. 95-99). 
7. The medical examiner determined that Breanna's immediate cause of death was 
pneumonia. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, 
M.D. (R. 695). 
8. The plaintiffs expert witness, Martin J. Nygaard, M.D., reviewed the Report of 
Examination and agreed with Dr. Leis that Breanna died of pneumonia. Affidavit of Martin 
J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 709). 
9. The stage of pneumonia that Breanna's autopsy revealed, while not always fatal, was 
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sufficient to cause death even to a child who was otherwise perfectly healthy. Affidavit of 
Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 709). 
10. Eight-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly healthy get pneumonia. 
Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 710). 
11. Pneumonia can progress from the point where symptoms are first detectible to the 
point found in Breanna's autopsy report in as little as 2 days. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, 
M.D. (R.710). 
12. The medical examiner testified that it was possible that Breanna would have died even 
if she had not had blunt force trauma injuries. Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, 
Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 450). 
13. Approximately six children die of pneumonia each year in the State of Utah who were 
otherwise perfectly healthy. Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr. Edward 
Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 450, 521-523). 
14. The medical examiner determined that Breanna had myocarditis, an infectious disease 
of the heart, which may have been sufficient in and of itself to be the cause of Breanna's 
death independent of the pneumonia. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical 
Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 696). 
15. The stage of myocarditis discovered by Breanna's autopsy was sufficient to cause 
death even to a child who otherwise perfectly healthy. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. 
(R. 710-711). 
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16. Myocarditis would have most likely been identified as the cause of Breanna's if the 
advanced stage of pneumonia had not been present. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. 
(R. 710). 
17. Pneumonia and myocarditis are caused by a bacterial and/or viral infection and not 
by blunt force trauma to the body. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 710-711). 
18. Eight-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly healthy get myocarditis. 
Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 711). 
19. Breanna's autopsy report identified the following blunt force and extremity injuries 
that could have been inflicted as the result of a battery (referred to as "Breanna's Injuries"): 
a. Multiple external bruises that were in various stages of healing at the time of 
her death. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. 
Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697). 
b. Periosteal elevation and calcification in both arms consistent with her arms 
being twisted. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward 
A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-696); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr. 
Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 484-485). 
c. A partial spiral fracture of Breanna's left leg that was consistent with the leg 
being twisted. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward 
A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-696); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr. 
Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 485-486). 
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d. A broken right collar bone. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical 
Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697). 
e. A scrap behind her right ear and on her left scalp. Report of Examination, 
Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697). 
f. A torn upper frenula inside her mouth. Report of Examination, Office of the 
Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697). 
g. A scrap/superficial cut below her lower lip. Report of Examination, Office of 
the Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697). 
h. Severe diaper rash. Report of Examination, Office of the Medical Examiner, 
Dr. Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 695-697); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, 
Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 477). 
20. None of Breanna's Injuries were sufficient either individually or collectively to cause 
Breannafs death. Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 711). 
21. Breanna's pneumonia and myocarditis were not caused by Breannafs Injuries. 
Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 710-711). 
22. Breanna had a medical history of chronic and persistent infectious illnesses including 
the following: 
a. Chronic and persistent ear infections during the last five months of her life. 
Affidavit ofMeridean Sanders (R. 715); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, 
Testimony of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 312-313). 
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b. A nose infection within the last month of her life that increased in gravity from 
January 12,1996 to February 11,1996 that could have been the cause of Breanna's 
Pneumonia. Reporter 's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, 
May 5,1998 (R. 551-552,583, note: pages 173-175 of the transcript are missing from 
the record); Reporter 's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Dr. Robert 
H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 349). 
c. Bronchitis within the last month of her life. Reporter's Partial Transcript of 
Trial, Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 (R. 549); Reporter's Partial 
Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 
349). 
d. An unidentified potentially serious viral infection during last month of her life. 
Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5, 1998 
(R. 538). 
23. Breanna had a history of chronic and persistent diarrhea that may have been caused 
by infection. Affidavit ofMeridean Sanders (R. 714-715); Reporter's Partial Transcript of 
Proceedings, Testimony of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 314). 
24. Breanna's mother had a history of failing to seek timely medical treatment for 
Breanna's infectious illnesses and failing to administer, or even fill, prescribed medications. 
Affidavit ofMeridean Sanders (R. 715); Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, 
Testimony of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 11, 1998 (R. 312-313). 
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25. The fact that a child has bronchitis increases the likelihood that an infection may 
spread to the lungs and develop pneumonia. Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial 
Testimony of Dr. EdwardLeis, May 5, 1998 (R. 550). 
26. Breanna experienced weight loss in the last months of her life that is unusual for a 
child her age which indicates that Breanna may have been insufficiently nourished. 
Reporter's Partial Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis, May 5,1998 (R. 573); 
Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, May 
11, 1998 (R. 307, 367-377); Affidavit of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 711-712). 
27. The medical examiner found that Breanna had a depletion of lymphocytes in her 
thymus at the time of her death. Report ofExamination, Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr. 
Edward A. Leis, M.D. (R. 704). 
28. A depletion of lymphocytes affects the ability of the body to fight infection. Affidavit 
of Martin J. Nygaard, M.D. (R. 712). 
29. Based on Breannafs medical history, it would not be unusual to find a depletion of 
lymphocytes in Breanna's thymus at the time of her death. This could be explained solely 
from the fact that Breanna was suffering from pneumonia and myocarditis at the time of her 
death since both of these diseases cause a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus. Even if 
the depletion of lymphocytes is not completely explained by Breanna's pneumonia and 
myocarditis, the depletion of lymphocytes could also be explained solely by the pneumonia 
and myocarditis combined with Breanna's medical history of chronic infectious illness, 
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failure on the part of Breanna's caretaker to seek timely medical treatment, and the failure of 
Breanna's caretaker to administer prescribed medications. Affidavit of Martin 1 Nygaard, 
MD. (R. 712). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Attorneys representing a plaintiffs9 class owe a duty to an unnamed member of the 
class; therefore, the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Attorney 
Appellees should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the 
Attorney Appellees should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. 
2. The Monitoring Panel appellees had contractual obligations and owed a duty to 
Breanna Loveless to perform its obligations skillfully, diligently and in a workmanlike 
manner; therefore, the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Monitor 
Panel Appellees should be overturned the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the 
Monitoring Panel Appellees should be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
3; The Breach of Contract actions were properly brought in the Third District Court; 
therefore, the District Court's dismissal of the appellant's Breach of Contract actions should 
be overturned and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. 
4. Existing case law and the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of 
the Division should be overturned and the Appellant's Wrongful Death cause of action 
against the Division should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings, or in 
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the alternative, the Utah Supreme Court should clarify the casual standard required by Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10 (2) and the District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of 
the Division should be overturned and the Appellant's Wrongful Death cause of action 
against the Division should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings because 
there are genuine issues of material fact that can only be resolved by a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
NEGLIGENCE - ATTORNEY APPELLEES 
The claims against the Attorney Appellees were dismissed because the District Court 
ruled that the Attorney Appellees had no responsibility or duty in this matter. The issue 
presented to the court is whether an attorney-client relationship exists between an attorney 
and an unnamed member of a class being represented by the attorney. 
Point 1 
Attorneys owe a duty to their clients. 
Once an attorney-client relationship is established, the attorney's duty is to 
"use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and 
capacity commonly possess and excercise in the performance of tasks which 
they undertake." 
Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, if an 
attorney-client relationship was established between the Attorney Appellees and Breanna 
Loveless, the Attorney Appellees owed a duty to excercise ordinary skill, prudence and 
diligence on her behalf. 
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Point 2 
An attorney-client relationship was established between the 
Attorney Appellees and Breanna Loveless. 
In general, an attorney-client relationship is created by contract except when an 
attorney is appointed by a court. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716,727 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). A contract may be expressed or implied. "Even in the absence of an express 
attorney-client relationship, circumstances may give rise to an implied professional 
relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client..." Marguiles by Marguiles v. Upchurch, 
696 P.2d 1195,1200 (Utah 1985). 
It is undisputed that the Appellant Attorneys were never specifically retained by 
Breanna Loveless; nevertheless, the Attorney Appellants filed a class action lawsuit in which 
they expressly and voluntarily undertook to represent "all children who are or will become 
known to the [Department of Human Services] by virtue of a report of abuse or neglect." 
Breanna Loveless was the Attorney Appellees client by virtue of being a member of the class 
that was represented by the Attorney Appellees. Even though Breanna Loveless was an 
unnamed member of the class, the Attorney Appellees owed Breanna Loveless the same duty 
to excercise ordinary skill, prudence and diligence on her behalf as they did to a named party 
in the action. 
Conclusion 
The Attorney Appellees owed a duty to Breanna Loveless. 
Because an attorney-client relationship was established between the Attorney 
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Appellees and Breanna Loveless, the Attorney Appellees had a duty to excercise ordinary 
skill, prudence and diligence on her behalf and the District Court's order for summary 
judgment on behalf of the Attorney Appellees should be overturned and the plaintiffs 
negligence cause of action against the Attorney Appellees should be remanded to District 
Court for further proceedings. 
ISSUE 2 
NEGLIGENCE - MONITORING PANEL APPELLEES 
The negligence claim against the Monitoring Panel Appellees was dismissed because 
the District Court ruled that the Monitoring Panel Appellees had no duty towards Breanna. 
The issue presented to the court is whether individuals who agree to monitor compliance with 
a contract owe a duty to the beneficiaries of the contract. 
Point 1 
A negligence cause of action may arise from the breach of a 
contractual obligation. 
Utah law has long recognized that a negligence cause of action may arise from the 
breach of a contractual obligation. Metcalfv. Mellen, 192 P. 767 (Utah 1920). "As a 
general rule, there is implied in every contract for work or services a duty to perform it 
skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a workmanlike manner, and a negligent failure to 
observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of contract... In other words, 
the contract creates the relation out of which grows the duty to use care." 57A Am Jur 2d, 
Negligence, § 120. "The prevailing rule appears to be that where there is a general duty, even 
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though it arises from the relation created by, or from the terms of, a contract, and that duty 
is violated, either by negligent performance or negligent nonperformance, the breach of the 
duty may constitute actionable negligence," 57A Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §121. 
Point 2 
The Monitoring Panel Appellees9 duty to Breanna Loveless 
arose from its contractual obligations under the David C. 
Settlement Agreement. 
The Monitoring Panel, including its duties and obligations, were established pursuant 
to the David C. Settlement Agreeement. The Monitoring Panel Appellees duty to Breanna 
Loveless was to perform its contractual obligations skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a 
workmanlike manner. 
Conclusion 
The Monitoring Panel Appellees owed a duty to Breanna 
Loveless. 
The Monitoring Panel Appellees had a duty to Breanna Loveless to perform its 
contractual obligations skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a workmanlike manner and the 
District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Monitoring Panel Appellees 
should be overturned and the plaintiffs negligence cause of action against the Monitoring 
Panel Appellees should be remanded to District Court for further proceedings. 
ISSUE 3 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
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Dealing causes of action were dismissed the District Court ruled that it did not have 
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement reached in a federal action. The issue 
presented to the court is whether a breach of contract action may be brought in state court to 
recover damages for failure to comply with contract if the contract was a settlement 
agreement reached in a federal action. 
Point 1 
Third District Court has jurisdiction over breach of contract 
actions. 
Article VIII, §5 of the Utah State Constitution provides the following: 
The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. 
Article I, §11 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 -4( 1) provides that "[t]he District Court has original jurisdiction 
in all matters Civil and Criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited 
by law." Based on the forgoing Statutes, the Third District Court has jurisdiction over a 
breach of contract action. 
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Point 2 
Ricky Sanders filed an action to recover monetary damages 
relating to a breach of contract not an action to force the 
State and/or Attorney Appellees to comply with the terms of 
the contract. 
Ricky Sanders claims that the State and Attorney Appellees entered into a contract, 
that Breanna Loveless was an intended beneficiary of the contract if not a party to the 
contract, that the State and Attorney Appellees failed to perform its obligations under the 
contract and that she suffered damages as a result. Ricky Sanders is seeking monetary 
damages in state court against the State and Attorney Appellees for damages Breanna 
Loveless suffered as a direct and proximate result of the State and Attonney Appellees9 
breach of contract. Ricky Sanders is only asking that the contract be looked at on its face and 
a determination made about whether the State and/or Attorney Appelees failed perform its 
contractual obligations and whether Breanna Loveless suffered damages as a result. This is 
within the proper jurisdiction of the District Court. Ricky Sanders is not asking the District 
Court to order or force the State and/or Attorney Appellees to comply with terms of the 
contract because Ricky Sanders agrees that such a remedy could only be pursued in the 
Federal Court. 
Conclusion 
The Breach of Contract causes of action were properly 
brought in the Third District Court. 
The Breach of Contract actions were properly brought in the Third District Court; 
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therefore, the District Court's dismissal of the appellant's Breach of Contract actions should 
be overturned and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. 
ISSUE 4 
DIVISION - WRONGFUL DEATH 
The District Court ruled that the Division has immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-10(2) which states as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all government entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if: 
(2) the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from assault, battery . . . 
Point 1 
Existing case law providing governmental immunity when 
a nongovernmental employee commits the assault or battery 
should be overturned. 
Ricky Sanders does not dispute that existing case law grants governmental immunity 
when an injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from an assault or battery when 
a nongovernmental employee commits the assault or battery. Ledfors v. Emory County 
School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Taylor v. Ogden City School District, 927 P.2d 
159 (Utah 1996). However, Ricky Sanders requests that existing case law be reevaluated to 
determine if proper legal standards regarding statute interpretation were followed in previous 
cases. Ledfors established the precedent that governmental immunity applies when a 
nongovernmental employee commits the assault or battery; however, the Ledfors court failed 
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to properly analyze the statute's language in accordance with proper legal standards 
regarding statute interpretation and failed to examine the legislative intent. Therefore, Ricky 
Sanders requests that the court reevaluate existing case law to determine if proper legal 
standards regarding statute interpretation were followed. 
A. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was 
meant to achieve. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent 
of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To 
discover that intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. In 
construing a statute, we assume that "each term in the statute was used 
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Only when we find ambiguity in the 
statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations. 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Nelson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162,1167 (Utah 1995). Therefore, 
proper statutory interpretations requires the court to look first to the plain language of the 
statute. If the literal reading of the statutes' plain language is unreasonably confused or 
ambiguous, the court should not simply choose between the possible meanings, but should 
seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations. 
B. Because the plain language of Utah Code Ann. $63-30-10 is 
unreasonably confused or ambiguous, the court is obligated to 
seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations. 
This court has held that language is ambiguous if the words can be understood to 
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reach two or more plausible meanings. Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1992). 
The confusion or ambiguity relating to Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 is whether the phrase 
"except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . assault, battery . 
.." is supposed to act as an independent clause from the preceding phrase "injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment" or whether it is supposed to act as a modifier to that phrase. Under the first 
interpretation, immunity is provided regardless of who commits the battery. Under the 
second interpretation, immunity only applies if the battery is committed by an employee 
within the scope of employment. Because either position is a plausible interpretation of the 
plain language of the statute, the court must find that the plain language of the statute is 
unreasonably confused and ambiguous. Therefore, the court should not simply choose 
between interpretations but should seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant 
policy considerations. 
C. The legislative history of Utah Code Ann §63-30-10 supports 
the position that immunity was only intended to be preserved 
where the injury is the result of an assault or battery committed 
by a government employee. 
The legislative history of Utah Code Ann §63-30-10 is recited in Justice Durham's 
dissenting opinion in Taylor which is offered for the court's consideration: 
When the Utah Legislature considered the Governmental Immunity Act 
in 1963, courts in California, Arizona, and Nevada had already abolished 
sovereign immunity, resulting in a flood of lawsuits. See Floor Debate, 
Statement of Senator Charles Welch, 65th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11, 
1965) (House recording No. 1, side 2) [hereinafter Welch Statement]. In 1963, 
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the Utah Legislature formed the Governmental Immunity Committee to study 
the state's options in legislating laws governing governmental immunity. 
(FN6) See H.R.J. Res. 21, 35th Utah Leg., 1963 Utah Laws 685. When the 
legislature formed this committee, it was concerned about the "hardship" 
imposed on parties who are injured or whose property may be damaged by 
actions taken by governmental entities. See id.; cf. Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838, 844 (Utah 1990) ("There was (and is) no place in the 
structure of the Act for a grant of absolute immunity."). The careful balancing 
of these concerns led to the current Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See 
Floor Debate, Statement of Representative Ray Harding, 65th Utah Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (Feb. 11, 1965) (House recording No. 2, side 2) [hereinafter Harding 
statement]. 
The Governmental Immunity Committee released its report in 1964, 
stating that it patterned its proposed bill after similar acts in California, 
Michigan, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. Utah Legislative Council, Report 
of the Governmental Immunity Committee, 67-68 (Dec. 1964) (on file with 
State of Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel). In 
evaluating available alternatives to governmental immunity, including the 
waiver of immunity for certain instances of tortious conduct, the committee 
stated: 
There was virtual unanimity that immunity of governmental entities 
should be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or 
omissions of employees (tort liability) with the exception of intentional or 
willful misdeeds, discretionary acts and certain other activities where it was 
felt that it is in the best interest of the public to exclude responsibility. 
Id. at 61 (emphasis added.) The committee, therefore, recommended 
that individuals should be able to sue the government for the negligence of its 
employees, retaining immunity only where its employees' acts or omissions 
were intentional or willful. 
The operative language of the committee's proposed bill contained 
almost the exact language subsequently used in section 63-30-10(l)(b). The 
proposed bill stated: 
Immunity from suite of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of his employment except if the injury: 
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^2j arises out of assault, battery, ialse imprisonment, talse arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, deceit, or interference with contract rights \ \ 
Id. at 92. The committee summarized this provision as a "[w]aiver of 
immunityybr negligent acts of employees, except:, (2) intentional torts" Id, 
at 68-69 (emphasis added). The report docs not refer to the actions of 
nongovernment employees. In fact, the entire report seems to focus soleh on 
the actions of government employees, not of private individuals. 
The puipose of the Act as a whole also supports this interpretation. 
Senator Charles Welch told the House of Representatives that this bill allowed 
individuals to sue the government for its negligence "so as to make more 
justice," Welch Statement, supra, Senator Welch stated that it was "not 
moral" for citizens to be uncompensated for losses resulting from the 
negligence of government employees. Id. He asserted that allowing suits 
against governmental entities would not financially cripple those entities 
because any person bringing suit would still have to prove all the legal 
elements of a negligence action. See id. 
Representative Harding the bill's sponsor, stated: "We say we're 
imposing an additional burden possibly on the taxpayer. But why should one 
individual through no fault of his own be required to bear the burden that 
society is responsible for? The bill will alleviate many injustices." See 
Harding Statement, supra. In response, Representative Evans stated, "I think 
we've waited long enough in the state to enact this legislation. If it costs a few 
more bucks that we might have justice, I am one that is willing to afford it." 
Floor Debate, Statement of Representative Richard V. Evans, 65th Utah Leg., 
Gen. Sess, (Jkb I 1, 1965) (House recording No. 3, side 1). In his closing 
statement, Representative Harding urged the passage of the bill: 
If we believe that a government should be responsible to the people, it 
should be responsible to all of its acts, and this means the acts of its 
agents. Now, at the present time, if a person commits a wrongful act 
in a negligent manner, not an intentional wrong, he is found responsible 
for his act by the courts, you ami 1 do. Bui a governmental agency is 
not, because "the king can do no wrong," It appears to me that we 
cannot allow this doctrine to remain the laws of this state, that we 
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should assert ourselves and realize the responsibility that government 
has to be a responsible agency, that its employees and officers must be 
responsible. I believe that to allow a person to commit a wrong and 
because of sovereign immunity and to hide behind the ancient doctrine 
of "a king can do no wrong" is to be but an ostrich and put your head 
in the sand and maybe it will go away. I think that we must accept 
[our] obligations. 
Harding Statement, supra. 
The legislative history strongly supports the view that the legislature 
intended to compensate victims injured by governmental negligence, but not 
for injuries caused by intentional torts of government employees. Hence, 
under the Act, the status of the intentional tortfeasor does matter. At no point 
in the entire legislative record is there any reference *169 to immunizing the 
state for its negligence where that negligence, together with an assault or 
battery committed by any person, causes harm. It makes very little sense, 
given the purposes of the statute, to say that the state is immune from suite for 
its negligence because a private individual has fortuitously committed an 
assault or battery also contributing to the injury. Thus, in this case, although 
Taylor could have sued the District if he had tripped aind fallen into the glass, 
the fortuity of his having been pushed renders it immune. Neither the 
legislative history nor the purpose of the Act indicates that the legislature 
intended such a result. 
Our holding in Ledfors did not comport with the legislative history or 
the purpose of the Act. 
Taylor at 167-169. 
Conclusion 
Existing case law should be overturned. 
Existing case law should be overturned because the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-10(2) is unreasonably confused and ambiguous and the legislative history supports 
the position that immunity was only intended to be preserved where the injury is the result 
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of an assault or battery committed by a government employee; therefore, the District Court's 
order ummary judgment mi III» In ill nil llir Diuiioii JHHIIIII In iiiiniliiiiinl .null lln 
, \ | "I'M 11!«n I,: > Wn m gfiil Death cause of action against the Division should be remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings 
POINT 2 
Even if the court is unwilling to overturn existing ease law, 
Breanna's death did not arise out of, in connection with, or 
result from a battery as a matter of law and the District 
Court wrongfully granted the Divisions Motion foi 
Summary Judgment 
Based on the evidence contained in the record together with all reasonable inferences 
natural effects of an untreated infectious disease independent of any battery inflicted injuries. 
lliiiclure, the District Court wrongfully granted the Divisioii's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Ricky Sanders does not dispute that his claims against the Division arise i 11 n 1111 n 
negligentactsoromissionsnl ||K | } n tsion's i iti|>ln\n, s (liiiiil war pwlonnni within (lie sn nipt 
of a P .. n n -r.: unction as defined in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a). Unless the court is 
overturn existing case law, Ricky Sanders does not dispute that pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. $oJ \-
Immunity from suit of all government entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
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(2) assault, battery... 
Therefore, the court must decide whether, as a matter of law, Breanna's death arose 
out of, in connection with, or resulted from a battery as claimed by the Division. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there are no disputes regarding material 
facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,235 (Utah 1993); State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952,954 (Utah App. 1994). The Court must 
view all facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. Day v. State, 882 P.2d 1150,1152 (Utah 1994); Katzenberger 
v. State, 735 P.2d 405,408 (Utah App. 1987). 
A. The court needs to clarify the casual standard required by Utah 
Code Ann. $63-30-10(2). 
Ricky Sanders' position is that the casual standard required by Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-10(2) is met only if Breanna Loveless died as the direct result of battery inflicted injuries 
or, if Breanna died of an infectious disease, that the battery iuflicted injuries contributed in 
some meaningful and material way to Breanna's death. In the majority of cases relied on by 
the Division in its Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff suffered injuries that were 
the direct result of an assault and battery. Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993); Tiede v. State, 
915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996); Malcom v. State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1994); S.H. v. State, 865 
P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993). In those cases, the plaintiff was either beat up, stabbed, murdered, 
34 
or sexually assaulted IJnder existing case law, Ricky Sanders fully understands that the 
Division would be immune from this suit if Breanna's mother had simply taken a baseball bat 
.mil I i".i( liii In lir.tlit, MnViTvn, l iner cases ,nv iiTdn/fiitl In llir. i\„IIISI" nl'iirlinn because 
Rreanna had i i :: battery inflicted injuries that were sufficient either individually or 
collectively to cause Breanna's death nor is Ricky Sanders suing the State to recover damages 
for Breanna's battery inflicted injuries. 
,i n h , , i \i , fin M" - « n ,'» nl '• l 'htlt>r\ch<H>!Hi\t ( P " T '"il i l | 
laintiff began fighting with another student. Id. at 160. During the fight, 
the plaintiff was shoved into a glass window and his hand was forced through the glass. 4s 
a result, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries to his haru *«\ u*r court siau 
uncontrovertea ^ 
>dow by the fellow student. Thus, [the plaintiffs] injuries originated, grew out of, and 
flowed from [the other student's] violent conduct," Id. Ilie Taylor court held that there was 
"undoubtedly 'some' causal relationship between [the plaintiffs] injury aiul ilic" I tin In,111.!! 
student's] as^« In ni II I I llu ,i niull 111 •<• I'lhiiifiH'"1 | iii|iii. "« v^ui1 I1 .nl hiive 
o r r - r r r
 IU. Vviule different conclusions can be drawn from the language used by the 
Taylor court, Ricky Sanders understands Taylor to mean that the Division is immune from 
—'- s if Breanna would not have contracted and diuI nl ixlmu* HIIM.IM In I lm 
Brea • --..>.. eiy inllii.li.il iii|iiiii". ," .( .i mmiimim .I'.II'I .u1 s< auire that there be at 
least some meaningful and material relationship between Breanna's battery inflicted injuries 
]5 
and the infectious disease that caused her death. 
The Division, on the other hand, is arguing that the Division is immune under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10(2) if Breanna's battery inflicted injuries were connected in any way to 
Breanna's death, no matter how remote or inconsequential that connection might be. This 
appears to be an attempt by the Division to recharacterize Breanna's death as a death that was 
caused by a natural disease process to a death that was caused by a battery. In this case, there 
is no question that Breanna had no battery inflicted injuries that were sufficient either 
individually or collectively to cause Breanna's death. There is no question that Breanna died 
as the result of a natural infectious disease process. The only question is to what extent, if 
any, did Breanna's battery inflicted injuries contribute to her death as the result of a natural 
disease process. 
Because Taylor leaves unclear the casual standard required by Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-10(2), the Utah Supreme Court needs to clarify the law on this matter. 
B. Breanna died of an infectious disease and not from battery 
inflicted injuries. 
Ricky Sanders presented the following facts to the District Court. The medical 
examiner determined that Breanna's immediate cause of death was pneumonia. Ricky 
Sander's expert witness agreed the Breanna died of pnuemonia. The medical examiner 
determined that Breanna had myocarditis which may have been sufficient in and of itself to 
be the cause of Breanna's death independent of the pneumonia. Even though pneumonia was 
the most likely cause of Breanna's death given the advanced stage of the pneumonia that was 
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present, Myocarditis cannot be ruled out as the primary cause of 13 reai 111a':«»111, u (I I"" i m\ • 1111 »i 
a n d m y o c a r d i t i s a r e c a u s e d h> a • I,II • i•• • tp ,i ml i i > ru IICIMH i ill i hndv. Breanna's 
following physical injuries that could have been inflicted as the 
r e s u l t of a batter}- (referred to as "Breanna's Injuries11); Multiple external bruises that were 
in various stages of healing at the time of her death, a partial spiral fraciu., -. \ - • * 
left leg that was consistent w ill) (In leg hem}.!, I wislcil, periosteal ele\ a i calcification 
i I Ili iinii'i (Li! i i iiiiisislciil nith her arm being twisted, a broken right collarbone, a 
scrap behind her right ear and on her left scalp, a torn upper frenula inside her mouth; and 
a scrap/superficial cut below her lowei I ip None oi"Breaima's Injuries were snil\i • iei 1in1111"i 
individually or collective 1, I- , an .<* Mreanna1. dcill 11" •.» | lliese facts and all 
reasonable interchv.es lh nil itic.se facts, a finder of fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna 
died as the result of a natural infectious disease process and not from battery inflicted 
injuries. 
Q Breanna could have contracted and died of an untreated 
infectious disease even if she had been otherwise perfectly 
healthy. 
The Division was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because a i > * *u,. , aU 
can reasonably conclude from the evidence provided linai Hreanna \ ! and 
died of an untreated inlei.lious disease n n» il she had been otherwise perfectly healthy. In 
••iiipporl of this statement, Ricky Sanders presented the following facts to the District Court. 
The medical examiner determined that Breanna's immediate cause of death was pneumonia. 
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The stage of pneumonia that Breanna's autopsy revealed, while not always fatal, was 
sufficient to cause death even to a child who was otherwise perfectly healthy. Children who 
are otherwise perfectly healthy contract pneumonia. Pneumonia can progress from the point 
were symptoms are first detectible to the point found in Breanna's autopsy report in as little 
as 2 days. It was more than 5 days from the last time Breanna saw a doctor until her death. 
Pneumonia is a potentially fatal disease to an eight-and-a-half-month-old child if left 
untreated. Approximately six children die of pnuemonia each year in the State of Utah that 
were otherwise perfectly healthy. The medical examiner testified that it was possible that 
Branna would have died even if she had not had blunt force trauma injuries. The medical 
examiner determined that Breanna had myocarditis which may have been sufficient in and 
of itself to be the cause of Breanna's death independent of the pneumonia. The stage of 
myocarditis discovered by Breanna's autopsy was sufficient to cause death even to a child 
who otherwise perfectly healthy. Children who are otherwise perfectly healthy get 
myocarditis. Based upon these facts and all reasonable inferences from these facts, a finder 
of fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna could have contracted and died of an untreated 
infectious disease even if she had been otherwise perfectly healthy. Therefore, the Division 
as not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the Division's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should have been denied. 
D. Even if a finder of fact were to reject the previous argument. 
Breanna was not otherwise perfectly healthy and could have 
contracted and died of an untreated infectious disease for 
reasons completely unrelated to her blunt force trauma injuries. 
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Even, if a finder of fact were to reject the previous argument, the Division is was not 
entitled to a judgment as a matter o I law because n liiiiilii I hi I iiiunm link illiiill Miraima 
mi i ii ill in led and din I ill ill iiiiiiiln, iillli ill inleelmus disease Itir i r.isons completely unrelated to her 
blunt force 'trauma injuries. In support of this statement, Ricky Sanders presented the 
following facts to the District Court: Breanna had a medical history of chronic and persistent 
infectious illnesses during the majority or ner ui; i 
< IIHI lib itiiJ pel si ilenl "'in' ififiYlioiis *• * rf her life, asenuua 
and persistent nose infection that increased in seriousness during the last month of her life, 
bronchitis within the last month of her life, an unidentified but potentially serious \ iral 
infection during the last month tsreann. 
persistcnl iilioiTliii, JII Ihal 111• is Rreanna exnerienced a vv^iu 
loss unusual in a child her age that could indicate that Breanna was receiving insufficient 
nourishment. Breanna's mother also had a history of failing to seek timely medical treatment 
for Breanna's infectious illn i sses and 1 ailing 10 adrninist 
iiniln tiliiiiiiPi IIK iiitiiy '. iniJop i^ n-> I'liU-il .1 ilcpltlioii til w mphoeytes inBreannafs Thymus. 
A depletion of lymphocytes affects the ability of the body to fight infection. Based on 
Breannafs medical history, it would not be unusual to find a depletion <>\ .vmphocytes in 
Breanna'sthymusat lllit IIIIIC i Il liui iln HIIIIII I  liiiiii. i mild In \ \\\U\\\\ ill sulk Ih liiiiii ihc lm I lh.it 
Brerinna was sultmng from,, pnei nd myocarditis at the time of her death since both 
of these diseases cause a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus. Even if the depletion of 
lymphocytes is not completely explained by Breannafs pneumonia and myocarditis, the 
depletion of lymphocytes could also be explained solely by the pneumonia and myocarditis 
combined with Breanna's medical history of chronic infectious illness, failure on the part of 
Breanna's caretaker to seek timely medical treatment, and the failure of Breanna's caretaker 
to administer prescribed medications. Based upon these facts and all reasonable inferences 
from these facts, a finder of fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna was in a weakened 
condition and contracted and died from the natural effects of an untreated infectious disease 
for reasons completely unrelated to her blunt force trauma injuries. Therefore, the Division's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied. 
Conclusion 
The District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of 
the Division should be overturned. 
Breanna's death did not arise out of, in connection with, or result from a battery as a 
matter of law regardless of the casual standard that may be applied. The Division cannot 
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact when all facts and reasonable 
inferences arising from those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Sanders. 
Based on the facts contained in the record together with all reasonable inferences arising 
from those facts, a finder a fact can reasonably conclude that Breanna would have contracted 
and died from the natural effects of an untreated infectious disease even if she had otherwise 
been perfectly healthy. In the alternative, even if Breanna would not have contracted and 
died of an infectious disease if she had been otherwise perfectly healthy, a finder of fact can 
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conclude that Breanna contracted and died from the natural effects of an untreated infectious 
disease for reasons completely unrelateo 
n behalf of die Division should be overturned 
and the Appellant's Wrongful Death cause of action against the Division should be remanded 
to the District Court for further proceedings because there are genuine issues of material fact 
that can only be resolved by a jury. 
CONCI USION 
1. The District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Attorney Appellees 
should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the Attorney 
Appellees should be remanded to div * h^i . . ... ior ruruu 
Panel 
Appellees should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the 
Monitoring Panel Appellees should be remanded lo (In District Court for further 
proceedings. 
3. The Disiiit ( ( Vimi'".,, dismissal H Ihc ii^ pi/ltui!*'1 Pitvu'Ji 'ilVnnlmct actions should 
be overturned and remanded to the district Court for further proceedings. 
4. The District Court' s order for summary judgment on behalf of the i; * v tsion should be 
overturned and the Appellant" s W rongfiil Death oust; i»(" action again- • 1 
bt: rcrrwiiiinl 1- • (In; I hsliiil "f '"«i ml I-, i furlhcr pinaTdiiip.s because the Utah Supreme Court 
should overturn existing case law, or in the alternative, there are genuine issues of material 
fact that can only be resolved by a jury. 
Dated this 1$ day of July, 2000. 
D. Kevin DeGraw 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Affidavit of Meridean Sanders (R. 714-716) 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies 
All. rights reserved. 
*** STATHTWi niUHI'lN'l THROUGH THE 1.999 SUM TiRMENT (1.999 GENF.UAI. 
SESSION) *** 
*** ..ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2 000 I IT 2 0 AND 2 000 UT APP 5 *** 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I . DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Utah. Const A r t . I , § 11 (1999 ) 
[Coui: t.s opei 1. Redr ess c - . njuries .] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to hi m in h:I 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himse •' 01 counsel , any civil cause to which he is a party. 
HISTORY: Const. .1 8 96. 
NOTES T U DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action under Civil R i gl its P. ct c: Ill: II 8 :i II 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 
Actions not created. 
Arbitration. 
Assignments. 
Attorneys' dut2 es. 
Criminal law, 
-- Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
Discriminatory classification. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Health care professional immunity. 
Injury or damage to property 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
-- Choses in action. 
-- Habeas corpus. 
-- Limitation of actions. 
-- Statutory limitation of revi ew 
No - f au. It statute. 
Occupational disease law. 
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 1999 SUPPLEMENT (1999 GENERAL 
SESSION) *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 20 AND 2000 UT APP 5 *** 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5 (1999) 
§ 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts -- Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by 
statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the 
Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
HISTORY: Const. 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2; 1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1. 
NOTES: 
COMPILER'S NOTES. --Provisions similar to those in this section were formerly 
found in Art. VIII, Sees. 7, 8 and 9. 
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Original and appellate jurisdiction, § 78-3-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Appeal by the state in criminal cases. 
Appeal from justice court. 
Appeal where case originated in circuit court. 
Appeals. 
City court supervision. 
Defendant's right to appeal. 




Educational institution proceedings. 






UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
i $ ;. . gi.L (c) 1953-1999 by the Michie Company 
A Division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. 
A13 Rights Reserved 
* THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH CHANGES RECEIVED AS OF' FEBRUARY 10, 
2 000 * 
State Rules 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VTT. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule- .,6 (2000) 
Ru 1 e -•f:; Summan" judgment. 
(ay roi claimant. A party seeking to recover up . ,. ... .^ :;., -jountercla.fi. ox-
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may. at any time after the 
expiration of 2 0 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a -:1a in. counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a r -ma-•"-.- -•:inmr-"' i- hi n favor 
as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda aindavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4 5 0 1 . The j moment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, I nterlocutory In character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine Issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief 
is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as 
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shal 3 be conducted according] y. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth si ich 
URCP Rule 56 
Page 21 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of 
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
adjudged guilty of contempt. 
HISTORY: (Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
NOTES: 
Amendment Notes. -- The 1997 amendment, in Subdivision (c), substituted the 
first sentence for the former first sentence which read "The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing"; deleted the 
former second sentence which read "The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits"; and deleted "forthwith" following "rendered" in 
the present second sentence. 
Compiler's Notes. -- This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross References. -- Contempt generally, §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 





-- Inconsistency with deposition. 
-- Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
-- -- Resting on pleadings. 
-- Objection. 
-- Sufficiency. 
-- -- Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
-- Superseding pleadings. 
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Utah K'UO^ AJUI.. ;^  t v - < H -^99) 
STATUS: CONSULT SLIP LAWS CITED BELOW FOR RECENT CHANGES TO THIS DOCUMENT 
< = 1> LEXSEE 2000 Ut SB 240 -- See section 1 ] ' 
§ 7 8 3 4 Jur i s d i c t ,i on. - - Apneas 
(1) The district court has ••.?! iu -i 1.1 MI ,I: <* I I 'i - s civiL 'and, 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah and not prcV - '-d by law. 
(2) Tl le district court juti<: -s may issue all extraordinary writs and other 
writs necessary to carry into •* - _,t their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters .; .^AV^,. «,J-. ^  ine 
consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over a„]] matters properly filed in 
the circuit court prior to July ] irn' 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de 
novo of the judgments of the justi ce court and, of the sma"n ri^-ims department of 
the district court. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgmc 
court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
("i ) The distr ict coui t 1 las jurisdictioi i to review agency adjudicative 
proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, and shall comply with, the requirements of that chapter, ,i n its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, c] ass C misdemeanors, infractions and 
violations of ordinances only if 
(c ,„) t: 1 i, e r € :i s i i : • j u s t i c < •••-..-<; r t: w ,:i t ,h„ t e r r i t o i :i a 1 j u i: i s d i, c t: ion; 
lb) the matter was properly filed in, the circuit court prior to July 1, 
iyy6; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4 
Page 51 
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in 
which the district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed 
§a justice court; or 
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single 
criminal episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
HISTORY: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-3-4; L. 1983, ch. 75, § 2; 
1986, ch. 47, § 50; 1987, ch. 161, § 305; 1988, ch. 248, § 10; 1991, ch. 268, § 
23; 1992, ch. 290, § 8; 1993, ch. 59, § 6; 1996, ch. 198, § 50; 1997, ch. 216, § 
2; 1998, Ch. 313, § 1. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1993 amendment, effective March 12, 1993, substituted 
"the circuit and district court of" for "no such court exists in" and inserted 
"have been merged into one court under Section 78-1-2 or 78-1-2.4" in the first 
sentence in Subsection (6). 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3), 
relating to transfer of cases to circuit court; added new Subsections (3) to 
(5), redesignating former Subsections (4) and (5) as (6) and (7); and deleted 
former Subsection (6), providing for jurisdiction when the circuit and district 
courts have been merged. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, added Subsection (8). 
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, deleted "between July 1, 1997, 
and July 1, 1998" after "Subsection (1)" in Subsection (8). 
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Constitutional delineation of jurisdiction, Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. 
Effect of formation of new county on pending cases, § 17-3-7. 
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Injunction, U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Juvenile courts, concurrent jurisdiction with, § 78-3a-105. 
Probate proceedings, §§ 75-1-301 to 75-1-311. 
Time of jurisdiction, U.R.C.P. 3(b). 
Venue, § 78-13-1 et seq. 
Water rights, determination of, § 73-4-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Consent of parties. 
Disciplining attorneys. 
Extraterritorial powers of district judge. 
Extraordinary writs. 





Judgments of justice court. 




UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 printed in FULL format. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 1999 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** (1999 GENERAL SESSION) *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 20 AND 2000 UT APP 5 *** 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1999) 
§ 63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission 
of employee -- Exceptions 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, 
interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of 
civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and 
civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
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Page 57 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, 
§or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the 
clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any 
function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity 
is in addition to all other immunities granted by law. 
HISTORY: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, 
Ch. 169, § 1; 1989, Ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, ch. 268, § 29; 1990, 
Ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 299, § 35; 
1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, ch. 264, § 1. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted 
"School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of 
Sovereign Lands and Forestry" for "Board of State Lands and Forestry" in 
Subsection (11). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective July 1, 1996, added "in connection 
with, or results from" to the end of the introductory paragraph; deleted "or 
results from" from the beginning of Subsection (7); deleted "or in connection 
with" from the beginning of Subsection (8); and substituted "Division of 
Division of Child and Family Services, Jan Graham, Attorney 
General, Carol Clawson, Solicitor General, Linda Luinstra, former 
Assistant Attorney G e — " son, Chair of the Federal 
Court Monitoring Pane L * c*' t ill, former member of the 
Federal Court Monitor /Vv"\ .t, former member of the 
Federal Court Monitor. , . oring Panel, the Utah 
State Department of H\ J
 r a^^ r\ he Division of Family 
Services, by and throL r)^^^^^^^^^^ . Soper and Barbara E. 
Ochoa, Assistant Attor f „,*,--> J I '- this Memorandum in /y/'-*1 A 
Support of Defendants' - _7, 
n^ , -7-* n / 
/).J V 
Plaintiff's minor daughter, Breanna, died on February 22, 
1996 as the result of pneumonia, which resulted from and was 
aggravated by the abuse and neglect to which she had been 
subjected by her mother, Bobbie Dawn Widdison, and her mother's 
boyfriend, Travis Widdison. (Complaint at M 15, 16, 27, and 
79). Criminal proceedings have been instituted against Bobbie 
Dawn Widdison and Travis Widdison in connection with Breanna's 
death. (See Notice of Claim, attached hereto as Exhibit A, at 
page 2) .1 
1
 The attaching of this Notice of Claim does not convert 
this Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. A court 
may consider exhibits attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss 
when the document may be considered part of the pleadings because 
the plaintiff has referred to it in their complaint and the 
2 
Breanna was a member of the plaintiff class in a federal 
action entitled David C , et al. v. Leavitt, et al. , filed in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, case number 93-C-
206W. (Complaint at f 10). The parties to that action entered 
into a consent decree (Settlement Agreement) on May 17, 1994, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.2 Defendants 
Leavitt, Steadman, and Noonan signed the agreement in their 
official capacities. Defendants Clawson and Luinstra signed the 
agreement as the attorneys for the defendants in that action. 
The Settlement Agreement provided for the appointment of three 
persons to serve as a Monitoring Panel to determine compliance 
with the consent decree (Exhibit B at p. 47-48) . 
document is central to plaintiff's claim. Sheppard v. Texas 
Dept. of Transportation, 158 F.R.D. 592, 595 (E.D. Tex. 
1994)(relying on Venture Associates v. Zenith Date Systems, 987 
F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1993); Branch v. Tunnel, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 
1994), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 2704 (1994); Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, 998 F.2d 1192 
(3rd Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 687 (1994); Fudge v. 
Penthouse Int'l, 840 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 
U.S. 821 (1988); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938 (2nd Cir. 1988), 
cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989). 
"And where an exhibit contradicts an assertion made in the 
complaint and eliminates any possible claim for relief, dismissal 
is appropriate." Sheppard at 595. 
2
 The attaching of this Settlement Agreement does not 
convert this Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
See footnote 1. 
3 
The Monitoring Panel appointees (defendants Atkinson, Cotterell 
and Lunt)3 were not parties to the David C. lawsuit and did not 
sign the Settlement Agreement. (Exhibit B at p. 52). 
Plaintiff's complaint in this action alleges causes of 
action against the State defendants (Leavitt, Steadman, Noonan, 
Giraham, Clawson, Luinstra, Utah State Department of Human 
Services, and Division of Family Services) for wrongful death, 
breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff also asserts a claim against 
the Monitoring Panel defendants for negligence. 
Plaintiff's first cause of action foisJvrongful death against 
the State defendants is barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act since the injuries arise out of assault and battery. In 
addition, plaintiff's first cause of action should be dismissed 
against all State defendants other than DFS for failure to file a 
notice of claim. To the extent that plaintiff's complaint 
purports to state claims against the individual state defendants 
in their personal capacity, such claims must be dismissed on the 
grounds that they are barred by governmental immunity. 
3
 Although the "monitoring panel" is also named as a 
defendant, it is not a legal entity and has no statutory or 
common law basis to be sued as an entity. It is simply a term of 
convenience used in the consent decree to collectively refer to 
the three individuals appointed thereunder to monitor compliance. 
4 
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Even if this 
Court had jurisdiction, no viable cause of action has been stated 
for those claims and plaintiff's second and third causes of 
action should therefore be dismissed. 
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action against the Monitoring 
Panel defendants should be dismissed because it is barred by 
quasi-judicial immunity. It is also barred for failure to file a 
notice of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
because the Monitoring Panel defendants did not owe a duty of 
care to Breanna. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim presents a 
question of law. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). In reviewing a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all factual allegations of the 
plaintiff as true. Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 
1991). 
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under Rule 12(b)(1) also presents a question of law and the 
determining question is "whether any cause of action cognizable 
5 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
DAVID C. et. al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL LEAVITT, in his official 




Case No. 93-C-206W 
On this 17th day of May, 1994, the undersigned State 
Defendants and their attorneys, and the Plaintiff class and its 
attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree to the following terms and 
conditions for purposes of settlement of this matter. 
I. CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
A. Priorities for immediate statewide implementation 
1. Investigations 
Except as modified in the sections which follow, all reports of 
child abuse or neglect shall be investigated in compliance with 
current law and policy, and the following: 
• With all investigations of child abuse or neglect, the 
child shall be seen or interviewed in accordance with the 
priorities already established in policy (priority one--
within one hour in urban areas and within three hours in 
rural areas, priority two--within twenty-four hours, and 
priority three--within three working days). If, due to 
unforeseen or extraordinary circumstances, the 
investigation time mandates are not met in an individual 
case, the caseworker shall document the reasons for the 
deviation from policy and report that deviation to the 
Regional Director in writing. 
Within 3 0 days of the report of abuse or neglect, or sooner if 
necessary to ensure the child's safety and welfare, the 
investigator shall: 
• determine whether the child can safely remain at home 
and, if not, arrange for the removal of the child from 
the home. 
• if the child can remain safely at home with appropriate 
family services, initiate available services. 
• determine whether the report of abuse/neglect is 
substantiated or unsubstantiated, and if the report is 
founded and removal from home or protective supervision 
is necessary to protect the child, contact the attorney 
general to initiate proceedings in the juvenile court. 
If, due to unforeseen or extraordinary 'circumstances, the time 
frames mandated for completing an investigation are not met in an 
individual case, the caseworker shall document the reasons for the 
deviation from policy and report that deviation to the Regional 
director in writing. The Regional Director may grant an extension 
of time for 30 days upon a showing of good cause. 
2. Screening of abuse/neolect reports 
In all cases where a decision is made not to accept and investigate 
a report of abuse or neglect (under Policy #202(4)): 
• The person making the report, unless the report is made 
anonymously, shall be informed of this decision and the 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
Wherever this Agreement refers to H.B. 265, the specifically 
cited sections of the Bill are incorporated by reference. However, 
failure to abide by time periods set forth in H.B. 265 is not a 
violation of the mandates of this Agreement unless adherence to 
applicable H.B. 265 time periods is specifically incorporated into 
the body of this Agreement. 
Definitions 
• Custody All references in this Agreement to "custody" of 
the Division of Family Services mean the date of the 
child'ss removal from home, unless otherwise specified 
within the body of this Agreement. 
• Use of statutory definitions Except where specifically 
noted, the definition of terms in this Agreement is the 
same as in state statutes pertaining to child welfare in 
effect during the time period of this Agreement. 
• Calculation of time periods Whenever a provision of this 
Agreement sets a time period, the time period shall be 
calculated in calendar days unless otherwise specified 
within the body of the Agreement. Similarly, references 
to "the end of the year" refer to calendar years. 
• Current law and policy References in the Agreement to 
"current law and policy" include statutes, regulations 
adopted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, and policy as set forth in the Child Welfare Manual 
and in other policies adopted by the Board of the 
Division of Family Services, which are in effect during 
the time period of this Agreement. 
reasons for it, and referred, where appropriate, to other 
agencies or community resources. 
• The nature of the report and the basis for the decision 
not to aRFept it shall be documented. 
• No less frequently than once a month, supervisors of 
screening staff shall review a sample of referrals for 
each screener which were rejected for investigation ar. 
the documentation supporting the decision to ensure thai 
all reports meeting the statutory definitions of abuse 
and/or neglect are being referred for investigation, and 
needs for additional training, support, corrective 
action, or discipline necessary to ensure that staff are 
making proper screening decisions are identified and 
fulfilled. 
3. Content of investigations 
All investigations shall include, among other actions necessary to 
meet reasonable professional standards, all of the actions set 
forth in H.B. 265, § 78-3a-304. 
4. Interviews of alleged victims 
It is essential to minimize the trauma to the child who is being 
interviewed about suspected abuse or neglect and to thereby 
increase the likelihood of ascertaining the facts. Accordingly, 
whenever a child is interviewed, the child shall be allowed to have 
a support person of the child's choice present (other than the 
alleged perpetrator). S££ H.B. 265, § 78-3a-304(5). The 
investigator shall inform the child of this right prior to the 
interview. Specifically, whenever a child is interviewed at 
school, the child shall be allowed to have present at the interview 
a member of the school staff with whom the child has a significant 
relationship. The school staff member remaining in the interview 
shall be required to sign a confidentiality agreement and agree to 
keep all information disclosed in the interview confidential. 
Each child protective and law enforcement agency shall notify all 
employees who participate in the investigation of child abuse 
reports of these requirements- The Division of Family Services 
staff involved in the interview shall not reveal the identity of 
the child's support person to the alleged perpetrator of the abuse. 
In "priority one cases" referred to in § I.A.I involving severe 
maltreatment, severe physical injury or recent sexual abuse causing 
trauma to the child, a medical examination of the child shall be 
obtained no later than 24 hours after the report. All 
investigations of medical neglect shall include an assessment by a 
health care provider within 30 days of the referral, or sooner if 
indicated by the nature of the neglect. In such situations, the 
opinion of the examining physician, physician's assistant or nurse 
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practitioner as to whether or not the injury is non-accidental 
trauma, sexual abuse, or medical neglect shall be specifically 
requested by the investigator. If the examining health care 
provider concludes that there is evidence of non-accidental trauma, 
sexual abustfT*- or medical neglect, the report shall be 
substantiated. Nothing in this section shall prevent DFS, the 
parents, or the child from obtaining a second opinion about the 
nature of the injury. See: H.B. 265. § 78-3a-304(2)(a) . 
6. "Unable to locate" cases 
No investigation of a report of abuse or neglect shall be closed on 
the grounds that the investigator is unable to locate the child 
until all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the child and 
family members, including, but not limited to: 
• visiting the home at times other than normal" work hours; 
• contacting local schools; 
• contacting local, county, and state law enforcement 
agencies; 
• checking public assistance records. 
X. Determination whether report is substantiated or 
unsubstantiated 
The decision whether a report is substantiated or unsubstantiated 
shall be made in light of all evidence obtained through the steps 
described above. A decision whether the report is substantiated or 
unsubstantiated may be based on the child's statements alone; 
corroborating evidence shall not be required in all cases. Also, 
if the evidence shows that abuse or neglect occurred, the 
investigator's inability to identify the perpetrator shall not be 
a basis for deciding that the report is unsubstantiated. 
The decision shall be made on the basis of the facts at the time 
the report was made; a report shall not be considered 
unsubstantiated because the family corrected the conditions that 
caused the abuse or neglect while the investigation was pending. 
6. Documentation of reports and investigations 
Records shall be kept of every report of abuse/neglect received by 
DFS in accordance with the provisions of H.B. 265, § €2A-4a-116. 
Within one week of the completion of an abuse/neglect 
investigation, the person making the report shall be notified of 
the completion of the investigation (unless the report is 
anonymous). The person making the report shall be notified of the 
outcome of the investigation only if the person is a part of the 
child's interdisciplinary team or is otherwise an individual 
authorized to receive such information in accordance with the Child 
Abuse Reporting Act. 
9. Revised Protocols for Investigations 
By the end of 1994, DFS shall revise and adopt protocols for child 
4 
abuse and neglect investigations which meet accepted professional 
standards and are reasonably in accordance with the recommendations 
of the American Association for the Protection df Children and the 
Child Welfare-ieague of America. 
10. Supervision of protective services cases 
No less often than every three months, supervisors shall receive 
comparative data concerning each protective services caseworker's 
compliance with priorities and timeliness, number of cases closed 
as unable to locate, numbers of cases determined to be 
substantiated and unsubstantiated, cases previously closed that 
have been reopened, and number of cases opened for services. 
Supervisors shall also review a random sample of each caseworker's 
investigations and accompany the worker during investigations in 
order to assess, among other skills, the worker's ability to 
interview victims. 
This information shall be used to identify problem areas and needs 
for corrective action. Corrective action may include additional 
training, assigning a mentor, and/or having a supervisor accompany 
tne worker during investigations. Workers who fail to improve 
their performance in accordance with the corrective action plan 
shall be subject to disciplinary action, including probation and/or 
dismissal. 
11. Investigation of reports of abuse/neolect in out of home care 
Investigations of reports of abuse or neglect of children in foste^ 
care and other out-of-home placements shall be conducted by law 
enforcement personnel. All allegations of abuse or neglect of 
children in out-of-home placements shall be reported by agency 
staff to the director of the Division of Family Services who shall 
request from law enforcement a copy of its final police report 
within 3 0 days. The director shall submit the police report to the 
Children's Justice Division of the Attorney General's office which 
shall review the report for purposes of assuring that the 
investigative standards of this Agreement have been met. If the 
Attorney General's office determines that the investigative 
standards have not been met, the Attorney General shall act to 
ensure that a proper investigation is conducted and prosecution 
initiated, if appropriate. If the director does not receive a 
police report within the 3 0 day time period, she shall so inform 
the Children's Justice Division of the Attorney General's office 
which shall coordinate with local law enforcement to ensure that 
the investigation is completed within a reasonable time period. 
Copies of all reports of abuse or neglect of children in out-of-
home placements, in which the child involved has been identified as 
developmentally disabled or mentally ill, shall be provided to the 
Legal Center for Persons with Disabilities. 
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12 Comprehensive Family Assessments 
Witr.m 3 0 days of substantiating a report of suspected abuse or 
neglect, DFS shall complete an assessment of risks to the child and 
the services needed to address those risks. This assessment shall 
be used in demising an individualized service plan to meet the 
unique needs of the family in accordance with the provisions of § 
II of this Agreement. The plan shall be completed no later than 15 
days after the assessment and shall be based upon the child's and 
family's needs and not just the services that are immediately 
available. DFS shall implement its responsibilities under the 
individualized service plan, and shall document the results of the 
services provided under the plan in terms of addressing the risks 
to the child. In areas where there are school-based interagency 
teams under the ACT/Youth at Risk program and where a child in the 
home is school-aged, such teams shall be invited to participate m 
the assessment and development of the service plan. 
13. Child Fatality Review 
A multidisciplmary and interagency child fatality review team 
shall be created which shall have responsibility for accurately 
identifying, investigating, and preventing child fatalities 
attributable to child abuse or neglect. The team shall be composed 
of at least five members, which may include representatives of 
social services, law enforcement, schools, physician/medical 
examiner, a prosecuting attorney, mental health professionals, 
concerned citizens and public health representatives. The director 
of the Guardian ad Litem or her designee shall be invited to attend 
reviews regarding deaths of children who were in DFS custody at the 
time of their death and the deaths of children for whom DFS has 
received an abuse or neglect referral prior to death. 
The Child Fatality Review Team shall review all deaths of children 
in DFS custody and deaths of children attributed by the medical 
examiner to 'homicide' or 'undetermined causes,' whether or not 
identified as caused by abuse or neglect. As part of its review, 
the Team shall do the following: 
• determine what actions were taken by the Division of 
Family Services and other public agencies before and 
after the death of the child; 
• determine the actual cause of death; 
• recommend actions which should have been taken in the 
case and; 
• identify appropriate actions taken by involved staff; 
• identify changes necessary to prevent future deaths; 
• report its findings (including non-identifying data) to 
the public. 
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II. FAMILY SERVICES 
A. Priorities for immediate statewide implementation. 
1. Service fr^entorv & needs assessment 
DFS shall complete an inventory of all early intervention, 
preventative, and family preservation services that are available 
through public and private agencies and individuals, in accordance 
with the provisions of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-202 (2). The inventory 
shall be distributed to caseworkers in a form usable as a resource 
directory, by the end of 1994. 
2. Core services for families against whom an abuse or neglect 
referral has been substantiated but whose children are not at 
immediate risk of removal 
In situations in which a report of abuse or neglect is 
substantiated but in which the family does nor qualify for 
intensive family preservation services as required by H.B. 265 at 
§ 62A-4a-202 (3) and at § II. A. 3. of this Agreement (i.e., for 
families whose children are not at immediate risk of being removed 
from the home and for families which are not in crisis) , the 
following core services shall be provided by DFS as long as the 
family is willing to accept them: 
• Home visits by a caseworker at least once per month. 
• Collateral contacts to monitor the child's and family's 
progress (e.g. by talking to teachers, day care providers, 
therapists, and other professionals working with the child or 
family) at least monthly. 
• Case management (helping the family maintain eligibility for 
needed benefits and services such as AFDC, food stamps, 
Medicaid, etc., and accessing community resources to meet new 
needs as they arise). 
DFS shall implement its responsibilities under this section and 
shall document its attempts at implementation as well as the 
results of the services provided under the plan in terms of 
addressing the risks to the child who has remained at home. 
If the family refuses to accept services voluntarily, fails to 
follow up on referrals made by the caseworker, or fails to benefit 
from the services provided and the worker has reason to believe 
that a child may be at risk, the caseworker shall discuss the case 
with Attorney General staff for purposes of making a decision about 
seeking court-ordered protective supervision or filing a petition 
to seek removal of the child. 
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3. Core services — intensive family preservation/reunif igar-i nr. 
program. 
Family preservation services shall be provided for families whose 
children are at immediate risk of being removed from the home and 
for families"-I* crisis in accordance with the provisions of H.B. 
265, § 62A-4a-202. As a part of these preventive services, the 
division shall provide family preservation services statewide that 
are short-term, intensive, crisis intervention programs which 
address the areas set forth in H.B. 265 at § 62A-4a-202 (3) . In 
fulfilling the requirements of § 62A-4a-202(3), DFS shall address: 
• Eligibility determinations & case management. 
Caseworkers shall assist parents in obtaining needed 
benefits and services. 
• Counseling & parenting-skills training. Caseworkers 
shall provide (or arrange for other professionals to 
provide) individual and family counseling, and training 
in parenting skills and child development, as needed in 
light of the problems that led to DFS intervention and 
the individual situation of the family. 
• Drug/alcohol assessment & treatment. Caseworkers shall 
arrange for such assessment and treatment (through 
coordination with the Department of Health or private 
service providers) for families where alcohol or drug use 
is a substantial factor in the problems leading to DFS 
intervention. 
• Parent-aide & homemaker services. Caseworkers shall 
provide or arrange for in-home help with homemaking tasks 
(such as budgeting, shopping, preparing meals, cleaning, 
infant care, etc.) for families whose inability to manage 
such tasks is a substantial factor in the problems 
leading to DFS intervention. 
DFS shall maintain the capacity to serve at least the same number 
of families served by its intensive family preservation-
reunification programs which existed in fiscal year 1993. 
If the family refuses to accept services voluntarily, fai"s to 
follow up on referrals made by the caseworker, or fails to benefit 
from the services provided and the worker has reason to believe 
that a child may be at risk, the caseworker shall discuss the case 
with Attorney General staff for purposes of making a decision about 
seeking court-ordered supervision or filing a petition to seek 
removal of the child. 
L* intensive fynjiy prgservatipn/r?vnific?tipn services fox 
families of adolescents. 
By the July 30, 1995, DHS shall complete a plan addressing the 
problems of adolescents with emotional or behavioral problems who 
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have been identified to DFS as children at risk of placement in DFS 
custody, with recommendations for serving this population. By the 
end of 1995, DHS shall have completed a long-range plan for 
statewide . implementation of intensive family 
preservation/reunification services for this population of 
children. Implementation shall be completed by December 31, 1998. 
5. Core reunification services for families of children in DFS 
custody as of the date of disposition 
The system of delivery of core services for families whose children 
are in DFS custody after disposition by the Juvenile Court and 
whose permanency goal is reunification shall include the provision 
of necessary services for the family which could speed 
reunification, including at least the following characteristics: 
• Eligibility determinations & case management. 
Caseworkers shall assist parents in obtaining needed 
benefits and services, including state and federal 
assistance programs such as Medicaid, housing assistance, 
special education, disability and employment benefits, 
general assistance benefits, food stamps, AFDC, AFDC-
Emergency Assistance, cash assistance, and child support 
enforcement assistance. 
• Counseling & parenting-skills training. Caseworkers 
shall provide (or arrange for other professionals to 
provide) individual and family counseling, and training 
in parenting skills and child development, as needed in 
light of the problems that led to DFS intervention i-.nd 
the individual situation of the family. 
• Drug/alcohol assessment & treatment. Caseworkers shall 
arrange for such assessment and treatment (through 
coordination with the Department of Health or private 
service providers), for families where alcohol or drug 
use is a substantial factor in the problems leading to 
DFS intervention. 
• Parent-aide & homemaker services. Caseworkers shall 
provide or arrar.ge for in-home help with homemaking tasks 
(such as budgeting, shopping, preparing meals, cleaning, 
infant care, etc.), for families whose inability to 
manage such tasks is a substantial factor in the problems 
leading to DFS intervention. 
• Children in DFS custody shall be provided with visits 
with their parents no less than once per week. If the 
caseworker believes that such visitation would be 
contrary to the welfare of the child, the caseworker 
shall staff the case with the Attorney General to pursue 
whether to seek a juvenile court order mandating less 
frequent visits. While awaiting a court order on the 
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issue of visitation, less-frequent visitation may be 
provided if, m the exercise of professional judgement 
and as documented in the case file, weekly visits are 
determines to be contrary to the health1and welfare of 
the child. Part of the child's treatment plan shall 
include the long term visitation schedule for the child 
and parents. Unless otherwise ordered by a court or 
impossible due to circumstances outside the control of 
the agency, an initial visit shall be offered within 
three working days of initial placement. For siblings, 
who have lived together prior to entry into foster care 
and who have a personal relationship, DFS shall arrange 
for visitation at least twice a month, unless the 
placements are in excess of two hours travel time apart 
in which case monthly visits shall be arranged. 
Mandatory sibling visitations need not be arranged if it 
is notN in the best interests of the child(ren) (as 
documented in the case record.) Visitation plans shall 
take into account the child's age, the child's own wishes 
and reactions regarding visitation, and the child's 
permanency plan. 
6. Aftercare services 
By the end of 1994, the following basic services shall be available 
to all families during the period of time in which DFS has a 
continuing court order for protective supervision of a child after 
a child has been returned home from foster care: 
• Home visits by a caseworker at least once per month. 
• Collateral contacts to monitor the child's and family's 
progress (e.g. by talking to teachers, day care providers, 
therapists, and other professionals working with the child or 
family) at least monthly. 
• Case management (helping the family maintain eligibility for 
needed benefits and services such as AFDC, food stamps, 
Medicaid, etc., and accessing community resources to meet new 
needs as they arise). 
DFS shall continue to prepare quarterly reports analyzing reason-
for-placement data from all cases in which children removed from 
home had prior custody episodes and to analyze case files from a 
random sample of these cases. This report shall identify practices 
and services (such as caseworker monitoring, supportive services, 
etc.) needed to ensure children's safety upon return home and to 
prevent reentry into foster care, and shall be used in long-range 
service planning. 
10 
B. Steps toward long-range service development 
Statewide service development plan 
DFS shall complete its statewide service development plan within 
the time frames" set forth in the federal family preservation act. 
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III. SHELTER CARE 
A. Priorities for immediate statewide implementation. 
1. Duration 56*5helter Care 
Upon initial removal from the parent or guardian's home, and if 
placement with a natural parent or relative (H.B. 265, § 78-3a-307) 
or in a former foster home is not acceptable or available, a child 
may be placed in shelter care for no longer than 14 days. If it is 
necessary to extend a child's shelter care placement beyond 14 
days, the case shall be screened by the out-of-home placement 
committee, unless the shelter placement is mandated by juvenile 
court order. The out-of-home committee may approve an extension of 
a shelter care placement for an additional 14 days. If the out-of -
home committee denies the request for a shelter care extension, the 
committee shall provide assistance in placing the child. 
2. Caseworker Visits 
By March 1, 1995, caseworker visits to children in shelter homes 
shall meet the following schedule: 
The caseworker shall visit the shelter care facility within the 
first two days of the child's placement and once a week thereafter. 
The purpose of these visits shall be to determine the child's 
adjustment to the placement and the child's and/or shelter care 
provider's need for services. These visits shall be documented in 
the child's case record. 
1^  Providing infprttifttiQn t? shelter cere Prpvjflers 
At the time the child is placed in shelter care, the caseworker 
shall provide the shelter parents whatever medical, educational, 
and developmental information about the child is known to DFS. 
Within 24 hours of the child's placement in shelter care, the 
caseworker shall make reasonable efforts to gather information 
essential to the child's safety and well-being (e.g., information 
about current illness or other medical problems, prescription 
medications, risks of suicide or aggressive behavior, etc.) 
Reasonable efforts include an attempt to identify and obtain 
information from the child's parents, physician, school teacher or 
care provider. Any additional information obtained as a result of 
these efforts shall be promptly provided to the shelter care 
provider. 
L* gJMcetiPTial Service? 
Educational services shall be provided to children in shelter care 
in accordance with this Agreement at § VII. 
5. Multiple Placements 
DFS shall identify the factors which contribute to multiple shelter 
care placements, including casework practices, and characteristics 
of children and shelter care providers. By the end of 1995, DFS 
shall develop and implement a plan with the goal of reducing the 
incidence of multiple shelter placements. 
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IV. QUALITY & SAFETY OF OUT-OF-HOME CARE 
A. Priorities for immediate statewide implementation. 
1. Placement inventory & needs assessment. 
DFS shall complete an inventory of all currently available out-of-
home placement resources, including foster homes, specialized 
foster homes, group homes, residential treatment centers, 
foster/adoptive homes, adoptive homes, etc. 
• The inventory shall include out-of-home care resources 
purchased directly by the DFS, those provided by private 
agencies from which it purchases services, and services 
available through the Divisions of Mental Health or 
Services to Persons with Disabilities. All types of 
substitute care resources shall be surveyed, -including 
foster "homes, therapeutic foster homes, group homes, 
residential treatment facilities, and independent living 
resources. For each out-of-home care resource the 
inventory shall provide the name of the foster parents or 
name of the director; address; type of resource; 
eligibility requirements; total number of beds available; 
specialized services available; the age, race and sex of 
a children and adults residing in the home or facility; 
the characteristics or needs of the children which the 
home is licensed to accept. 
• By December 31, 1994, and thereafter on an annual 
basis, using the information obtained in the out-of-home 
care resources inventory database and additional data 
available from regional offices regarding the number and 
characteristics of the children in state custody and 
their special needs, DFS shall determine the number and 
types of additional out-of-home care resources necessary 
to provide appropriate placements, including therapeutic 
foster homes and group homes. 
2. Statewide Placement Resource Recruitment and Development 
By the end of 1994, DFS shall have completed a survey of regional 
administrators and caseworkers to determine what kinds of out-of-
home placements are needed by children in their area, but are 
unavailable or available only through waiting lists. DFS shall 
use the information gathered through its placement inventory and 
needs assessment to develop a region-by-region plan by June 30, 
1995 for foster parent recruitment and other placement development 
activities. The plan shall include staff time and resources 
designated specifically for recruitment activities. Recruitment 
criteria and activities shall reflect the types of placements 
needed in each region -- 'regular1 foster homes, homes for sibling 
groups, infants, adolescents, children with special needs, foster-
adoptive homes, culturally appropriate homes for minority children, 
etc. The plan shall be implemented on an ongoing basis and updated 
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annually to reflect changing needs for placement resources. 
3. Placement information system. 
By the end of 1995, DFS shall have developed an efficient system 
for caseworkefy-to survey available placement resources (including 
information about the special skills or resources and the 
limitations of each placement), to determine which available 
placement will best serve the needs of each child. The information 
in the system shall be updated quarterly. 
DFS shall train all caseworkers to use this information system, in 
conjunction with information from foster care licensor staff, to. 
select the best placement for each child, in light of the placement 
criteria discussed in § A.6., below). 
4. Placement selection: kinship care 
If a child is in the protective custody of the Division, the 
Division shall report to the court at the shelter hearing whether 
it has knowledge of any relatives who may be able and willing to 
take temporary custody of the child. If temporary custody is 
awarded to the Division at the shelter hearing, then the caseworker 
shall make reasonable efforts prior to the dispositional hearing to 
identify and locate the child's relatives (non-custodial parent, 
grandparents, aunts and uncles, adult siblings, etc.) Reasonable 
efforts include asking the child, the parents, school teachers, and 
care providers about the child's relatives and how to contact them. 
The information gathered by the caseworker shall be provided to the 
juvenile court at the dispositional hearing. 
The decision with respect to whether placement with the other 
natural parent is appropriate shall be left to the juvenile court 
judge in accordance* with H.B. 265, § 78-3a-307 (1) , (2). If the 
court orders DFS to conduct an investigation regarding the safety 
and appropriateness of the placement, the division shall report its 
findings in writing to the court. If a child is removed from the 
physical custody of his parent and is not placed in the physical 
custody of his other parent, the juvenile court shall determine if 
there is a relative who is able and willing to care for the child 
in accordance with H.B. 265, § 78-3a-307(4). DFS shall investigate 
the relative's home and report in writing as ordered by the court 
in accordance with H.B. 265. 
Relatives interested in providing care to children in state custody 
shall be informed of the option to seek guardianship of the child 
pursuant to H.B. 265, §78-3a-307 (4) , as well as the option to 
become licensed as a foster home to care for the child and to 
receive foster care payments if the court orders DFS to remain the 
temporary guardian of the child. 
5. "Specific" foster homes. 
By July 1, 1994, DFS shall promulgate and begin implementing a 
licensing and training policy for all "specific" foster homes, 
14 
including licensed kinship placements. The DFS Executive Team will 
charter a team to oversee development of policy changes, training, 
staffing requirements, and implementation plans for foster parent 
training. 
Children in state custody who are placed in "specific" foster homes 
and kinship homefe shall receive all of the same protections and 
services (e.g. health care, caseworker visits, placement support 
services, etc.) as other foster children. 
6. Placement selectior criteria. 
Placement decisions shall be made in light of complete and accurate 
information about the child's needs and currently available 
placement resources. 
All placement decisions shall be made in accordance with the 
following criteria listed in order of priority: 
• special needs or circumstances of the child; the skills, 
training, and resources required to meet those needs; 
including, in the case of sexually reactive children and 
children with severe mental health problems, conditions 
necessary to ensure the safety of the child and other children 
in the home; the foster parents' willingness to work with a 
child with those needs, (and, where applicable, proximity to 
community resources required to meet the child's needs); 
• least restrictive placement consistent with the child's 
needs; 
• potential for adoption if return home is unlikely (to be 
considered for all children); 
• placement of siblings together; 
• proximity to the child's home and school; 
• sensitivity to the cultural heritage and needs of 
minority children (same-race placement is not required, 
if the foster parents possess the skills and^resources to 
ensure such sensitivity). 
These criteria shall be used by placement screening committees in 
making an initial choice of placement, and in all other contexts in 
which in which a child's placement is selected or reviewed, 
7. Placement selection upon reentry into foster care 
Upon a child's reentry into foster care, the child's former foster 
care provider(s) shall be notified of the child's reentry and the 
caseworker shall determine their willingness to accept the child 
for re-placement in their home. 
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If the former foster parent is or becomes licensed and is willing 
and able to accept the child, the former foster parent shall be 
given a preference for placement of the child and the caseworker 
shall immediately place the child in the former foster home, as 
long as this" placement is consistent with the placement selection 
criteria listed in § A.6, above. 
Caseworkers and placement screening committees may consider a 
waiver of restrictions on the number of children in a foster home. 
Only the Regional Director may approve waiver requests. 
6. Licensing Evaluations. 
Immediate steps snail be taken to ensure the quality and safety of 
all out of home placements, including licensing evaluations. 
a. Licensing evaluations. No child in DFS custody shall be 
placed m an out-of-home placement without a current and valid 
license (including compliance with training requirements). 
By the end cf 1994, all out-of-home placements shall have had 
an annual reevaluation by a licensor. 
All shelter homes and foster homes in which there has 
been a ma]or change in the lives of the foster parents, 
shall be reevaluated within one month of the change. A 
ma^or change in the lives of the foster parents shall 
include, but is not limited to : (1) death or serious 
illness among the members of the foster family, (2) 
separation or divorce; (3) loss of employment; (4) change 
of residence; (5) suspected abuse or neglect of any child 
in the foster home. 
Licensors shall receive proper training, to be updated 
annually, on the standards out-of-home placements homes and 
how to evaluate compliance with these standards. 
9. Special needs payments 
Adequate funds shall be made available to address foster children's 
educational, cultural, and recreational expenses, and DFS shall 
ensure that the use of these funds is consistent statewide and that 
the process of accessing them is not unduly burdensome for 
caseworkers and foster parents. 
10. Providing information to out-of-home care providers. 
DFS shall address the crucial need of foster parents, shelter 
parents, and other out-of-home care providers for complete 
information about children for whom they provide care. Foster 
parents shall be included as part of a child's treatment plan team, 
in accordance with H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-205 (3) and providing them 
with copies of the child's treatment plan in accordance with H.B. 
265, § 62A-4a-205(6). All out-of-home care providers shall be 
provided with the child's foster care out-of-home placement record 
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•'traveling file" and all medical information which is discussed 
below. All out-of-home care providers shall be provided with a 
copy of the child's treatment plan and any revisions to the 
treatment plan in accordance with H.B. 265. 
Caseworkers shall be responsible for gathering and providing 
background information to out-of-home care providers as soon as 
possible, but no more than 30 days from the date of placement. 
This information shall include, at least: 
• Health history, current health status, and names of health 
care providers; 
• School records and names of teachers and counselors familiar 
with the child (including preschool); 
• Records and ccntact persons from any other public and 
private health, mental health, social service, etc. agencies 
that have worked with the child; 
• Information from the natural parents about the child's needs 
and habits; 
• Child's current treatment plan, within 3 working days 
of its completion. 
Caseworkers shall also give out-of-home providers, before a 
placement is made, basic available information essential to the 
child's safety and welfare and the safety of other children in the 
home (e.g., information about current illness or other medical 
problems, prescription medications, suicide risk, risk of 
aggressive behavior, etc.), which the caseworker shall obtain from 
the child's prior health care providers, parents, school, etc. 
Foster parent training shall discuss the right to receive such 
information, and the responsibility to seek clarification or 
additional information if the information received is unclear or 
incomplete. 
IX* Decisions affecting the foster parent or children 
Foster parent due process procedures shall be established on or 
before July 1, 1994 as required by the provisions of H.B. 265, §§ 
62A-4a-206 and 78-3a-115. 
12. Foster and shelter parent grievances 
DFS shall publish the phone number of the Office of Liability 
Management's constituent advocate as a resource for parents to 
contact in cases where their foster or shelter children's needs are 
not being met through the normal process of working with the 
caseworker and supervisor, and in cases where foster or shelter 
parents wish to report misconduct by DFS staff. 
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Foster and shelter parents may express their concerns to the 
grievance council established by H.B. 265, § 6?A-4a-102(3). 
13. Caseworfcatr visits. 
By March 1, 1995, DFS shall have implemented the following 
caseworker visitation schedule statewide: 
Children in DFS custody shall be visited by their caseworker at 
least once per week in their out-of-home placement during the first 
four weeks of placement. After the initial month in care, the 
caseworker shall visit the child at least twice per month, at least 
one of those visits being m the child's out of home placement. 
Each visit shall include a private conversation with the child 
outside the presence of the foster parents or group home staff 
except in those cases where the child is an infant or otherwise 
non-communicative. The caseworker shall also regularly interview 
the foster parents or providers of care. The purposes of these 
visits shall be to assess the quality of the care being provided, 
to determine the extent to which the child's needs are being met, 
and to investigate the child's adjustment to the placement and to 
school. The caseworker shall indicate the date of the visit and 
summarize the results of each visit in the child's case record. If 
the child or out-of-home providers inform the caseworker of unmet 
needs of the child during a visit, the caseworker shall make every 
reasonable effort to meet these needs, and shall document these 
efforts in the case record. 
14 "Red flag" reviews--statewide. 
Each child's administrative review shall include a review of his or 
her placement history. If a child has experienced more than two 
changes of placement in one year, a "red flag" notice containing 
the number of placement changes experienced and a copy of the 
child's placement history shall be sent to the local Regional 
Director by the caseworker and/or the administrative review team so 
that special attention will be paid to the case by appropriate 
supervisory staff not directly involved in providing services in 
the case. This notice shall be prepared and sent within two weeks 
of the third change in placement and shall serve to focus attention 
on the case in order to address the issues related to placement 
changes, including detailed action set forth in the treatment plan 
to address the problems that may be causing or contributing to the 
multiple placements. The review shall be completed within 30 days 
of receipt by the Regional Director of the notice. This review 
shall include interviews with the child, the caseworker and 
supervisor, and the foster parents. Based upon this review, the 
Regional Director shall take appropriate action (a) to determine if 
the child is appropriately placed and (b) to prevent further 
placement disruptions by additional interventions which may include 
additional training for foster parents or requests for additional 
support services for the foster parents. Changes in placement do 
not include the initial placement, hospitalization, respite care, 
institutionalization, or return to out-of-home placement after a 
scheduled visit home. 
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15. Placement support and preventing placement disruption. 
DFS snail address the need for supportive services to help foster 
parents meet the needs of foster children and prevent placement 
disruption. _ In order to seek to prevent the disruption of a 
child's placement in a foster home and to assist the foster parent 
in providing proper care to a child, DFS shall establish, either 
directly or through contract, placement support services to seek to 
assure stable placements for children in DFS custody. The division 
shall offer to specialized and structured foster parents a total of 
12 days of respite care annually. The division shall offer to 
basic foster parents a total of 6 days of respite care annuallv. 
Crisis response and emergency medical help for serious medical or 
mental health problems shall be available as needed. 
DFS shall require caseworkers to determine, whenever there is a 
risk of placement disruption, whether supportive services could 
avoid the ne^d for a change in placement, and if so, to arrange for 
these services. 
DFS shall not change a child's foster placement without a 
determination that the foster parents are requesting removal of the 
child or the current placement does not meet the child's needs and 
that a change in placement is in the child's best interest; this 
determination and the reasons for it shall be documented in the 
case file. 
B. Pilot Projects: 
1. Foster and adoptive home recruitment. 
In pilot pro]ect areas (one rural and one urban), DFS shall 
intensify its efforts to recruit foster and adoptive parents and 
shall explore new sources for recruitment. Based upon the 
information obtained from the resources inventory and the 
Division's needs assessment (see section IV.A.1. above), the 
Division shall implement recruitment plans for out-of-home care 
providers on a local Regional level with the goal being to ensure 
that all children are placed in the least restrictive, most family-
like setting that meets their individual needs and is in close 
proximity to the homes or communities where they resided prior to 
entering DFS custody, and which takes into account the importance 
of placing siblings together- Targeted recruitment of specialized 
and therapeutic foster parents shall be conducted to address the 
special needs of children in DFS custody- DFS will develop and 
implement in the selected area a program to intensify its efforts 
to recruit foster parents and foster parents who wish to become 
adoptive parents. Foster parents who wish to be considered as 
potential adoptive parents shall receive, as part of their foster 
parent training, information concerning both the role of foster 
parents in family reunification and the adoptive process. Foster 
parent and adoptive placement recruitment efforts shall include, 
w^here appropriate, public and private agencies and community 
groups. An innovative system will look to new sources for 
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recruiting families who can be trained to do this work and people 
with education and experience in working with special needs 
children who prefer to work at home. Recruiting themes shall 
present a realistic picture of the difficulties of caring for 
today's fostel^children and what the job entails, emphasizing the 
need to work in partnership with the children, their parents, and 
the Division. DFS shall also intensify its efforts to recruit 
foster and adoptive parents that reflect the racial and cultural 
composition of the foster care population. The purpose of these 
efforts is to ensure that there is a choice of placements for a 
child and that placement is not made on the basis of the first 
available resource. DFS shall also intensify its efforts to 
recruit foster and adoptive parents that reflect the racial and 
cultural composition of the foster care population. 
At the end of July, 1995, DFS shall complete a report on the 
results of these recruitment efforts, and the report shall be used 
in DFS's long-ranae recruitment and placement development plan (see 
§ IV.C.l, below). 
2 . Peer parent program 
In the pilot areas for each DFS region, DFS shall implement its 
"peer parent" program, using specially trained foster parents to 
assist and mentcr natural parents with the goal of family 
reunification. 
At the end of July 1995, DFS shall complete a report on the 
problems and successes experienced in the pilot areas, any 
modifications needed to ensure the program's effectiveness, and the 
steps necessary to implement the program statewide. The report 
shall be used in developing a long range plan for statewide 
implementation of peer parenting. 
C. Long-range planning 
1. Placement support services. 
By the end of 1995, DFS shall develop a plan for statewide 
implementation of placement support services (beyond the basic 
services described above) , to help foster parents care for children 
with special needs and to prevent placement disruption. In 
developing this plan, DFS will seek input from foster parents as to 
their needs for supportive services, and input from caseworkers and 
Regional administrators as to the common reasons for placement 
disruption. The plan will include steps for obtaining needed 
resources, staff, and coordination with other agencies to ensure 
statewide availability of these support services. 
DFS shall implement this plan so as to achieve a measurable 
reduction in the average number of placements experienced by foster 
children, and measurable improvements in recruitment and retention 
of foster parents, by the end of 1996. 
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2. Review of utilization of specialized foster care. 
By the end of July 1, 1995, DHS shall complete a review of current 
utilization of foster homes receiving "specialized" care rates. 
Using this review, DFS shall determine whether the qualifications 
enabling foster-parents to receive specialized rates actually match 
the special needs of the children placed in their homes. Based 
upon this information, the Division shall develop a long range plan 
for the utilization of specialized-care homes. The plan shall 
include written standards and training requirements for 
specialized-care homes, and criteria for placement of children in 
these homes. 
DFS shall implement this plan so that, by the end of 1996, all 
homes receiving specialized-care rates shall meet the plan'? 
standards and training requirements, and all placements cf childre 
in specialized-care homes shall comply with the plan's placemen! 
criteria. 
3. Review of utilization of unpaid placements. 
3y the end of 1994, DFS shall provide that all foster children are 
placed in licensed foster placements and, where the foster parents 
are not receiving payments, inform the providers of foster care of 
the availability of foster care payments. 
4. Independent living. 
By the end cf 1994, DFS shall complete a plan to ensure that ail 
foster children age 16 and over receive training and other services 
to develop independent living skills, as described in DFS Policy 
#307(4-6), and to set standards for the substantive content of that 
training. 
DFS shall implement this plan so that, by the end of 1996, every 
child in DFS custody aged 16 and over is given independent living 
services appropriate to that child's individual situation. In 
con:unction with this plan, starring January 1995, DFS shall 
conduct an exit interview with all children leaving DFS custody 
from an independent living program and request these children to 
complete a questionnaire about the skills gained by the child while 
in independent living. The questionnaire shall gather information 
about the child's'current living status, services that were helpful 
in achieving independence, unmet services needs., etc, DFS shall 
use this information to assess the success of, and any need for 
change in, the independent living program. 
5. Quantifiable outcome measures for substitute care 
In accordance with the provisions of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-117, the 
Director of DFS in cooperation with the Board, shall develop 
quantifiable outcome measures for foster care and other substitute 
care placement of children in its custody having mental health 
problems. 
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V. HEALTH CARE FOR FOSTER CHILDREN 
A. P r i o r i t i e s f o r immediate s t a t e w i d e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . 
1. Health Se rv ices Advisory Committee 
DFS shall form and begin utilizing the Health Services Advisory 
Committee, comprised of specialists from medicine, dentistry, child 
psychology and/or psychiatry and public health. The Advisory 
Committee shall help develop protocols to be followed in the 
initial health screening and comprehensive health assessment of 
children in DFS custody and to assist the health care coordinators 
to recruit health care providers, advise DFS on contracts with 
providers, and review and advise on health care components of DFS 
training plans. The Advisory Committee shall include at least one 
member who is a foster parent. 
By the end of 1994, all DFS policy changes, health screening and 
assessment protocols, provider recruitment plans, health-related 
components of caseworker and foster parent training curricula, and 
similar measures concerning health care for foster children shall 
be reviewed and approved by this committee. 
2. Health Care Coordinators DFS shall hire health care 
coordinators for each region and a state coordinator for the State 
Office. These people will have responsibility for assuring that 
each child in foster care receives regular health care, including 
mental health services in accordance with accepted medical practice 
as currently exemplified in the EPSDT(CHEC) standards- The health 
care coordinators will be responsible for organizing, supporting 
and monitoring the following activities: (1) development and 
monitoring of agency health policies and procedures; (2) completion 
of initial health care screening; (3) collection of health history 
information; (4) completion of comprehensive health assessments; 
(5) assist caseworker in preparation of a health plan for each 
child; (6) advising case workers on health issues; (7) assisting 
case workers in collection and maintenance of health information 
for each child; (8) tracking of appropriate health and mental 
health care for each child; (9) recruitment and development of 
service agreements or contracts with health providers; (10) 
establishment of liaison with health services providers; (11) 
assessment and evaluation of data about health care services; (12) 
reviewing periodically the appropriateness of health plans; (13) 
collaborating with the Health Department and the advisory committee 
to develop and implement a plan for recruiting additional health 
care providers. Regional Administrators and supervisors shall be 
responsible for monitoring and providing supervision for the 
performance of the above mentioned activities. 
3. Health care resource survey & needs assessment. 
By the end of 1994, DFS shall update and expand its 1993 survey of 
health care providers to include all medical and dental care 
providers, including pediatric and adolescent health care 
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specialists, who are willing to accept foster children as patients. 
This survey shall be distributed to all caseworkers and foster 
parents in a form organized by region and usable as a resource 
directory, and*fee updated annually. 
In conjunction with completing and updating the survey, DFS shall 
complete a comprehensive and detailed report on: which regions have 
unmet needs for which kinds of health care providers 
(pediatricians, adolescent health care specialists, family 
practitioners, specialists in various areas, dentists, 
orthodontists, etc.); and what factors affect providers' decisions 
whether to treat foster children. 
The results of the survey and needs assessment shall be used in 
DFS's long-range plan for health care resource development (see § 
V.C.2, below)\ 
4. Initial health screenings & treatment. 
All children in DFS custody shall receive initial health screenings 
as follows: 
• A child who enters the custody of DFS where the reason 
for removal is evidence of severe mistreatment, severe 
physical injury or recent sexual abuse involving trauma 
(a "priority one" case) or where there is evidence of 
acute illness or injury, shall receive an initial health 
screening within 24 hours of removal. All other children 
who enter DFS custody shall receive an initial health 
screening within 5 working days after removal from their 
homes. The initial health screening may be performed by 
a physician, nurse practitioner, registered nurse, 
qualified E.M.T.s sanctioned by health care professionals 
in rural areas, or a physician's assistant under the 
supervision of a physician. In cases of allegations of 
severe mistreatment or injury, a physician shall conduct 
the initial health screening. DFS will provide 
authorization letters for the payment of health care at 
the time of the initial screening, unless a mediraid card 
is available. DFS will complete a medicaid application 
within 30 days of removal of a child from her home. DFS 
has entered into an agreement with the Office of Family 
Support (OFS) under which medicaid applications of 
children in DFS custody shall be processed on an 
expedited bases. 
• The out-of-home care provider should, whenever 
possible, accompany the child to the initial screening. 
If the care provider cannot attend, the case worker or 
case aides shall accompany the child and inform the 
child's care provider of the results of the screening, 
and any instructions for the child's care and treatment 
that develop from the screening. The care provider shall 
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be informed of the name of the person performing the 
screening and the names of the child's prior health care 
providers, if known. 
• The content of initial screenings shall comply with 
CWLA Standard 2.3.1 
If a child's initial screening indicates a need for further 
evaluation or treatment within 3 0 days, such treatment shall be 
provided as follows, within the time frame recommended by the 
treating professional: 
• The case worker, in conjunction with the foster 
parent, is responsible for seeing that treatment is 
properly provided. The foster parent should accompany 
the child to the additional medical examinations and 
consult with the health care provider about the child's 
health care needs. If the foster parents do not 
accompany the child, the case worker or case aide shall 
accompany the child and convey the health care 
information to the foster parent. After each health care 
visit, the health passport (traveling record) shall be 
revised as necessary. The case worker is responsible for 
informing the child's parent about any medical treatment 
scheduled for the child, unless prohibited by Court 
Order. 
Children in DFS custody shall promptly receive initial screenings, 
comprehensive screenings, and all necessary treatment regardless of 
their Medicaid eligibility status. If a child is not Medicaid-
eligible at the time the health care is provided, EFS shall 
guarantee payment from its own funds. 
5. Gathering and maintaining health records, and providing health 
information to out-of-home placements. 
Accurate and complete health histories shall be gathered and 
maintained for all children in DFS custody, as follows: 
(a) An accurate and complete health care history for a 
child in DFS custody is necessary for DFS to adequately 
fulfill its duty of providing proper care. All 
reasonable efforts should be made by the caseworker to 
obtain and update the child's medical record. The case 
worker is responsible to gather the medical history for 
each child by using the forms contained in the travelling 
medical packet. Information obtained shall be available 
for the comprehensive health examination. 
1
 All references to CWLA Standards refer to the Child Welfare 
League of America, Standards for Health Care Services for Children 
in Out-of-Home Care (1988) . 
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(b) The case worker shall obtain all 
available 
information about the child's medical history and written 
releases for health records from the parents, if 
possible. The case worker shall also ask' the child (if 
age appifSpnate) about his or her health care history, 
and shall seek out other available sources of 
information, such as previous caretakers of the child and 
school records. If indicated, the case worker shall 
check with the State and County Health Departments to 
obtain health information. 
(c) The Department will track medical authorization 
letters and medicaid payments and ensure that letters are 
provided and payment documents are complete within 3 0 
days of removal, 
(d) All medical history information gathered shall be 
given by the caseworker and/or foster parent(s) to the 
physician who will do the comprehensive health 
examination, and also shall be used to supplement and 
complete the child's medical passport. 
(e) After each health care visit, the case worker and 
foster parent shall collect records of the child's health 
care and update the medical packet. 
(f) When a child moves to a permanent placement (e.g., 
return home, placement with a relative, adoption), the 
case worker shall provide the current medical record and 
all essential medical information to the child's 
permanent care taker. 
(g) If a child enters an independent living program, the 
case worker shall provide essential medical information 
to the child, including the medical packet. 
If adequate records are unavailable from other sources, caseworkers 
snail cnecK other available systems, including the Medicaid MIS 
system (as soon as access to that system r>y DFS becomes possible.) 
In addition to giving records to health care providers as described 
m (d) above, DFS caseworkers shall provide all available health 
records described in (a) through (c) above to the out-of home 
provider within 30 days of a child's placement. Caseworkers shall 
also give out-of-home care providers, before a placement is made, 
basic available health information essential to the child's safety 
and welfare. 
When a child is moved to a new out-of-home placement, health 
records and information shall be given to the new providers at or 
before the time the new placement is made. 
All out-of-home care providers, and all foster children over 14 
years old, shall be informed of the availability and scope of CHEC 
services and of the importance of preventive health care. 
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By the end of 1994, DFS shall complete a report on any existing 
barriers and inefficiencies in gathering and maintaining foster 
children's health records (e.g., duplicative paperwork 
requirementsi difficulty in accessing the Medicaid database, etc.). 
The report sha?l consider using clerical or administrative staff to 
gather health records, to free up caseworker time. This report 
shall be used in developing a computerized health information 
system (see § V.C.I, below). 
6, Comprehensive health assessments. 
Every child currently in DFS custody, and every child entering DFS 
custody, shall have initial health assessments as described above, 
and periodic health assessments, as follows: 
(a) A comprehensive health assessment of each child shall 
be completed within 3 0 days of removal from the home and 
every 12 months thereafter as long as the child is in DFS 
custody or more often if required by periodicity 
schedules recognized by the American Academy of 
Pediatrics. 
(b) The assessment shall be conducted by a qualified 
health practitioner as authorized by the Department of 
Health, and in consultation with a qualified mental 
health practitioner, if indicated and necessary. 
Preferably, the physician should be the one who will 
provide the ongoing care for the child. The case worker, 
natural parents, and foster parents shall be involved in 
the assessment, unless prohibited by Court Order. 
(c) The case worker shall develop a health plan for the 
child which shall be incorporated into the child's 
treatment plan. The health plan shall be maintained and 
updated as part of the child's treatment plan. Health 
plans will contain, where appropriate, a mental health 
plan. This part of the plan shall indicate what services 
are necessary and how the services will be provided and 
updated. 
(d) DFS shall review the case files of every child in out 
of home care, as part of the administrative review 
process and determine whether the child has received the 
equivalent of a comprehensive health examination, whether 
the child's treatment plan includes a health plan, and 
whether the child is currently receiving all essential 
treatment in a timely manner. Regional Administrators, 
i.e. Regional Director, Associate Directors and 
Supervisors shall monitor, supervise and evaluate workers 
to ensure that examinations are conducted and health 
plans prepared. The health care coordinators will be 
responsible for assisting case workers in obtaining 
comprehensive health examinations and devising written 
health plans. The health care coordinators will monitor 
this activity and make it available to the caseworker's 
supervisor. 
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(e) Periodic reassessment of child's needs Following 
the initial screening and comprehensive health 
assessment, DFS shall insure that periodic evaluations of 
each footer, child's health and mental health are 
conducted by qualified providers according to the 
schedule recommended by the health care professionals. 
DFS will review periodically (but not less than every 6 
months in conjunction with the administrative case 
review), the appropriateness of each health plan and 
shall modify it as necessary. 
The content of these assessments shall comply with CWLA Standards 
2.6 and 2.7. 
The medical portion of the assessments shall be conducted by a 
qualified health practitioner, and also by a mental health 
practitioner if necessary, as described above. The dental portion 
of the assessments shall be conducted by a dentist and/or 
orthodontist. 
7, Ongoing treatment. 
DFS has the responsibility to provide proper care to children in 
its custody in a timely manner. The case worker, the health care 
coordinator, and the foster parent shall ensure that a child's 
health care, treatment and follow-up care are provided according to 
the schedule recommended by the child's health care professionals. 
Every child in DFS custody shall receive all treatment identified 
as necessary during a comprehensive health assessment, within the 
time frame recommended by the treating professional. Foster 
parents will accompany children when they receive treatment. If an 
emergency prevents the foster parent from accompanying the child, 
the case worker or case aide shall accompany the child and convey 
the health care provider's diagnosis and instructions to the foster 
parents. After each visit, the child's medical information packet 
shall be appropriately amended for the caseworker in conjunction 
with the foster parents or other care provider. For those children 
for whom the permanent treatment plan is reunification, the case 
worker shall keep the child's parents informed about the child's 
health status, unless prohibited by Court Order• 
8- continuity <?t gfrrs 
DFS caseworkers shall be responsible for maintaining continuity in 
foster children's health care. DFS shall, whenever possible, 
ensure that the provider -no conducts the initial screening and 
comprehensive assessment will be the child's ongoing health care 
provider. When a child must be moved, whenever feasible the child 
shall continue to see the same health care providers. When a child 
must change health care providers, the caseworker shall be 
responsible for ensuring that periodic assessments and any ongoing 
treatment are not interrupted. 
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9 Natural parents as health care partners. 
In cases where the goal is reunification, DFS shall involve natural 
parents in their children's health care to the- extent appropriate 
(e.g. by requesting parents to accompany children to health care 
appointments***^ providing transportation if needed, by providing 
any needed training for parents to meet their children's home 
health care needs, etc.). 
B. Long-range planning for foster children's health care. 
1. Computerized information system. 
In coordination with the Department of Health and in accordance 
with the State of Utah's health care reform act, DFS shall complete 
a plan for a computerized system to store, update, and access 
foster children's health records, and provide ready access to 
health information to caseworkers, foster parents, natural parents, 
and health care providers. In collaboration with the Health 
Department, DFS shall develop and implement a system for 
maintaining, tracking and providing medical history on children in 
DFS custody. 
The system should be readily usable by caseworkers. The plan shall 
include concrete steps and timetables for implementation (including 
training in the use of the system) , and steps to ensure that DFS 
has adequate staff, resources, and equipment to carry it out. 
DFS shall implement this plan so that the health information system 
is fully operational statewide by the end of 1998. DFS shall, at 
least on an annual basis, complete a comprehensive report to the 
monitoring panel on its progress towards development of 
computerized management information systems and steps to be taken 
during the next year. This report shall be provided to the panel 
in accordance with XI.D. of this Agreement. 
2^ Health care resource development. 
By the end of July 1995, DHS, in coordination with DOH, will 
develop a plan to address barriers to health care for foster 
children. This plan shall use the results of the resource survey 
and needs assessment discussed above, and shall examine ways of 
solving problems that have discouraged providers from accepting 
foster children as patients in the past, and ways of enhancing 
DFS's use of existing public and private health care resources. 
This plan shall be implemented on an on-going basis. 
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VI. MENTAL HEALTH CARE FOR FOSTER CHILDREN 
A. Priorities for immediate statewide implementation. 
1. Survey of iffacement and treatment resources for foster children 
with mental health problems, and needs assessment. 
DFS shall conduct a statewide survey of existing resources for 
children with mental health problems, including: providers of 
initial mental health assessments and of the psycho-social 
component of CHEC screenings; providers of ongoing mental health 
treatment for children in DFS custody (e.g., CMHCs, private 
providers, public and private psychiatric hospitals, etc.); and 
placements for children with mental health problems (including 
specialized and therapeutic foster homes, group homes, residential 
treatment centers, etc.). 
DFS shall also collect data indicating the extent of unmet needs 
for such assessment, treatment, and placement resources. For each 
region, DFS shall determine whether there are waiting lists for 
assessment or treatment, and/or a lack of appropriate placements 
for children with certain kinds of problems. DFS shall consult 
with the health department, CMHCs, and private providers of mental 
health services regarding the reasons for shortages of assessment, 
treatment and placement providers. 
As part of this resource survey and needs assessment, DHS shall 
analyze its funding and expenditures for placement and treatment of 
foster children with mental health problems. DFS shall explore ail 
available sources of funding for mental health services, and shall 
determine how the proposed change to the state's Medicaid plan can 
be used to remove barriers to foster children's access to mental 
health care. 
Z?S shall also examine whether a disproportionate part of its funds 
are currently being used for highly restrictive, high cost 
placements (e.g., inpatient psychiatric facilities and residential 
treatment centers), and whether there is a corresponding lack of 
resources for home- and community-based treatment. If so, this 
information shall be used to plan for reallocation of resources 
away from highly restrictive and costly settings. 
The resource survey and needs assessment shall be used in a long-
range resource development plan. 
2. Interagency coordinat ion. 
DFS shall take steps to resolve interagency coordination problems 
leading to inadequate and uncoordinated mental health services for 
children in DFS custody. These steps shall include: 
a. CA5SP/community mental health planning. DFS shall 
participate in the development and implementation of the 
state's CASSP plan and community mental health plan, to 
29 
ensure that the needs of foster children are addressed by 
these plans. 
b. CMaCc. DHS, in conjunction with the health 
department, shall work with CMHCs' to develop contracts 
and service planning processes which address the mental 
health care needs of foster children, especially needs 
for home-based and day treatment services and for mental 
health services coordinated with family reunification 
efforts. 
c. Participation in interagency teams. DFS caseworkers 
shall participate in interagency coordination efforts 
for children being served both by DFS and by the mental 
health system. 
3 Obtaining timely and adequate mental health assessments and 
treatment for children in DFS custody. 
DFS snail utilize the CHEC system to obtain needed mental health 
assessments and treatment for foster children (and overcome 
Medicaid restrictions on coverage of mental health treatment). 
3y tne end of 1994, all initial/emergency health screenings shall 
include an assessment of whether the child has any urgent mental 
health problems requiring immediate treatment and/or specialized 
care, and all CHEC screenings shall include psycho-social 
assessments and referrals for follow-up treatment when needed. 
In addition, caseworkers shall by July 1995 be trained and provided 
with guidelines (such as the Children's Behavior Checklist or a 
similar instrument) for screening of children's mental health 
needs. 
Caseworkers shall gather information about children's mental health 
history for use in assessments and treatment; seek out treatment 
resources to meet those needs; monitor the treatment to assure that 
it is consistent with the treatment plan; and work with other 
agencies and professionals involved with the child. 
DFS shall make intensified efforts to involve foster parents in 
planning and monitoring children's mental health treatment. 
4. Placement of children with mental health problems. 
Children with mental health problems shall be matched with the 
least restrictive placement appropriate to meet their needs. 
Caseworkers shall choose placements for children with mental health 
problems in light of all available information about the child's 
history and needs and the array of currently available placements. 
5. Providing information to caregivers 
Foster parents and other out-of home providers shall receive all 
available information about the past mental health problems and 
special needs of children placed in their care. Out-of-home care 
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providers shall be enabled to decide whether to care for a child in 
light of complete and accurate information about the child's needs 
and, after agreeing to care for a child, shall have information 
necessary to-pjovide safe and appropriate care; 
B. Steps towards long-range planning 
1. Treatment and placement development plan 
By the end of 1994, DFS shall complete a statewide plan for 
development of sufficient resources for initial mental health 
assessments, ongoing mental health treatment, and appropriate 
placement for all children in DFS custody with mental health 
problems. The plan shall include recruitment of additional private 
providers, better coordination with the Division of Mental Health 
and with local CMHCs, and recruitment and training of specialized 
foster care providers. 
DFS shall implement this plan so that, by the end of 1998, every 
child in DFS custody who has a serious diagnosed mental health 
problem shall receive appropriate assessment and treatment, and 
shall be placed in the least restrictive environment consistent 
with the child's needs. 
2. Case management system. 
By the end of 1995, DHS shall complete a plan for a statewide case 
management system to track the provision of mental health services 
to foster children, and, for children involved with multiple state 
agencies and service providers, to coordinate these agencies' 
efforts and centralize information and planning. This system shall 
also provide a source of data for future service planning. 
This system shall be integrated with the health care information 
system (see § V.C.I, above) and the general plan for computerizing 
DFS recordkeeping and case planning (see § VIII.B.l. below) 
The system shall be fully operational by the end of 1998. DFS 
shall, at least on an annual basis, complete a comprehensive report 
to the monitoring panel on its progress towards development of 
computerized management information systems and steps to be taken 
during the next year. This report shall be provided to the panel 
in accordance with XI.D. of this Agreement. 
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VII. EDUCATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN 
A, Priorities for immediate statewide implementation 
1. Protecting^foster children1s basic educational rights 
All children in the custody of DFS are entitled to a free 
appropriate public education. This includes the right to special 
educational services. DFS shall ensure that all school age 
children in its custody attend school regularly and comply with 
state compulsory education laws. 
Providing a tutor for children in shelter care does not comply w^th 
the requirement that children in DFS custody shall be provided with 
a free appropriate public education. An exception to this 
requirement may be permitted for no more than 5 days and until 
transportation can be arranged to the child's home school or 
his/her transfer to another school. 
In order that children in DFS custody may fully participate in 
school activities, DFS shall pay all school fees that are not 
waived by the school district. 
By December 31, 1994, DFS shall publish for public comment a 
comprehensive written policy regarding the educational rights of 
foster children and the responsibilities of DFS employees for 
assuring that these rights are fulfilled. 
2. Educational assessments 
Within 10 days of a child's placement in foster care, the 
caseworker shall refer the child to the appropriate Youth In 
Custody (YIC) program and take whatever steps are necessary in 
order to obtain an evaluation of the child's level and scope of 
educational performance and the student's learning abilities. 
Following completion of the assessment, the caseworker and foster 
parent shall participate in the development of an individual 
education plan for the child. The caseworker and foster parent 
shall carry out the responsibilities assigned to them in the YIC 
plan. 
3. Minimizing school changes 
All children in shelter care shall attend the school they attended 
prior to entering DFS custody, unless removal from the school is 
necessary to ensure the child's safety. If a child in shelter care 
must be removed from the home school, DFS shall make every effort 
to ensure educational continuity (e.g. arrange for the home school 
teacher to consult with the on-site tutor; arrange for special 
education staff to come to the shelter) 
The goal of minimizing the number of times a child must change 
schools shall be taken into account in choosing initial foster 
placements and in all subsequent changes in placement. 
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When a child in DFS custody must be transferred to a new school, 
the caseworker shall inform the transferring school in advance, and 
consult with that school's staff about how to minimize disruption 
of the child's education. 
4. Foster parents' educational responsibilities. 
DFS shall ensure that all foster parents take responsibility for 
monitoring and assisting in children's educational progress (e.g. 
by helping with homework, attending parent/teacher conferences), 
and alerting the caseworker to any unmet educational needs. 
5^  Gathering the child's educational record 
Upon a child's entry into shelter care, DFS shall determine .e 
name and address of the school attended by the child, the name .f 
the child's teacher(s), the child's current grade level, progress 
and behavior in school, and any special education services the 
child was receiving. This information shall be provided to out-of -
home care providers, and shall be updated at the time of any 
subsequent changes in placement and provided to the child's new 
caregiver. 
6. Screening for special education needs 
Caseworkers shall immediately refer children for special education 
assessment if, at any time during the child's placement, the 
child's school records or performance indicate that the child may 
have a disability requiring special education services, or if the 
child's foster parent, teacher, or other service provider informs 
the caseworker that the child might need special education-
Caseworkers shall be responsible for ensuring that children receive 
a thorough and appropriate special education assessment, and that, 
as a result of the assessment, children receive all special 
education and related services to which they are entitled under 
federal and state law. 
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VIII. • CASE PLANNING, CASE REVIEW, PERMANENCY PLANNING, AND 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
A. Priorities^for immediate statewide implementation 
1. Treatment plans for children in DFS custody 
Treatment plans shall be prepared for all children in the custody 
of the Division and finalized within 45 days after the child's 
entry into DFS custody in accordance with the provisions of H.B. 
265, § 62A-4a-205, but no later than 60 days after removal from the 
child's home. To prepare a child's initial treatment plan, the 
caseworker and supervisor shall use an interdisciplinary team 
approach and shall convene an informal conference including, 
whenever possible, the child's natural parent(s), and foster 
parents, representatives of mental health, education, and where 
appropriate, va representative of law enforcement. H.B. 265 §62A-
4a-205 (2) , (3) . Implementation of the treatment plan is the 
responsibility of individual workers. Caseworkers shall be held 
accountable for making concrete, reasonable steps to implement all 
provisions of the treatment plan. 
2. Modification of treatment plans/permanency plans 
Whenever there is a substantial change in circumstances of the 
child or parent which may indicate a need to change the treatment 
plan or permanency goal, the caseworker shall immediately arrange 
for a treatment planning conference (see VIII.A.1 above) to 
determine whether the treatment plan and/or permanency goal should 
be changed. This determination shall specifically take into 
account any failure by parents to fulfill the requirement of 
previous treatment plans. 
After the conference, if the caseworker decides that the treatment 
plan or permanency goal should be changed, the caseworker shall 
immediately notify the case review panel of the recommended changes 
and the reasons for them, and shall immediately arrange for a case 
review (see §VIII.A.7) (not waiting for the next six month review 
or court date). 
If the case review panel determines that a modification of the 
treatment plan* or permanency goal is necessary, the panel shall 
modify the plan or if necessary, notify the court of its 
recommendation. If a change in a court-ordered treatment plan is 
necessary to implement the case review panel's determination, the 
caseworker shall staff the case with attorney general staff, for 
purposes of requesting a court hearing or receiving advice with 
respect to the previous court orders. 
3. Multiple reentries into state custody—"red flag" review 
If a child returns to DFS custody after being placed home to 
facilitate a "return home" permanency plan goal, a "foster care 
reentry red flag" notice containing the child's protective service 
and placement history and past treatment plans, shall be sent to 
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the locai Regional Director by the caseworker within five days 
after the child's shelter hearing. The case shall also be "red 
flagged" to the child's administrative review team so that special 
attention will be paid to the case by appropriate supervisory staff 
and others wh^are not directly involved in providing services in 
the case. This notice shall serve to focus attention on the case 
in order to address the issues related to the failure of the 
"return home" goal. Upon a child's reentry into foster care, the 
new treatment plan shall specifically address, among other things, 
the reason (s) for the child's return to foster care and for the 
selection of the particular foster care placement for the child. 
If any of the criteria set forth in H.B. 265 at §78-3a-311 (3) exist 
in the case, then it shall be presumed that a goal of return home 
is inappropriate and that reunification services should not be 
provided to the parents. If after reentry, the caseworker and 
supervisor adopt a goal of "return home" and the court does not 
order otherwise, then the treatment plan shall specify the reasons 
why a goal of reunification was selected again. 
4. Adoption planning for children who reenter care 
When the permanency plan is adoption, such plan shall include 
specific steps for termination of parental rights. Where possible, 
voluntary relinquishments shall be obtained. If a relinquishment 
has not been obtained within six weeks of establishing the plan, 
the worker shall perform and record the following: 
• Within 60 days after establishing the plan, submit to 
the attorney representing the Division the necessary 
information for termination of parental rights. If the 
worker has reason to believe a voluntary relinquishment 
will not be obtained, he or she may make an earlier 
referral. 
• Within 15 working days of submitting information to 
the attorney, the worker shall contact the attorney to 
discuss the status of the case, to determine if any 
additional information is needed, and to establish and 
put in writing a reasonable timetable for obtaining 
necessary information, for filing the petition, and for 
requesting a hearing date. 
• If the court dismisses a petition to terminate 
parental rights, the worker shall meet with the Attorney 
General's office and the guardian ad litem to determine 
whether an appeal should be taken or other relief sought 
from the court's decision. 
• As soon as a permanency plan of adoption is 
established for a child, the Region's adoption unit shall 
be notified and provided with pertinent information on 
the child. The adoptions staff will begin examining 
available adoptive families for a possible match with the 
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child upon receipt of t h i s no t i ce . 
5. Adoption planning 
DFS shall conduct a special review of the cases' of all children in 
DFS custody wTrace parental rights have been terminated and who have 
a permanent plan of adoption, but who have not been adopted. In 
cases where termination of parental rights has not been achieved, 
DFS shall seek voluntary relinquishment or termination of parental 
rights, as described above. DFS shall make prompt and intensive 
efforts to find adoptive placements for these children, including 
coordination with and referrals to private and religious agencies 
involved in adoption services. 
By July 1995, DFS shall complete a report on the successes and 
problems experienced in this expedited adoption planning process. 
This report shall be used to develop a statewide" plan for all 
children in DFS custody whose parental rights have been terminated 
and have a permanent plan of adoption. 
6. Preferential Adoptive Placements--
For any child whose permanent plan is adoption and who has 
substantial emotional ties to foster parent(s) or other caregiver 
who have had physical custody of the child, and for whom removal 
from that caregiver would be seriously detrimental to the child's 
well-being, the caregiver's application to adopt the child shall be 
given preference. The caregiver's application shall be processed 
and, if satisfactory, the family study shall be completed before 
any other applications to adopt the child are processed. 
7. Case reviews* 
All children in DFS custody shall receive case reviews within six 
months of coming into DFS custody, and every six months thereafter, 
and these case reviews shall meet the following standards: 
• Through a process of administrative/citizen panel/court 
review, DFS shall monitor the effectiveness of its 
treatment planning and service delivery in achieving the 
goals of preserving families, providing proper care for 
children in out of home care, and achieving discharge of 
children from out of home placements into permanent 
homes. The case review process shall also monitor 
compliance with state and federal law and policy to 
identify resources and training needs and to identify 
problematic procedures or practices. 
• The administrative/citizen review panel must ensure at 
least the following evaluations and assessments are made: 
(a) a determination that the initial and annual health 
screening and comprehensive assessment have been 
performed and incorporated in the plan; 
(b) a review of the treatment plan to ensure that the 
plan ccnplies with court orders, agency policies and procedures; 
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(c) a review of the case record to ensure that the record 
contains documentation as to the reasons why the child 
was taken into state custody and the reasonable efforts 
that were made to keep the family intact; • 
(d) a revTIw* of the reasons for selecting the permanency 
goal, the appropriateness of the plan tc the goal, and 
goal achievement date to ensure that these decisions are 
consistent with court orders, agency policies and 
procedures; and 
(e) a review of the child's placement history with 
particular attention paid to changes of placement since 
the last review, reasons for change, impact on the class 
member, and services and other steps required to enable 
him/her to have a stable placement. 
• Staff will be assigned to manage the process of 
organizing administrative reviews (notification, 
organization, keeping up documentation, etc.) The 
administrative review panel/citizen review board shall 
identify significant deficiencies in implementing the 
treatment plan and performing case activities and shall 
report them in writing to the Regional Director who shall 
take appropriate actions. 
• Prior to scheduling a case review, workers shall give 
recommendations as to the amount of time needed for the 
hearing. The review panel should receive case materials 
for review at least two days in advance. Foster parents' 
opinions and recommendations on the child should be 
included. Part of the preparation should be to review 
previous panel recommendations and outcomes. 
Administrative case review notices shall be sent by 
certified mail to the parents. See notice requirements, 
paragraph IX.A.2 of this Agreement. 
• In constituting the panel for an administrative review, 
the following considerations will be implemented: (a) 
The review panel members will be independent of the 
caseworker and supervisor assigned to any child's case, 
(b) The panel shall include at least two members who are 
neither a DFS employees or employees of an organization 
which receives more than 50% of its direct funding from 
DFS- (c) The panel may include an outside professional 
who has relevant specialized expertise. The outside 
panel members must sign a confidentiality form. 
• Attendance at administrative reviews shall include (a) 
the child, if age 12 and older and attendance is feasible 
and appropriate, (children as young as ages 7-8 may be 
invited to attend as the case situation may indicate) and 
(b) the caseworker and supervisor. Caseworkers shall 
encourage natural parents, foster parents, out-of-home 
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care providers, treatment providers, and GALs to attend. 
• The panel needs to review for accountability, not just 
staff a~aaee. Especially, participants should be asked 
to report progress on implementing specifics contained in 
the treatment plan. There will be greater scrutiny of 
progress and outcomes, in addition to specifying future 
directions for the case. The administrative review 
summary shall include a checklist of recommendations. 
The summary shall be sent to natural parents, foster 
parents, the GAL, the court, the child's caseworker and 
his or her supervisor. The administrative case review 
panel shall have the authority and responsibility to 
recommend changes in the treatment plan if necessary to 
assure that each case is managed in conformity with 
agency policies and procedures. The administrative case 
review/citizen review panel staff shall have the 
authority and responsibility to report to the Regional 
Director if it is their opinion that the treatment plan, 
agency policies and procedures, or the panel's 
recommendations have been violated or disregarded by the 
caseworker or his or her supervisor. The Regional 
Director shall determine any action needed to remedy any 
deficiency in a treatment plan or in a worker's 
implementation of a treatment plan or the review panel's 
recommendations with respect to a changes in a treatment 
plan. The Regional Director shall, within one month of 
receiving a report of a deficiency in a treatment plan, 
direct the worker's supervisor and the caseworker to take 
actions. Within one month of receipt of the Regional 
Director's directives, the family services worker or his 
supervisor must certify in writing to the Regional 
Director that appropriate corrective actions have been 
taken. Any failure of the Regional Director, supervisor, 
or caseworker to fulfill their responsibilities with 
respect to correcting deficiencies in treatment plans 
shall be recorded in the employee's personnel record or 
other remedial actions taken. 
DFS may elect to use administrative review panels, citizen review 
boards, and/or courts to perform these reviews. Where DFS elects 
to use administrative review panels, these panels must include at 
least two members who are not DFS employees. 
B. Involving foster parents in treatment planning & case review. 
The treatment plan shall be signed by the foster parents, as well 
as by the caseworker, the supervisor, and the child's parents. A 
copy of the treatment plan shall be provided to the child's foster 
parents. Foster parents' input and opinions shall be sought for 
every administrative or court review regarding a child in their 
physical custody. If foster parents cannot attend a conference or 
hearing, caseworkers shall request written comments and 
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recommendations from the foster parents and/or make arrangements 
for the foster parent to participate by telephone. A form should 
be created for use by foster parents to encourage their giving 
input in reviews and hearings. 
In order to facilitate the agency's emphasis on foster parents as 
members of the treatment "team" for out-of-home care cases, the 
department shall develop and implement a consumer evaluation 
procedure. 
9. Case assignment 
By the end of 1995, DFS shall design and implement measures with 
the goal of reducing caseworker changes experienced by foster 
children. These measures shall include: a system for rating the 
difficulty of the case and selecting caseworkers with appropriate 
experience and training; mentoring and supervision to assist 
caseworkers when problems arise; and "red flag" reviews when a case 
is transferred to a new foster care worker more than twice in a 
twelve-month period. 
10. Case transfer 
Whenever a child's case must be reassigned: 
• The case shall be assigned within two weeks of the date when 
the former caseworker ceased to actively work on the case; 
• The assigned caseworker shall receive and review the child's 
complete file, and visit with the child, and the foster 
parents or other caregivers, within four weeks of that date. 
11. Permanency planning. 
All treatment plans for a child in state custody after disposition 
shall include a permanency goal for the child which goal may be: 
(a) provide reunification services in order to allow the child to 
return home (including kinship placements), (b) termination of 
parental rights/adoption, (c) independent living or (d) permanent 
foster care/guardianship. The agency's selected permanency goal 
shall be presented for juvenile court approval at the dispositional 
hearing in accordance with H.B. 265, § 78-3a-311. The Division 
may, under any circumstances, recommend to the court that efforts 
to reunify a child with his family are not reasonable, based upon 
the individual circumstances of the family, and that reunification 
services should not provided to the family. The agency will 
represent to the court that reunification services need not be 
provided to a parent when the agency is of the opinion that the 
circumstances outlined at H.B. 265, § 78-3a-311(3)- (5) exist. 
12. Expedited permanency planning and relinquishment/termination 
(a) The Division shall by July 1, 1994 have ascertained all 
children in its custody who have remained in custody in excess of 
18 months. For purposes of this section, parental visitation of 
the child by the parents during the 18 month period shall not serve 
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to interrupt the running of the period. By December 31, 1994, 
those children who have remained in DFS custody in excess of IS 
months shall be screened for expedited permanency planning and 
scheduled fos^a dispositional review hearing before the ]uveniie 
court in accordance with the provisions of H.B. 265, § 78-3a-312. 
The permanency goal for these children shall be reviewed by the 
juvenile court and a permanent plan developed in accordance with 
the provisions of K.B. 265, § 78-3a-312. 
(b) Prior to the dispositional review hearing provided for by H.B. 
265, the Division shall convene an administrative/citizen review 
panel for a determination of the content of the agency's report to 
the court as required by H.B. 265, § 78-3a-312. The panel shall 
examine the child's history with the agency, which examination 
shall include reviewing the parents' response to the agency's 
reasonable efforts to maintain the child at home prior to removal, 
the parents' response to the agency's reasonable efforts to reunify 
the family after removal, the age of the child, the frequency of 
contact between the parent and child, the available means of 
contact, the extent of the child's present relationship to the 
parent(s), the parents' response to the treatment plan entered into 
with the return home goal, and the adequacy of the services 
provided to the parents pursuant to the treatment plan. If this 
examination demonstrates that the reunification efforts provided 
the family by the agency have been inadequate and that, in the 
opinion of the committee/panel, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the return home objectives of the treatment plan can be 
accomplished within six months with provision of intensive 
reunification services to the parent (s), then the agency's report 
to the court may recommend that the reunification goal be extended 
for an additional six months. If the administrative review panel 
determines that the treatment goals cannot be reasonably 
accomplished within an additional six months with provision of 
additional family centered services, then the panel shall recommend 
that the child's permanency plan goal be changed to a more 
appropriate goal, including termination of parental rights, 
adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. 
11. Computerised treatment; plannjpg 
The Division shall develop and implement a management infomation 
system that meets the requirements of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-116. DFS 
shall, at least on an annual basis, complete a comprehensive report 
to the monitoring panel on its progress towards development of 
computerized management information systems and steps to be taken 
during the next year. This report shall be provided to the panel 
in accordance with XI.D. of this Agreement. 
B. Long-range planning 
1, Expedited permanency planning and adoptive planning 
By the end of July 1995, DFS shall develop a plan, including 
coordination with the attorney general's office, to ensure that: 
• all children who remain in DFS custody for 18 months or more 
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receive an intensified and expedited permanency planning 
process; and 
• voluntary relinquishment or termination bt parental rights 
is promptly pursued for all children in DFS custody for IB 
months or more who cannot return hone, and for all children 
whose permanency plan calls for adoption. 
• intensive efforts to find an adoptive family are promptly 
made for all children whose permanent plan is adoption. 
DFS shall implement this plan with the goal that, by the end of 
1998, no child shall remain in DFS custody for more than two years 
(except children for whom a permanency plan of long-term foster 
care or independent living is chosen after full exploration of all 
other permanency planning options). 
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IX. NOTICES, COURT PROCESSES, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND GUARDIANS AD 
LITEM--
A. Priorities for immediate statewide implementation. 
1. Out-of-home care providers/GAL contact 
DFS shall inform all out-of-home care providers, at or before the 
time of a new placement, of the name, address and phone number of 
the child's guardian ad litem (GAL), and of the GAL's role in 
protecting the child's interests. DFS shall also promptly give all 
out-of-home care providers this information for children currently 
in DFS custody. Foster parents shall be encouraged to contact the 
child's GAL about any concerns that the child's needs are not being 
met. 
2. Notice and access to information 
DFS shall provide-to all children's GALs, natural parents, and out-
of-home care providers: 
• written notice, one week in advance, of administrative 
reviews, of changes m foster placement, and of adjudication 
and disposition hearings and reviews. Notice (written or 
oral) of case conferences as soon as they are scheduled. 
• written recommendations of the caseworker, one week in 
advance of court hearings and administrative reviews. 
In addition, DFS shall provide all children's GALs: 
• prompt and continuous access to all DFS files and other 
information in DFS's control concerning the child; 
3. Participation in treatment planning 
DFS shall encourage the active participation of children's GALs, 
natural parents, and foster parents in treatment planning 
conferences, planning of parent-child visitation, and permanency 
planning. In addition, DFS shall solicit the input of the GAL in 
the selection of adoptive placements of children for whom they 
served as attorney. 
4. Coordination with attorney general staff 
DFS caseworkers shall meet with attorney general staff to assess 
every case having a permanency goal of termination of parental 
rights or adoption, and every case which meets the criteria stated 
in § VIII.A. 10 above and/or in H.B. 265 for seeking termination of 
parental rights. In these conferences, the caseworker and attorney 
general staff shall develop a strategy to achieve termination of 
parental rights and permanency for the child. The caseworker shall 
work with the attorney general staff on an ongoing basis to ensure 
that this strategy is promptly carried out. 
By the end of 1995, DFS shall complete a report on problems and 
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successes experienced in working with attorney general staff, if 
this report indicates problems areas, then DFS and the attorney 
general's office shall jointly develop a plan fpr dealing with any 
problems poinj^d out by the report. This plan shall be fully 
implemented by the end of 1997. 
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X. STAFFING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION k ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Priorities for immediate statewide implementation 
1, Caseworker training 
Education and training of new caseworkers and curriculum shall be 
accomplished pursuant to the provisions of H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-107 
and training shall be conducted to enable caseworkers and 
supervisors to fulfill their responsibilities under all sections of 
this Agreement. 
By December 31, 1994, supervisors shall conduct individual 
assessments of current caseworkers' training levels. After 
conducting these assessments, supervisors will develop individual 
performance and training plans for caseworkers for the following 
purposes: (1) to incorporate evaluations of the strengths and 
weaknesses of a worker's knowledge, skills, and familiarity with 
agency policies and procedures and (2) to designate time frames and 
training programs required to improve a worker's knowledge and 
skills or to remedy professional deficiencies. These individual 
performance and training plans will be maintained in the worker's 
personnel file. The Regional Director will conduct individual 
assessments of DFS supervisors to ascertain their current level of 
training and to develop individual performance and training plans. 
These plans shall be maintained in the supervisor's personnel file. 
The Division Director shall conduct individual assessments of 
Regional Director's training and develop individual training and 
performance plans which shall also be maintained in their personnel 
file. 
Using the results of the individual training and performance plan 
assessment process, a training plan and schedule shall be developed 
for each caseworker and supervisor as is needed and implemented by 
December 31, 1995. The plan shall be revised annually as part of 
the employee's performance evaluation. Workers shall be 
temporarily relieved of their duties to participate in training and 
supervisors shall be responsible fox ensuring that their caseloads 
are covered. 
Every caseworker and supervisor shall receive a minimum of 40 hours 
of training annually. Every foster care worker shall have attended 
the training given to foster parents. For all caseworkers and 
supervisors, DFS shall maintain a record of the training the 
employee has attended. 
2^  Foster parent traininq--
DFS shall develop and implement training programs as needed for 
foster parents (including shelter care parents) to fulfill their 
responsibilities under all sections of this Agreement, including: 
• providing safe and appropriate care to children in 
their homes (§§ III and IV) , and monitoring and assisting 
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in children's health care (§ V), mental health care (§ 
VI), and education (§ VII) 
• participating in treatment planning, permanency planning, 
and case reviews (§ VIII) 
3. Supervision and accountability 
DFS shall develop and implement supervision, accountability, and 
disciplinary measures needed to ensure that caseworkers and foster 
parents fulfill their responsibilities under this Agreement. Such 
measures shall include at least: 
• Periodic outcome and performance ratings for individual 
caseworkers and foster parents; 
• Corrective action by supervisors in response to any problems 
revealed ' by these ratings (e.g. mentoring, additional 
training, enhanced supervision, etc.); 
• Discipline and termination processes to be used where 
corrective action is not effective. 
B. Long-range planning 
1. Training 
By the end of 1994, DFS shall complete a comprehensive training 
plan for foster parents (with provisions for joint training of 
foster parents and caseworkers whenever possible). 
The plan shall cover pre-service training, in-service training and 
professional development, and individualized training for foster 
parents up to the plan's new standards. 
The plan shall set mandatory standards for pre-service training, 
yearly in-service training for basic and specialized foster care. 
These standards shall include: 
• minimum numbers of hours of both classroom and on-the-job 
training (classroom hours shall only count if relevant to the 
job skills actually needed and used by the trainee); 
• evaluation processes, including both classroom testing and 
on-the-job evaluation, and provisions for corrective action if 
the trainee does not pass the evaluation. 
DFS shall implement this plan so that caseworkers, supervisors, and 
foster parents are in full compliance with the plan's standards by 
the end of 1996. 
2. Staffing 
By July 1, 1995, DFS shall complete a study of caseworkers' and 
supervisors' caseloads and staffing patterns. The study shall 
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consider: whether current caseloads and work distribution are 
appropriate; whether DFS should adopt a weighted caseload system 
(i.e. varying the number of cases assigned to a. worker according to 
the complexity of each case) ; whether some tasks currently being 
done by caseworkers could more efficiently be done by clerical 
staff, aides, or other support staff; and what qualifications 
should be required for newly hired or promoted DFS caseworkers, 
supervisors, aides, and support staff. 
DFS shall fully implement the recommendations of this study by the 
end of 1996. 
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XI. MONITORING AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Composition of the monitoring panel 
The monitorin^^anel shall have three members. All panel members, 
at the time of their appointment to the panel, must be Utah 
residents, and cannot be DHS employees or contractors. 
B. Selection and organization of monitoring panel. 
At the time this Agreement is submitted to the Court for approval, 
plaintiffs and defendants will each select one member of the 
monitoring panel. The third member of the panel shall be Pamela 
Atkinson, who served as a volunteer mediator during the negotiation 
of this Agreement. 
The panel shall have 4 5 days, from the date the Agreement is 
approved by the Court, to develop its internal procedures and hire 
its staff. 
C. Staff and budget 
The panel shall have a staff of two: one research analyst and one 
secretary. In addition, the panel may engage consultants (who may 
be from out of state), if needed. The panel members shall receive 
a per diem of $90, and shall be reimbursed for expenses. The 
budget for the panel's per diem and expenses, staff, and 
consultants shall be sufficient to allow the panel to fulfill its 
responsibilities under this Agreement, and shall be at least 
$111,345 per year. 
D. Access to Information 
The panel shall have access to all internal memoranda, reports and 
studies generated by DFS and DHS, and all DFS files, including 
foster care files, CPS files, and licensing files (except the 
agency's Resolution Committee (RC) records which will be provided 
in accordance with section XI.L below). The panel may require that 
DFS research personnel meet with them and provide information about 
reports generated by the Research and Evaluation Office. 
The panel may informally interview any DFS employees, foster 
parents, private service providers, and/or families involved in the 
child welfare system. Panel members may also visit any site at 
which care or services is provided to class members. 
If the information received by the panel from DFS is inadequate to 
determine compliance with the Agreement, or is not produced in a 
timely manner, the panel may issue subpoenas compelling any DFS 
employee to appear before the panel and to produce any documents 
requested by the panel (except documents whose production is 
prohibited by a court order). 
E. Case-reading
 § 
In conducting .the annual review of a sample of cases required by 
H.B. 265, § 62A-4a-118, DHS shall review a randomly selected, 
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statistically significant sample of cases, using a case reading 
instrument that includes all* case-specific provisions of this 
Agreement. In conducting the audit required by H.B. 265 § 62A-4a-
118(4), the -fa%gisiative Auditor General shall review a randomly 
selected subsample of these cases, also using an instrument that 
includes all case-specific provisions of this Agreement. If, at 
any time during the period of this Agreement, the Auditor is unable 
to perform this review, the Panel shall have authority to retain 
consultants to perform an independent case review. 
In addition, DHS shall review a sample of foster care aud 
protective services cases and the Legislative Auditor General shall 
audit a subsample of foster care and protective services cases. 
DHS and the Auditor General shall use an instrument- including all 
applicable case-specific provisions of this Agreement and DHS shall 
seek approval of the monitoring panel for the number of cases which 
it reviews. (The sample used in this case review may also be part 
of the sample used for the review mandated by H.B. 265, which is 
due December 31, 1995.) The results of this initial review and 
audit shall be reported to the Panel by July 31, 1995. 
All reports generated by DHS and by the Auditor General shall be 
provided to the monitoring panel. 
F. Six-month grace period 
DFS shall begin providing information to the Panel 30 days after 
the agreement is given final approval by the Court. The panel 
shall make its first compliance report six months from that date. 
During this six-month period, the plaintiffs shall not seek court 
enforcement of the agreement. 
G. Compliance Reports 
After its first report, the panel shall make quarterly written 
reports, to be issued on or before March 1, June 1, September 1, 
and December 1 of each year. (This off-set reporting schedule is 
to allow the panel to incorporate data generated quarterly by DHS.) 
The panel's reports shall follow the, format of the Agreement, 
shall make findings of compliance or non-compliance with each 
provision of the Agreement applicable in that quarter, and shall 
describe the basis for each finding- of compliance or non-
compliance. The panel's findings shall be provided to both 
plaintiffs' counsel and defendants' counsel and each side shall 
have 15 days from receipt of the report to review the report and 
redact confidential, protected and privileged information from the 
report before the panel publishes it. The panel shall not publish 
the report until each side has submitted its redacted version. In 
cases of a dispute regarding redaction, the panel shall make the 
final decision. When the redacted and edited versions have been 
received, the panel shall publish its report as a public document. 
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The panel's findings of compliance or non-compliance shall be based 
on sufficient information to determine overall, systemic patterns 
of compliance or non-compliance, not on isolated instances or 
unsupported -reports of compliance or noncompliance. Compliance 
does not always require 100* performance of each provision of the 
Agreement. The panel retains the discretion to define an 
appropriate level of compliance with each provision of the 
Agreement, based upon a review of the agency's implementation of 
that provision. 
H. Corrective Action period 
If the Panel finds non-compliance with any provision(s) of the 
Agreement, the panel will confer with the plaintiffs' and 
defendants' counsel and with DHS and DFS officials regarding a 
corrective action plan. 
DFS shall submit a corrective action plan to the panel within two 
weeks of the finding of non-compliance. The panel, within two 
weeks of the submission of the plan, shall either approve the 
corrective action plan, or allow DFS an additional two weeks to 
submit a revised corrective action plan. If the panel does not 
approve DFS's revised corrective action plan, the panel shall 
create a corrective action plan. 
DFS shall implement the corrective action plan within 90 days of 
the date it is approved by the panel. At the end of the 90 days, 
DFS shall report to the panel. The panel shall consider this 
report, and may also conduct its own investigation, to determine 
whether the non-compliance has been corrected. If the non-
compliance is not corrected, but the panel finds that there are 
extraordinary circumstances and that compliance could be achieved 
in an additional 3 0 days, the panel may allow DFS an additional 3 0 
days to implement the corrective action plan. 
At the end of the corrective action period, the panel shall make a 
finding as to whether compliance has been achieved. 
L< Court Determination of Compliance or Non-Compliance 
If the monitoring panel finds non-compliance, defendants may 
immediately seek court review of the finding. Plaintiffs must wait 
until the corrective action period has transpired before they may 
seek relief from the court upon a finding of non-compliance. 
If the panel finds compliance, plaintiffs may immediately seek the 
court determination of the panel's findings. 
All requests for relief for court determination shall state the 
specific findings of compliance or non-compliance challenged, the 
reasons for such challenge, and the relief sought. Such a request 
must be filed within 20 days of the issuance of the panel's 
compliance report. The opposing party shall have 20 days from the 
filing of a request for court determination to file a response. 
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The court shall then set a hearing or other proceeding to resolve 
the matter. The court shall examine the evidence before it de novo 
and it shall enter its own findings of compliance or non-
compliance. 
J. Enforcement of the Agreement. 
The Agreement constitutes a final and binding determination of 
plaintiffs' claims and entitlement to relief. These claims, and 
any defenses to these claims, are merged into and resolved by the 
Agreement. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over these claims 
solely for the purpose of enforcement of the Agreement. If non-
compliance is not resolved through the corrective action process, 
as described above, the Court may enter any necessary orders to 
enforce the Agreement. 
K. Modification of Agreement based on Compliance 
At the request of defendants, plaintiffs will stipulate to a 
modification of the Agreement upon a finding by the panel of 
compliance with any portion of the Agreement (unless such finding 
is reversed by the court on review). 
L. Individual cases 
The mechanism for resolving problems that may arise in individual 
children's cases is as follows: 
(a) Plaintiffs' counsel may request the files of any children 
in DFS custody, or any CPS files, when they have reason to 
believe that a child's health, safety, or welfare is at risK 
due to a violation by DFS of the requirements of federal or 
state law, or the provisions of this Agreement. Defendants 
shall produce these files within 15 days of plaintiffs' 
request. 
(b) Plaintiffs' counsel may contact the DFS Director or the 
Director's designee directly, concerning any information they 
receive indicating that a child's health, safety, or welfare 
is at risk due to violation by DFS of the requirements of 
federal or state law, or the provisions of this Agreement. 
Within 10 days of plaintiffs' request, the DFS Director or the 
Director's designee shall: 
(i) take action directly to resolve the complaint, 
(ii) refer the matter to the Resolution Committee 
(RC) , which shall make a recommendation within 15 
days of the referral; or 
(iii) determine that no action is needed, and 
inform plaintiffs' counsel of the reasons for that 
decision (plaintiffs' counsel may then bring the 
matter before the grievance council, as set forth 
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in section (d), below). 
(c) The Division shall report on its actions regarding cases 
referred-tp it under section (b)(i) or (b)(ii) above, within 
3 0 days of receiving instructions from the Director or 
designee, or receiving recommendations from the RC, 
(d) After receiving the Division's report, if plaintiffs' 
counsel believe that the problem has not been resolved, they 
may bring the matter before the grievance council established 
under H.B. 265 § 62A-4a-102 (3) . An attorney representing the 
plaintiff class shall serve as a member of this council. 
(e) DFS shall, on a quarterly basis, submit its reports on 
the cases referred to it (see section (c) above) , to the 
monitoring panel. 
The timelines set forth above shall not apply in cases where there 
is imminent risk to a child's health or safety. 
No attorneys fees shall be claimed by plaintiffs' counsel for any 
time spent under this section. 
The RC and the grievance council shall submit periodic reports, at 
least on a quarterly basis, to the Monitoring Panel, summarizing 
the issues raised in each case brought to their attention, and the 
resolution of each case. These reports shall be considered (along 
with all other data described in section XI.D, above) in 
determining compliance with the Agreement. 
JL Termination of the Agreement 
The Agreement shall terminate in 4 8 months from the date it is 
given final approval by the Court. 
N. Attorneys' fees 
Plaintiffs shall provide the State with an itemization of 
attorneys' fees to date that they intend to claim. Nothing in the 
Agreement shall constitute a waiver of any defense to any claim of 
fees made by the plaintiffs. 
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: day cf May, 1994 
MICHAEL 0. LEAVIT 
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FOR: JAN GRAHAM 
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Solicitor General, State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CRAIG L. BARLOW 
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EXHIBIT A 
Addendum/Modification to Settlement Agreement § XL L, M, N & O 
L Individual cases 
The mechanism for resolving problems that may arise in individual children's cases is as follows: 
(a) Plaintiffs' counsel may request the files of any children in DCFS custody, or any 
CPS files, when they have reason to believe that a child's health, safety, or welfare is at 
risk due to a violation by DCFS of the requirements of federal or state law, or the 
provisions of this Agreement Defendants shall produce these files within 15 days of 
plaintiffs' request. 
(b) Plaintiffs' counsel may contact the DCFS Director or the Director's designee 
directly, concerning any information they receive indicating that a child's health, safety, or 
welfare is at risk due to a violation by DCFS of the requirements of federal or state law, 
or the provisions of this Agreement Within ] 0 days of plaintiffs' request, the DCFS 
Director or the Director's designee shall 
(i) take action direct!) to re>oi\ e the complaint. 
(ii) refer the matter to the ()f:kc of Child Protection Ombudsman 
COCPCT), or 
(iii) determine that no action LS needed, and inform plaintiffs' counsel of the 
reasons for that decision 
(c) The OCPO shall report on its actions to the Division and plaintiffs' counsel 
regarding cases referred to ii under section (b)(ii) above, within the time frames 
established by OCPO policy and procedures, but in no event to exceed 40 days of the 
plaintiffs' request to the DCFS Director or designee 
(d) After receiving the Director's or OCPO's report, if plaintiffs' counsel believe that 
the problem has not been resolved, they may bring the matter before the Consumer 
Hearing Panel as set forth in U.C A § 62A-4a-102 or the Grievance Council as set forth in 
§ XI. M of this Agreement In the event that the Utah Legislature repeals, amends or 
otherwise modifies § 62A-4a-102, plaintiffs shall continue to have a right of review before 
the Grievance Council, but will have no claim for any alternative or additional review 
before the Consumer Hearing Panel 
(e) The timelines set forth in (b) above shall not apply in cases where there is imminent 
risk to a child's health or safety 
(f) No attorneys fees shall be claimed by plaintiffs' counsel for any time spent under 
this section. 
(i) Plaintiffs have informed defendants of their intension to seek an award of 
attorney's fees for time spent on individual cases prior to the effective date 
of this stipulation and reserve the right to file such a claim. 
(ii) Conversely, defendants reserve their rights to object to those fees as 
outside the terms of this settlement agreement A reservation of rights to 
claim such fees, is not an agreement to change the provision in this section 
(g) Plaintiffs' counsel shall receive a travel allowance for attendance at the Grievance 
Council meetings The Board will set the travel allowance Air fare, when necessary and 
appropriate, shall be based upon the lowest seven day advanced purchase fare available 
(h) The OCPO and the Grievance Council shall submit periodic reports, at least on a 
quarterly basis, to the Monitoring Panel, summarizing the issues raised in each case 
brought to their attention, and the resolution of each case These reports shall be 
considered (along with all other data described in section XI D , above) in determining 
compliance with the Agreement 
M Grievance Council 
By June 1, 1997, the Board of DC! S shall create a Grievance Council, independent of the 
division, for the purpose of receiving, mediating, and making recommendations to the division 
regarding the concerns of consumers, natural parents and immediate family members, and foster 
parents regarding child welfare issues as specified in this section 
(a) The Grievance Council shall be appointed by the Board of Child and Family 
Services and shall include, but not be limited to the following 
(i) A representative of the Child Welfare Legislative Oversight Committee, 
chosen b\ the 0\ crsiuht Committee The representative may be either a Senator 
or a Representative The Oversight Committee shall also have the option of placing 
two representatives on the council If there are two representatives, one shall be a 
Senator and one shall be a member of the House of Representatives In the event 
that the Oversight Committee declines in writing to have a representative serve on 
the Grievance Council, this requirement will be waived 
(ii) At least one member of the Board of Child and Family Services, and 
(iii) An attorney representing the plaintiff class 
(b) Potential other members of the council may include educators, child mental health 
care providers, social workers and physicians, 
(c) No employee of the Division shall be a member of the Grievance Council 
(d) The Department of Human Services will provide staff support to the Grievance 
Council for purposes of keeping minutes, sending out notices, and other items that 
are necessary for the Grievance Council to function 
(e) When the Grievance Council reviews and discusses an individual case, its meeting 
may be held in private. However, the consumer, the child's natural parents, if 
applicable, the child's foster parents, if applicable, the Guardian ad Litem and the 
parties' attorneys may attend 
(0 All records of the Grievance Council shall be classified as private, and may be 
disclosed only in accordance with Utah Code Ann § 63-2-202 
(g) The plaintiflTs shall first exhaust all administrative remedies under section L (b) and 
(c) above prior to requesting a review by the Grievance Council The council may, 
however, consent to accept a case for review, pnor to exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, if it determines it to be appropriate under the circumstances 
(h) The Grievance Council has authority only to make recommendations to the 
Division, and has no power to overturn decisions made b> the Division, or to make 
determinations regarding a party's rights or responsibilities 
Section M on page 51 is relettered to be section N 
Section N on page 51 is relettered to be section 0 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
DAVID C , etal., : 
Plaintiffs, ORDER 
vs. : Case No. 93-C-206W 
MICHAEL LEAVITT, et al., : Judge David K. Winder 
Defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Parties have consented to the entry of their settlement of the above-captioned 
matter as an Order of the Court. By virtue of the Parties' settlement and consent, it is 
unnecessary to have a trial on the liability issues and the remedies in this case. 
The Parties' agreement to entry of this Order is the outcome of negotiations and 
bargaining. The Settlement Agreement (hereafter the "Agreement") (Exhibit "A" attached), 
incorporated herein by reference, is the result of intensive negotiations starting in May of 
1993 and continuing through May of 1994, in which both parties were represented by 
negotiating teams including Plaintiffs' and Defendants' counsel. 
This Order and the Agreement set forth general operating standards and direct 
Defendants to ensure that the Utah Department of Human Services' (DHS) and its Division 
of Family Services' (DFS) child welfare system comply with the Agreement. Defendants 
maintain full operating authority over DHS and DFS and have discretion as noted in the 




The provisions of this Order and the Agreement shall apply to and be binding upon 
the Parties to this action, and upon their employees, heirs, successors-in-interest, and assigns. 
The undersigned representatives of Plaintiffs and Defendants certify that they are fully 
authorized, subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to enter into and to execute the 
terms and conditions of this Order and to legally bind the parties, including all members of 
the certified Plaintiff classes. 
TIL THE PLAINTIFF CLASSES 
On May 7, 1993, the Court certified this matter as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court defined the Plaintiff classes as follows: 
(1) All children who are now or who will be in the custody of DHS and who have 
been or who will be placed by DHS in a shelter care facility, foster family 
home, group home or institutional care; and, 
(2) All children who are or who will be known to DHS by virtue of a report of 
abuse or neglect. 
IV PROVISIONS 
A. SCOPE: The Governor of the State of Utah, the Executive Director of DHS, 
the Director of DFS, and representatives of the Utah Attorney General have all signed and 
agreed to be bound by the terms of the Agreement. 
B. COMPLIANCE AND OVERSIGHT REPORTING: The Agreement creates a 
Monitoring Panel and establishes a mechanism for monitoring and oversight of the 
implementation of its provisions. 
C. CONFIDENTIALITY: Plaintiffs' counsel shall maintain the confidentiality of 
any information contained in any documents provided to them during the course of this 
84238.1 2 
litigation or provided under the terms of this Order, that may identify specific individuals 
where the confidentiality of such information is provided by law. 
D. ENFORCEMENT: This Order and the Agreement, incorporated herein by 
reference, constitute a final and binding determination of Plaintiffs' causes of action. The 
Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter. 
E. ATTORNEYS' FEES: Plaintiffs and Defendants reserve the issue of 
entitlement to and amount of attorneys' fees and costs of this action. The parties agree to 
meet in good faith in an attempt to settle this issue. If no settlement is reached by June 30, 
1994, the issue of attorneys' fees and costs shall be submitted to the Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this ~T\ day of UltGU&L 1994. 
/ 
The Honorable David K. Winder 
United States District Court Judge 
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Approved by. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By 
Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB-?4894) 
D. James Morgan (USB # 6005) 
Daniel A. Kaplan (USB #6258) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-3200-





Elizabeth Butler Steyer 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW 
114 Sansome Street, Suite 900 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
(415) 543-3307 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Jan C. Gra 
Carol Cla 
Linda Luinstra 
Craig L. Barlow 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140 
PAIGE BIGELOW - 6493 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy C I * * 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
RICKY LEE SANDERS, individually, and in 
his capacity as the personal representative of 




MCHAEL O. LEAVITT, in his capacity as 
Governor of the State of Utah; et at., j 
Defendants. 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
DEFENDANT TRAVIS WIDDISON 
C M No. 980901895 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
IN THIS ACTION, defendant Travis Widdison, having been regularly served with process 
on March 19, 1998, and having failed to appear and answer plaintiffs complaint on file herein and 
the time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said defendant in the premises 
is hereby duly entered according to law. / 
ATTEST my hand, and the seal of the above-entitled court, this _o££-day of June, 1998. 
•. A Clerk of the Gburt 
BY: 
Depufy Clerk 
F:\DATAVDws\Files\Sanders, RL\P\Default Cert. T. Widdison. wpd 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140 
PAIGE BIGELOW-6493 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
RICKY LEE SANDERS, individually, and in 
his capacity as the personal representative of 
the estate of Breanna Marie Loveless, 
Deceased, 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 




MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, in his capacity as 
Governor of the State of Utah; et al, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 980901895 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
IN THIS ACTION, defendant Bobbie Dawn Widdison, having been regularly served with 
process on March 19, 1998, and having failed to appear and answer plaintiffs complaint on file 
herein and the time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said defendant in 
the premises is hereby duly entered according to law. / 
ATTEST my hand, and the seal of the above-entitled court, this pv day of June, 1998. 
F:\DATA\Dws\Files\Sanders, RL\P\Default Cert BD Widdison. wpd 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER rn Cn I I I * « ^ 
City Centre I, Suite 900 ™ j f f i K f t g B ' 
175 East 400 South J U , s t r , c t 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Jjj^ j r «QQ^  
(801) 524-1000 ; 
Attorneys for Michael O'Brien, Jones, (^^/^^:=::^!^QSir 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 
William Grimm, The National Center 
for Youth Law 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY LEE SANDERS, 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff, | ft> 
Civil No. 9809018$ 
vs. | Judge: Homer F. Wilkinson 
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, et al., 
Defendants. 
The motion of defendants Jones,Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, the National 
Center for Youth Law, Michael O'Brien and William Grimm came on for hearing before 
the Court on June 23, 1998. Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, David Scofield, and 
the moving defendants were represented by David Eckersley. The Court, having 
considered the memoranda submitted by counsel and the arguments made at hearing, hereby 








Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. 
offeneM998. 
BY THE C O t a ^ w S f e 
DATED this'jL. day 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ft* 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, first-











David W. Scofield 
Paige Bigelow 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James R. Soper 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Post Office Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
t3Z g f " 
2s VI 
ORIGINAL 
JAMES R. SOPER - 3043 
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorneys General 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Leavi11, Steadman, Noonan, 
Graham, Clawson, Luinstra, 
Utah State Department of 
Human Services, Division of 
Family Services, Monitoring 
Panel, Atkihson, Cotterell, 
and Lunt 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY LEE SANDERS, 
individually, and in his ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
capacity as the personal : 
representative of the estate 
of Breanna Marie Loveless, : 
Deceased, 
: Civil No. 980901895 
Plaintiff, 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
vs. 
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, in his 
capacity as Governor of the : 
State of Utah; et al. , 
Defendants. 
The MOTION TO DISMISS filed by defendants, Michael 0. 
Leavitt, Kerry Steadman, Mary T. Noonan, Jan Graham, Carol 
Clawson, Linda Luinstra, Pamela Atkinson, Sherianne Cotterell, 
r iTM°wD , , S T , , , C T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 15 1398 
SAUJ 
Larry Lunt, the Monitoring Panel, the Utah State Department of 
Human Services, and the Division of Family Services, duly came on 
for hearing on the June 23, 1998, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson presiding. The moving defendants being represented by 
James R. Soper and Barbara Ochoa. Plaintiff being represented by 
David W.Scofield. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and 
papers on file and having heard agrument of counsel and being 
fully advised, HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Count I of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed, with 
prejudice, againt the following defendants for failure to file a 
notice of claim as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12: 
Utah State Department of Human Services 
Micheal 0. Leavitt 
Kerry D. Steadman 







the Monitoring Panel 
The motion to dismiss Count I as against defendant Division of 
Family Services is continued without date. 
2. Count II of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed against the 
following defendants because this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
2 
enforce the consent decree entered in David C. v. Leavitt, Civil 
no. 93-C-206 W, U.S. District Court for District of Utah: 
Utah State Department of Human Services 
Division of Family Services 
Micheal 0. Leavitt 
Kerry D. Steadman 







the Monitoring Panel 
The dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice to 
plaintiff to bring the claims of Count II in U.S. District Court. 
3. Count III of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed against 
the following defendants because this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
enforce the consent decree entered in David C. v. Leavitt, Civil 
no. 93-C-206 W, U.S. District Court for District of Utah: 
Utah State Department of Human Services 
Division of Family Services 
Micheal 0. Leavitt 
Kerry D. Steadman 







the Monitoring Panel 
3 
The dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice to 
plaintiff to bring the claims of Count III in U.S. District 
Court. 
4. Count IV of plaintiff's complaint is dimissed, with 
prejudice, against the following defendants because they did not 




the Monitoring Panel 
Dated this ^T day of 1998 
f-
mer F. Wilkins 
istrict Court JuJ 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, this 
day of June, 1998, to the following: 
David W. Scofield 
Paige Bigelow 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorneys" for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South
 j^~\ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 '' J 
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bleeding disorders that make them easily detectable and one 
can, you know, rule those out or make that diagnosis often 
just really on history, based on a history and physical 
examination, and if that can't be done, then in certain 
simple laboratory studies. 
Q. Based on your training and experience, Doctor, 
what's the significance of weight loss in a child under the 
age of 1? 
A. Weight loss in any child under the age of 1 
is--always should set off alarms and warning signs to a 
pediatrician. An infant should triple its birth weight by 
the time it reaches the age of 1, so a child should continue 
to grow and gain weight from day-to-day literally until 
about well, it goes on until its first birthday beyond that. 
So that a child who fails to gain weight or in fact loses 
weight, this indicates a significant--a significant problem 
and something should be investigated by the physicians. 
It may be due to chronic illness, serious chronic 
illness. It may be one of the early signs of abuse and 
neglect inadequate nutrition. Often merely neglect itself 
may lead to a child not eating, as well may cause her to 
gain weight or even weight loss. 
Q. How common is it for infants to die of pneumonia? 
A. It's very rare for a normal infant to die of 
pneumonia particularly beyond the neonatal period first 
J. M. LIDDELL 
histories. The histories are also inconsistent. I mean 
these children don't suffer these kinds of injuries in falls 
from a couch or getting trapped between a mattress and a bed 
spring of a crib. And we've seen different histories again. 
This is characteristic of Battered Child Syndrome, 
discrepancy in the histories. 
But even without the history, if we look at this 
child--look at the the child, just look at the photographs 
here where these injuries are and fractures and you can rule 
out any natural disease process. And Ifve seen, as I say, 
not only babies who will die, but thousands of babies. I've 
seen babies who have accidental injuries and these are not 
consistent with any form of accidental injury. They're not 
consistent with any form of natural disease process that I 
know of or that is recognized today by the physicians in the 
medical field. 
Q. Thank you, Doctor. Did you review records showing 
that Breanna had been seen numerous times for ear 
infections? 
A. Yes, she had. 
Q. Was there any significance to you o*f the number of 
times in eight months that she had had ear infection? 
A. Well, I think the fact that these ear infections 
did not clear up and were recurrent, that they indicated 
that she was not receiving medication that she was supposed 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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to receive when a culture of the ear infection was finally 
performed and did turn out Pseudomonas. That Pseudomonas 
was sensitive to virtually any antibiotic and had she 
received adequate therapy with the antibiotic, we would 
expect the ear infection to have cleared up. In fact, you 
know that in January that when the prescription was given, 
ah, to, urn, to Mrs. Widdison, that the, ah--that it was not 
filled. And then finally a physician followed necessarily 
injectable antibiotics in order to assure the child was 
receiving the appropriate dose* 
Q. Did you review the records relating to a visit 
that Breanna had to the doctor on January 12th of 1996? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you find that was significant about that 
visit? 
A. Well, not only, of course, that at that time that 
she had, ah, still had suppurative otitis media, but that 
she also had bruises on the forehead and on the left cheek. 
And again, we have three bruises. One bruise on the 
forehead. You might find some excuse, for there are usually 
bruises on the forehead. Should be midlines. Here we have 
two more, not midline, plus the bruise on the cheek. And I 
think the bruise to the cheek is immediately suspicious for 
a bruise because it's not the kind of area that we come to 
get an accidental--an accidental bruise. 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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Q. As to the condition of the baby's nose, did you 
find anything significant about that? 
A. Well, also, there was erosion of the child's 
nose--tip of the nose. Between the nostrils, there was 
abrasion and erosion. Again, it's a medical condition that 
needed to be treated. 
Q. Did you also--I!m sorry. 
A. I'm sorry. The child also had diaper rash, a 
chronic diaper rash which was persistent up until her death. 
Q. Did you also then review records that were 
relating to the doctor visit on January 30th of 1996? 
A. Yes. And the record of January 30th, particular, 
was very disturbing because now the child has multiple 
bruises all over the body and multiple bruises of different 
ages now on the face and this. And also it was significant 
that at this time, although the child had complained of as 
given diarrhea, the previous visit on the 12th of January, 
and the mother even had been asked to bring a stool sample, 
that stool sample had not been returned. And again, it's 
important, if a child has diarrhea, to culture the stools 
for the presence of different organisms in order to know how 
to treat the diarrhea; and that had not been done. 
But as I say, most importantly the fact that not 
only were there additional bruises, but these were on the 
facial, also a lesion--a laceration below the lower lip, 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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those documents and let me just have you take a look at 
that, 
(INDICATED) 
And you received copies of those, didn't you? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. I have these. 
Q. And do you have the one in front of you for 
January the 30th--excuse me. January the 12th or the 30th; 
which one did I just show you? 
A. You showed me January the 12th. 
Q. January the 12th. And you're familiar that at the 
end of this situation the physician made some diagnosis; is 
that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And the first diagnosis was--what's the 
first thing that he noted? 
A. Purulent rhinitis. 
Q. What's the second then thing he noted? 
A. Bronchitis. 
Q. The third thing? 
A. Diarrhea. 
Q. And the fourth? 
A. Diaper dermatitis by history. 
Q. Thank you. 
Q. Concerning Pseudomonas, this case you indicated 
that you did see a culture relating to Pseudomonas? 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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of the body, and then when that was removed, I'd say-
eventually lividity would appear in that area of the body. 
Q. Assuming that so much time hadn't passed that 
we're past the time when lividity could occur? 
A. If that portion of the body were dependent, yes. 
MR. McCANDLESS: I don't believe I have any other 
questions right now, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Parrish, you my redirect. 
MR. PARRISH: Thank you, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARRISH: 
Q. Let's just begin, Dr. Kirschner, with that 
particular issue of what position the baby had likely been 
lying for the hours prior to her being discovered. The 
opinion you rendered earlier was that approximately two 
hours prior to her discovery she would have been lying face 
up. Is that also somewhat based on the degree of rigor 
mortis and the position of the baby's body? 
A. It's based on the degree of rigor mortis, yes. 
Q. Would you explain that, to some extent• 
A. Again, rigor mortis sets in much more quickly in 
children than in adults. We don't see rigor in adults until 
perhaps up to eight hours, or eight hours after death. And 
noticeable rigor within a couple of hours after death, we'd 
J. M. LIDDELL 
see significant rigor mortis in an infant. But in a child 
whofs just died or only been dead less than an hour, we 
wouldn't expect to see for an hour-and-a-half to two hours. 
As I say, itfs not an exact science, but it does take at 
least an hour-and-a-half to two hours for rigor mortis to 
become apparent in a child. 
If a child has a fever, it may become more marked, 
yes, earlier on, if the child1s body temperature is lower. 
It may take longer for rigor mortis to appear. But that 
estimate of anywhere from 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 hours there was 
significant rigor is what we would use. So it means a 
child, if it's found and the paramedics got there and the 
child was already in rigor, the child has to have been dead 
for some period of time. 
Q. Mr. McCandless asked you a number of questions 
about Dr. Nixon's report of his concern about the quality of 
X-rays. Did Dr. Leis actually examine those bones? 
A. Yes. And I examined them microscopically and 
those were fractures. 
Q. There's no doubt about that. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Mr. Gaither's cross examination, you talked about 
stresses and the difference between*the adrenal system and 
the effect on the thymus. I think you testified, and 
correct me if I'm wrong, that the lymphocytes in the heart 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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maybe were related to the adrenal hormones; is that correct? 
A. I said actually in this case I don't think they 
are. I think what we found in this case is purely just the 
benign. That's like a slight collection you see in infants. 
It has no significance whatsoever. I was talking about the 
possibility. In cases we see this, all the adrenal effect 
is while the adrenal effect is possible. My opinion is this 
is just a totally benign collection of lymphocytes that has 
no connection whatsoever. 
Q. Thank you. That helps. 
As to the questions about bronchitis and pneumonia 
and such, as you review the records, did you note that every 
time the doctors listened to the baby's chest they found 
that it was clear? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. If I were to tell you that the evidence in this 
case is that the baby had a saturation rate of 99 percent on 
the 11th of February of 1996, what would that say to you? 
A. That would certainly be inconsistent with the 
child having pneumonia. And oxygen, that's total oxygen 
saturation. Thatfs a normal oxygen saturation level and in 
the blood, which indicates that the lungs were functioning 
normally. And when one gets pneumonia, the oxygen 
saturation level in the blood drops down. So this child did 
not have pneumonia at that time. 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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Q. Does the underlying cause of the pneumonia in this 
case, that meaning whether itfs viral or bacterial, have any 
effect at all on the opinions you've rendered here today? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Gaither asked you a question about thrush and 
whether that might be a sign of some underlying immune 
deficiency disorder. Do you have an opinion as to whether 
Breanna had an underlying immune deficiency disorder? 
A. She did not have an underlying immune deficiency 
order. 
Q. And how do you rule that out? 
A. We rule that out several reasons. She was very 
healthy for the first six or seven months of her life. She 
has no other types of intercurrent infections. She showed 
no growth retardation. She grew normally. She was on the 
50th percentile. All this is against the immune defieicney 
disorder. 
She has a normal white blood cell count, so that 
this also would be against that, microscopically, at 
autopsy. She has a normal--normal lymphoid system. That is 
she has a thymus. She has lymph nodes, the lymphoid 
decrease; and secondly, immune deficiency disorders often 
have an absence of the thymus, and if they have a thymus, it 
would be very small and would not have shown proper 
development. We would not see the normal lymphoid cells 
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within the lymph node. She does not have an immune 
deficiency disorder. Her bone marrow is also normal. 
Q. And that's another indication? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Mr. Gaither also asked you some questions about 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome or SIDS. Is that even 
something to be considered in a case like this? 
A. It can't even be in the differential diagnosis 
because it first of all requires that you have a negative 
autopsy; also, a negative in every respect. It's totally 
unlike SIDS. Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, by definition, 
requires that you have totally negative autopsy. That is no 
evidence of disease, no evidence of injuries, and a negative 
scene and circumstances investigation. And it's the sudden 
death of a child who's previously been in good health and 
where there's no other evidence of any possible injury or 
disease. So she just doesn't fall into the SIDS category. 
Plus she really is too old. As I say, officially a 
definition goes up to the age of a year. It's really rare 
to see a child even as old as six months die of SIDS. 
Q. There was a question asked about the lack of lung 
cultures done during the autopsy. Does that have any 
significance in this case? 
A. It doesn't have any bearing in regard to my 
opinion or the diagnosis. I think the child had bacterial 
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pneumonia, not viral pneumonia, based on the microscopic 
appearance. Again, the child does not/ show Pseudomonas 
pneumonia because the microscopic appearance is a not 
Pseudomonas pneumonia. So it doesnft have any bearing. 
MR. PARRISH: Thatfs all I have. 
THE COURT: You the may recross. 
MR. GAITHER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GAITHER: 
Q. Concerning the viral or bacterial pneumonia, the 
culture could have shown which one was present; is that 
correct? 
A. It's not a viral pneumonia. Viral pneumonia 
doesn't look like that. 
Q. Concerning my question, would a culture have 
showed what type of bacterial infection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are you aware of a situation that exists where 
there can be a viral pneumonia and a bacterial pneumonia in 
combination? 
A. Certainly. 
Q. And there's been some testimony by some of the 
experts in this case that if you have that type of a 
combination, the onset could happen more quickly--
A. It certainly could. 
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Q. --and that the child could die quicker--is that 
correct?--if there were a combination. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the usual symptoms that you described would 
not necessarily onset in the--the more slower faction. It 
may have a quick onset. 
A. There is an onset in that case. The child becomes 
ill more quickly, but it would be even more obvious to the 
caretaker this child is in severe respiratory distress. 
Q. But there's no evidence that this child has even a 
mixed viral bacterial pneumonia. 
A. This doesn't show the type of cellular partner in 
the lungs that we would see in a cellular viral pneumonia. 
Q. Concerning the question about SIDS, and that's 
basically the question I asked you, if the child is 
diagnosed with pneumonia, that takes the child out of the 
classification of SIDS 
A. Any child had bruises or evidence of fracture 
would diagnose not SIDS. 
Q. Concerning the periosteal elevations that counsel 
asked you about, could those types of elevations be caused 
by mishandling of a child? 
A. Only by intentional mishandling of a child. That 
is inflicted injuries of this child. 
Q. Now that would be possibly grabbing a child by one 
J. M. LIDDELL 
arm and picking a child up? 
A. You have to take this nine-month-old and take its 
arm and snap its arms to do that. This is not 
something--it's inflicted injury. It's not an accidental 
injury. It's not due to carelessness. It's due to an 
inflicted injury on the child. 
Q. And you've never seen any type of injuries to this 
area, that you would classify as accidental? 
A. In a nine-month-old? 
Q. Yes. 
A. In radial ulnar injuries I don't believe I have. 
Q. Concerning the age of the clavicle injury, did 
you--what was the age that the clavicle injury was diagnosed 
at? Do you remember? 
A. I think at the time it was diagnosed it was a 
fresh injury. 
Q. Excuse me. I used the wrong word. You did some 
microscopies in relation to the clavicle injury? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And those microscopies, did they show healing? 
A. They showed healing, yes. 
Q. And did you put an age on the clavicle injury? 
A. Not specifically. It's difficult to do. It's 
simple with a couple of weeks of age, but it's hard to be 
more specific than that. I can't pin it down to a specific 
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day or more, give it a time frame. 
Q. The periosteal elevations, did you have what time 
frame they were evolved in? 
A. Again, that would indicate a time frame of 
approximately three to four weeks or three to five weeks. 
Q. Okay. So which ones--
A. Are you talking about just in the clavicle? 
Q. No. The clavicle, you said it was--
A. I think the clavicle was consistent with an injury 
of, you know, anywhere from 10 days to 3 weeks or so. 
Q. And then you said the periosteal, let me talk--
A. Well, the other injuries looked older. That is 
the clavicle looked more recent than the other injuries. 
They're probably somewhat older, three to four weeks or 
three to five weeks of age. 
Q, What would be the the long-range length of time on 
those other fractures? 
A. Ah, probably about six weeks. It's difficult. It 
is difficult microscopically to be specifying on those 
injuries. That's one of the reasons that radiologic 
assessment is important. 
Q. So if we're talking about the injuries, were they 
related as far back as noting the time of death, back into 
early January and December would have been a possible time 
frame? 
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A. For those other injuries. Certainly back into the 
early part of January is possible, yes,. I don't know that 
they go back into December. I think that probably is too 
early. But they could go back to January. 
Q. Do you remember the date of--ah, and then again, 
you may have mentioned this. I just didn't get it down in 
my notes. Would it have been that the range of that, the 
earldest possible situation, what was it? 
A. Again, I could say some time in the early part of 
January would be the earliest part. 
Q. The latest--excuse me. I'm sorry. 
A. I don't think there are any younger than probably 
two to three weeks of age. Probably older. 
MR. GAITHER: That's all the questions I have. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. McCandless? 
MR. McCANDLESS: Yeah. Just one question for some 
clarification. 
RECRQSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCCANDLESS: 
Q. All right. Doctor, you testified, I believe, that 
one of the things you relied on in ruling out immune 
deficiency disorders was Breanna was in the 50th percentile; 
did I understand that right, as far as weight and growth is 
high? 
A. For six months, yes. 
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Q. Would it change your opinion at all if she were in 
the 10th percentile? 
A. She dropped down in weight to the 10th percentile. 
But the ultimate test of whether or not she had an immune 
deficiency disorder is the autopsy that she has structurally 
normal lymph nodes, structurally normal thymus, structurally 
normal bone marrow; that she also had a normal white cell 
count. These are all inconsistent with immune deficiency 
disorder, so the drop of her weight is not due to an immune 
deficiency disorder. The drop of her weight is the other 
factors. 
Q. And that would be consistent, despite the findings 
that Dr. Leis made, regarding the thymus? 
A. Yes. Those are secondary findings. Those are due 
to the chronic distresses. The immune deficiency disorders 
do not cause bruises and do not cause fractures. It's as 
simple as that. 
MR. McCANDLESS: I don't have any other questions. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Parrish? 
MR. PARRISH: Just one very brief question. 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARRISH: 
Q. Dr. Kirschner, Dr. Leis, in his autopsy, indicates 
in his opinion that fractures were two to four weeks old at 
the time of death; do you have any disagreement with that? 
J. M. LIDDELL 
PREPARED IN A .ICIPATION OF LITIGATION: l ^ I S DOCUMENT 
IS NOT TO BE RELEASED WITHOUT A COURT ORDER 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
FATALITY REVIEW 
Deceased: BREANNA MARIE COURTNEY LOVELESS 
Date of Birth: May 22, 1995 
Date of Death: February 22, 1996 
Medical Examiner Determination of Cause of Death: 
Manner of Death: Undetermined 
Immediate Cause of Death: Pneumonia 
Other significant Conditions: Musculoskeletal trauma, recent and healing; myocarditis 
Fatality Review Committee: 
1. Charlotte Meacham (Chair), Bureau of Risk Management 
2.. David McShane, Bureau of Risk Management 
3. Joyce Marsing, Bureau of Risk Management 
4. Kent Barry, Attorney General's Office, Child Protection Division 
5. George Glines, Division of Child and Family Services 
6. Chris Thomas, Division of Child and Family Services 
7. Susan Bradford, Office of the Guardian ad Litem (6/5/96 meeting) 
8. Kristin Brewer, Director, Office of the Guardian ad Litem (8/28/96 meeting) 
9. Dr. Helen Britton, PCMC Child Protection Team 
10. Barbara Pearce, Constituent Services 
Date of Committee Review: June 5, 1996, August 28, 1996 
Persons Interviewed by the Committee: 
1. Pam Goodrich, DCFS caseworker 
2. Theldon Myrup, DCFS supervisor 
3*. David Tibbs, Assistant Attorney General, Child Protection Division 




Information Examined by the Comm lttee: 
Division of Child and Family Services file for Breanna Loveless- M^.Vai v • « 
BACKGROUND/NATURE OF AGENCY INVOLVEMENT 
The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) received the first rhfM p • • r • 
refe^ al concerning Bobbie Widdison, Breanna L o l e l e s s ' m i t o n e 2 199T ^ n T ^ 
sub a^ntiated for medical neglect after it was determined that Bobbi Widd so'n and ^wZ™ 
(Bobbie s then-husband) failed to seek medical attention for their 10-mon h old H / T u T 
arm. The child did not receive treatment until her grandmotherTook t l ? ? ^ ^ 
approximately a week after the injury occurred At that rinTth t h e h°S p ' t a l 
four months, the case was closed on October 28, 1991. 'raiment plan. Aiter 
DCFS received its first referral concerning Breanna on January 1? loofi
 whf„ >,„ f„>, r,- , 
Sanders, and paternal grandmother, Maradeen Sanders, took hio"thememenJ™ f' 
oi^ iuijumi. one stated that she did not notice any other hniKM \Xc r^~j • L ^ . , 
case with David Tibbs, an assistant attorney general, * t S » ^ ? ? ^ ' 
doctor that the condition was not neglect. Ms. Goodrich Zl'Zt * t 7 """ ? 
re.tera.ed that the condition was not caused by neglect Ms Goodlh a l ° - ~ »' T* 
Widdison's home
 3 „ f M M P l 1° ^ '" Pa'n Whe" S h e P i cked "«r «P f™™ Ms. 
o S i t L l ™ ' r m un'Shi' .AftW COnSU"inS W i , h m e d i c a l Professionals, Ms. 
With regard to the bruises, K Goodrich staffed the case with Dr. Sta.no, who had seen Breanna 
on January 30, 1996 after she purportedly became stuck between the her crib mattress and box 
springs. According to the consultation report prepared by Dr. Helen Britton after a review of the 
relevant medical records, Dr. Shamo noted that Breanna had multiple contusions, abrasions and red 
linear marks. While he was concerned about the marks, he indicated that they were consistent with 
Ms. Widdison's story that Breanna got caught between the crib rail and mattress. (It should be noted 
'that at the preliminary hearing, Dr. Shamo stated that there were red linear marks, not bruises.) Dr. 
Monsen's medical records from the February 11, 1996 visit indicate that there were "multiple 
contusions . . . of the face, right arm, right upper chest, left hip and back." Some of the bruises and 
a chin laceration were new since the January 30 visit with Dr. Shamo. Dr. Monsen's emergency room 
notes indicate that he believed the bruises were due to abuse. He stated that "[t]he mother is advised 
of the possibility of this child being taken from her care She does not seem amenable to help in 
the home. I advised her of the possibility of losing this child if things did not improve." Dr. Monsen 
also recommended twice daily visits to the home by CPS and advised that the situation needed to be 
"watched extremely closely." 
It was also discovered during the investigation that Breanna had been diagnosed with ear infections 
at the January 30 visit, but Ms. Widdison did not have the prescription filled until a week later, when 
she asked Ms. Sanders to do it. Ms. Goodrich was also concerned after the mother tested positive 
for opiates and benzodiazepine. The positive opiate result was explained by Ms. Widdison's use of 
Lortab, but there was no explanation for the positive result for benzodiazepines. Ms. Goodrich 
staffed the case with Lorraine Iverson and the decision was made to release the child to Ms. Widdison 
upon her agreement to allow CPS to visit the home twice daily, at least initially. The case was 
subsequently staffed with Ms. Goodrich's supervisor, Theldon Myrup, and with the assistant attorney 
general, David Tibbs. In addition, information tp support a protective supervision request was faxed 
to David Tibbs. 
On Monday, February 12, 1996, Ms. Goodrich visited the home three times and saw the baby twice. 
At both visits, the child appeared to be in satisfactory condition. Ms. Iverson also visited the home 
twice on Tuesday, February 13, where the baby continued to appear adequately cared for. In 
addition, the amount of medication was decreasing, indicating that it was being used. On Wednesday, 
February 14, Ms. Goodrich visited the home twice and was told both times that the child was asleep. 
On the first visit, the worker insisted on seeing Breanna, who was in her crib but did not appear to 
be sieepy. Ms. Widdison, however, refused to allow the worker to see the baby on the second visit 
that day, stating that Breanna slept all the time because of the pain. On Thursday, February 15, 1996, 
Ms. Widdison came into the DCFS office and stated that she would not be available that afternoon 
and would be unavailable on Friday. Ms. Goodrich, however, called the doctor's office later that 
afternoon and confirmed that Breanna and her mother were there for a follow-up visit. From Friday, 
February 16 through Monday, February 19, no visits were attempted. On Tuesday, February 20, Ms. 
Goodrich attempted a home visit, but Ms. Widdison refused to let her see Breanna. The case was 
staffed with assistant attorney general David Tibbs the following day, Wednesday, February 21, and 
the decision was made to petition for at least protective supervision. That night, however, emergency 
personnel were summoned to Breanna's home upon reports that the Breanna was not breathing. No 
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resuscitation efforts were mac. as it was clear that Breanna was already aead « the f .u ,• , 
and law enforcement personnel arrived. " Y t h e t i m e l h a t m e d i c a l 
Breanna.'s ° l d e r siblin§s> ages 4 and 5, were immediately taken to the h«. v i r u • 
exarrunanons and were removed from the home. They were i m 4 t D l 1 H T ^ PhySlCal 
un.1 the JuvenHe Court released them to their father o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ h o m e 
the ^ ° f l b m a r y 2 5 ' 1 9 9 6 W h h a I I^a t i o n s ttat Ms. w7ddison had cLsed I i ^ 
the children by hitting her. Photographs were taken of the b^se
 a n d t h e ' ^ ? ^ 
medial examination. There was some uncertainty as to why theTuise did nnf' d *"* * * ? *?' * 
of the trunal physical, but the bruise appeared to be too old to h a t b Z t u s L t l ^f ? ^ ^ 
It was determined that the injury may have been too fresh at thH mnf t - ^ , ^ h ° m e -
show up. The child told the f o L mother and the doctor h s ^ t " ! W ** 'V° 
hit her. As a result, the case was substantiated for physical abuse ^ ^ m ° t h e r 
The medical examiner's report indicates that Breanna had many contusion, ^ u • 
addmon, she had two broken arms, a broken leg and a broken cZide t d i o l o l H t raS'°nS- • * 
the broken bones indicated that the injuries were inflicted 2 4 ie!'t R a d , o l o S l c data concerning 
Bobbie Edison and Travis Addison 5 S d ^ £ ^ Breanna's death. 
v*h first-degree felony murder in Breanna's death. In a d d i t i o n , ^ ^ b ~ c h ^ % *T? 
counts of second-degree felony and class A misdemeanor c h S u s e A J t h o S T ^ 
pneumonn, prosecutors contend that the abuse inflicted on BreannaomoromLed f * * * ° f 
and prevented her from surviving the pneumonia. In J f a ^ ^ ^ F ™ * * « « 
may have died of inflicted suffocation 6 V l d e n c e that B r e a n n a 
FINDINGS 
1. While Ms. Goodrich complied with most areas of relevant law and noi;™ „ •• • , • 
were identified in the following areas: P y' P°' ,Cy v , 0 , a t l 0 n s 
( A )
 B e caseworker did not review the nrinr history
 The David C v r «„;„ c „> 
«V »btag or other child residing in that household, and thea! le^ e ^etra .or , •'d' 
requiems are contained in CPS policy (see Child Welfare Manual tt^KU, j ' S ' 
Although the referral number of the prior substantiated referral was notefon thV74 r f ^ r H 'I 
d,d not review the prior history as part of her investigation. 4 ' *' M$' G ° ° d n C h 
S O O C n ^ L ) 1 ^ ^ 1 : ^ """ ""f J 1 " ^ " " " i"""" ' '' Child Welfare Manual Section 
S ^ J f -ures in infants generally are the ^ ! ^ ^ Z u ^ t ^ Z 
a strong hkel.hood at the „me the referrai was received that the case may have invoTved crinTa! 
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charges. While a "Mandate Keport to Law Enforcement" was fihw- out, the facsimile date/time 
stamp indicates that it was not received by the Millard County Sheriffs Office until February 26, 
1996, four days after Breanna's death. It should be noted, however, that at the time this referral took 
place, Ms. Goodrich was unaware that a broken clavicle generally resulted from child abuse. In 
addition, it appears that workers may not receive adequate training on when to involve law 
enforcement. 
© Bobbi Loveless and Travis Widdison should have been qnpstinned more ftYtpn^vply 
concerning the cause nf \h? hryi^, At the time the January 12, 1996 referral was made, Breanna 
had bruises on her cheek and forehead. There Is no indication in the case record or in the worker's 
statements that the mother was ever questioned regarding the bruises. As noted earlier, Breanna had 
many marks and bruises at the time of the February 11, 1996 referral, many of which were new since 
the January 12 referral. The caseworker staffed the issues regarding bruises with Dr. Shamo and 
noted in a letter to David Tibbs, assistant attorney general, that Dr. Monsen was very concerned 
about the bruises that he saw on the February 12, 1996 visit. There is no indication in the activity log, 
however, that she questioned the mother or Travis Widdison regarding the bruises, although there 
is a notation in the investigation summary that "the mother reports she is a very active baby and 
bumps her head when crawling, etc.". Many of the bruises, however, were not on Breanna's head. 
The care givers should have been questioned more extensively regarding the cause of the bruises to 
determine whether they could give plausible, consistent explanations and/or whether there was 
evidence of abuse. 
The settlement agreement requires that all investigations include "an interview with the child's natural 
parents or other guardian" (see Section I.A.3 of the Settlement Agreement and U.C.A. § 78-3a-
304(c)). Presumably, the provision requires the caseworker to question the caretakers regarding the 
allegations contained in the referral in order to determine whether the charges have validity. As noted 
above, however, Travis Widdison was not interviewed and the mother appeared to be questioned only 
briefly regarding some of the bruises. 
2
- Aside from the ahove-noted violations. Ms. Goodrich's investigation*; were thorough an^ i 
conducted in compliance with relevant law and policy. Ms. Goodrich initiated and completed the 
investigations within the required time frames, made appropriate collateral contacts, conducted 
staffings as required by policy (and in some cases, when they were not) and obtained the necessary 
medical records. In addition, Ms. Goodrich's documentation was thorough and clearly documented 
the actions taken on the case. The consensus of the committee was that Ms. Goodrich was a good 
caseworker. The committee felt that the policy violations noted above, as well as many of additional 
problems noted below, were more a result of systemic problems than problems or deficiencies on 
the caseworker 'span. 
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-
 m It would have been consistent with best practices for the caseworker to have insisted on 
seeing the child despif? mother's refusal to let her in the home Ms. Goodrich was very concerned 
for Breanna, as evidenced by her desire to have CPS check on the child twice daily. Ms. Widdison's 
refusal to allow Ms. Goodrich to visit the child should have raised a red flag and prompted Ms. 
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uooanch to insist on seeim. ,e child over the mother's objection, r, . u . 
erroneously believed that she could not force the motfo to
 h r * ! & * " , ? ' ™ l B involvement ( e Drotective «,„««.!AI,\ Tu • •,.,. e t h e ch l ld without court 
saved tf CPS Ld S S o r X e £ £ £ £ £ % ? * * M ** » » ta™ • « 
provided. The information obtained by^  h e 1 j £ S ^ n ^ ^ ? * ^ ™* WaS ,he" 
office, however indicates that it \*Z LT k » ,V,S,Cn Qf t h e A«°mey General's 
no. a certain^ ^ v i ^ ^ ^ ^ B ^ ^ S o ' " " " ' ^ * « 
•nformation eta™, by the Attorney GeneraTs officeTntaesfhat e i ° 'TvideT * , T ""' 
was abused during the last twn
 w~i™ of u... tv / • I ? evidence that Breanna 
not have prevented any further abuse or revealed any additional abuTe " * * k°™ ™ y 
"' ^^eworkerron-er . lvh>l i . ,Hthatther .h;H^, , | - 1 ^. . . | . r r n n , , , , , r , 
empowered nr have
 n,ffiri„ t,n„,„i./ :: ,. ' - ~ T | " i n u m . n ? T* h m - d K l "" ' W 






 Ms, Goodrich incorrectly hHieved that rn,in ;m^i„,mrnt f | . pq~> ti/ae _ . , 
yore .he rnnld inri,t nn ^ n „ P . — . .nd/nr r ^ l . T I : ^ - 7 * 1 - ,1 7 i ^ 
the caseworker erroneously believed that there had to be s J Z u n ^ m t t ^ U M' 
msist on seeing the child. She also believed that the court had t o T « Z c ^ r e ^ M ? , 
the child removed. If the circumstances justify it however a casev™LT™ >!• she could have 
law enforcement and visit and/or remote a^hiid even ^ ^ Z ^ ^ ^ ^ Z Z ^ 
( iB ) • M ? l g Q 0 d r i c h d i d n n f h p l i p v p that she haH c„ff i^ n f evidence of „h„« T>, 
~ : ^ E ^ *: rw that she fe,t ,here ^ r^^Sc^fe^ 
c av.de was the result of child abuse. (Her failure to view the brota davicle L3uleKMc , r 
abuse appears to have been a training issue that has since been resdved l T G o o d r i c h I f ' T Z , 
since the baby's death, she learned in a CORE training that broken cUvicfes shouldU™"f, u 
Monsen fe7we d t ' t I n T T " '," V a n°U S S ,aSSS 0 f hea l inS. "»"V of which Dr. 
s u b ^ i a t ' ^ r e f e t ^ r p ^ a l a b u ^ ^ " ^ *" W * ™ S h ~ i d ' " « " * » » 
6 
© Ms Qoodric ,g not believe she could rely^ on her own .rigme^ During the fatality 
review and preliminary hearing, Ms. Goodrich indicated that she could not rely on her own judgment, 
but that she had to have "outside" evidence from third parties (doctors, etc.). For example, it appears 
that Ms. Goodrich appears to have relied too much on the judgment of the assistant attorney general 
and not enough on her own. Ms. Goodrich was very concerned about Breanna, but felt that the 
assistant attorney general, David Tibbs, did not believe there was enough for even protective 
supervision. (Mr. Tibbs, however, does not recall stating that there was not enough for protective 
supervision.) As a result, she said that despite her concerns, she would have "felt stupid" pursuing 
PSS or removal. Ms. Goodrich stated that she believed the assistant attorney general had to make 
the decision of whether to pursue removal, PSS, etc., but Mr. Tibbs states that the decision has 
always rested with the caseworker. (It appears that the current position of the attorney general's 
office is to leave the decision to the caseworker, although it is unclear whether that is a new position 
or a reiteration of what that office's position has always been.) 
Several members of the committee expressed concern that many DCFS caseworkers have increasingly 
felt that they are not empowered to make decisions due to the high level of scrutiny and "second-
guessing" of their decisions. Some workers feel paralyzed and are willing to abdicate decision-
making responsibility to others. DCFS workers, however, are specifically trained to recognize child 
abuse and need to feel empowered to make decisions based on their assessment of the case, even if 
their opinion conflicts with the opinion of the doctors, assistant attorney generals, etc. 
5; After Breanna's death the caseworker took appropriate action tn protect Breanna's two older 
S'Sters, Immediately upon notification of Breanna's death, Ms. Goodrich, along with law 
enforcement, took the two older children for a physical examination and removed them from the 
home. Pursuant to a court order, they have since been placed with their natural father. A review of 
the case record indicates that Ms. Goodrich complied with relevant law, policy and court orders in 
removing and placing the two children. 
6
- PCFS employees have implemented changes as a result of Breanna's rWh Since Breanna's 
death, the DCFS employees involved have reviewed their handling of the case and have made the 
following changes as a result: (a) procedures have been modified to ensure that a copy of any prior 
referrals are attached to the 741 and reviewed by the worker as part of the investigation; (b) the 
caseworker now requests that law enforcement accompany them on all cases in which injury to an 
infant is alleged; © a complete skeletal survey is done if injury to a child is found (Dr. Britton clarified 
during the review that this may be accomplished by having a full set of x-rays taken in Delta (where 
the child resides) and having the x-rays sent to Primary Children's Medical Center, rather than 
requiring the child to travel to Salt Lake City for the survey); (d) workers and supervisors now leave 
their cellphones and beepers on 24-hours a day to improve accessibility and improve communication. 
The workers and Western Region should be commended for their proactive response in 
independently improving their practices after Breanna's death. 
7
- The caseworker would benefit from additional training Ms. Goodrich indicated that she 
would benefit from additional training. She specifically stated that training regarding sex abuse 
7 
mvwHgauons and the risk cessment tool would be helofiil i 
and presumably other rural areas, family preservation services are u n a v a S t ^ h m W r ' 
?" , ^ h ^ r e ?rfi times when Mc Goodrich's ragrinarl i« - w . - . . : . . .
 r 4l 
T „ ' V ^ P t ^ ^ carted a„ ejces Jv ^ . a d ^ i n ^ ™ 'li,!" * " f * " 
manageable when there has been another worker there hut t L ;7 CaSe load *** 
worker, as she is now. (The a m ^ J S ^ ^ D C T S ^ n ^ ^ ^ l the" " "" "% 
hmng another worker to replace a worker who recently left the DdToffi J ? ™ t h e J r 0 c e s " f 
excessive caseload can be exacerbated in rural areas by the n e c e s s t o ^ L "l * " 
clients lengthy distances for services. necessity of having workers transport 
Breanna's medical history, * * « i ^ £ ^ ^ £ ^ ™ f" ^ . *" 
her death, however, t n ^ X ^ s S S t T ^ l ' 1 "**• " T « ° 
inBreanna's care did become concerned about abuse after bse^ng.hat £ l n t d ^ ' 7 ^ 
broken clavicle, multiple bruises and abrasions and an untreated „fe«ion i " """""T^ 
wice daily visits and otherwise indicated in his notes that he felt h " uries stemLn t """"I 
(i.e., by telling the mother thai the child would be removed if ,he s h Z n l !,^ ^ m abuse 
appropriately referred ,he case to DCFS and c o o p e r a t e d t n t ^ " ^ ^ * 
doeJLJ^^^^^Ti"™ COnCSrned 3b0Ut the bmises and th< d ° « ° ' 
concerning is *ll*^lX7 T * Sn0S'S °r C3USe r e p o n e d b y , h e P^cian. More sunlit, is a later visit to the same doctor on January 30 1996 in «/»«/* n.» , 
multiple abrasions and contusions, which the mother su ed o ^ Z ^ L ^ Z r *"" I' 
between the mattrpcc **A U~ • ,. u^urrea wnen breanna was caucht 
noted h teve r that *""* ™ " ^ * ™* ° t h e r aCC0UntS' the ^ "»• * • Brtaon 
lojn physical examination . . . bruises of different ages are documented: a recent 'red/purple' 
1 cm diameter bru.se on the lateral aspect of the eyebrow 'old ecchv™*!? 1 L - t 
cheek and cheek bone about 5 mm diameter, a 5 mm b'y 4 c°m ' ^ ^ 1 ^ 
8 
lower lip, a 4 cm
 4. j raised contusion' above the left ear, a 1 cm by 4 cm horizontal 
contusion on the back of the head, an old 1 by Vz cm oval shaped contusion on the upper arm 
two red linear bruises or abrasions 5 mm by 5 cm located midway up the upper back and just 
below the waist, a red linear mark or abrasion on the right buttocks measuring 1 cm by 10 cm, 
and a deep purple 'confluent diaper rash'. Although the medical assessmenfstates that these 
injuries are consistent with the history, the varied ages of the bruises and abrasions and their 
location-(some would be under clothed and diapered areas) do not support this conclusion. 
Nonaccidental trauma would be the most likely explanation for this constellation of 
physical findings (emphasis added)." 
While sole responsibility cannot be placed with medical personnel for not always identifying 
Breanna's injuries as stemming from abuse, the failure to do so was a significant factor in the 
decisions made regarding Breanna's case. 
H ; . PCFsS caseworkers mav not be adequately trained to know when to oet a second medical 
2JTOIL Although there were several physical symptoms indicating that Breanna had been physically 
abused, the caseworker relied on a doctor's assessment that the child's injuries were not consistent 
with neglect and/or abuse (in connection with the January 12 and February 11, 1996 referrals). While 
it is understandable that a lay person would defer to a medical professional's judgment regarding the 
case of the injuries, DCFS workers need to be trained on when to seek a second opinion regarding 
the cause of injuries. 
12
- The caseworker was provided with appropriate support following Banna's death The 
Western^region should be commended for providing excellent support to Ms. Goodrich following 
Breanna's death. Ms. Goodrich stated that her supervisor, Theldon Myrup, was extremely 
supportive. In addition, the region arranged for a clinical consultant to come down from Ogden to 
talk with Ms. Goodrich. (The consultant was available for additional visits, but Ms. Goodrich'did not 
feel that further sessions with the consultant were needed.) It is commendable that the Western 




 . PCFS should continue its efforts to ensure that workers are properly fraJneH DCFS should 
continue to assess worker's knowledge and should provide training in needed areas. Specifically, 
additional training may be required in the following areas: 
(a) Thg DCFS worker's right to conduct home visits ^ he/she feeU is necessary to 
protect children As indicated earlier, Ms. Goodrich seemed to believe that she did not have 
the right to insist on seeing Breanna over her mother's objections without protective 
supervision. Caseworkers should be educated on their rights regarding visitation and other 
interventions and should be trained on how to obtain the appropriate support (i.e., law 
enforcement) in asserting those rights. 
9 
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Caseworkers should be trained to properly fill out he as e s s ^ m f f Assessment Tool, 
extent possible in protecting children Sme"' ^ ' ° u s e " t 0 t h e &I1«< 
abuse/nonaccidental trauma and should be e d u c e d o whe'nt p o Z T t o h,'""' 
second opinion and/or to contact appropriate medical professtona s fi
 e theCh M P , ,'" * 
Team a. Primary Children's Medical Center or K t e i Z c n X l Z T T 
knowledgeable and concerned about child abuse) Such o
 n f e l •° *" 
determining whether a child has been abused and can assia t h e l X ™ "?* ? 
children), particularly if the worker needs U H B ^ t ^ Z ^ J T T ? , 
physician. While it is understandable for a lay person o defer « h Z ? ' 1 r ? , 
professional regarding the cause of injuries" DCFS ^ I f f i ^ r t t 
~ P
a r p n a t e a n d n e c w ^ ^ 
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' • PCFS workers should h>
 trJ;ned and wnpmvererl to rriu ™ .1 . . : :...,• „ . , 
attenuon should be paid ,0 ensuring that workers do no place undu ia e o , ' '
 f ^ 
ass.s.ant attorney generals. I, appears that in the past, the attorney sen
 al i t ? " ' 
appropriate to leave the decision ,0 the caseworkers, i i C ^ ^ l « f * " W - b ' " 
attom^eneral(s) are va.uable and should be sought, bu, t h e l c ^ X , r t v e ' t e k 
PSS etc. should ulnmately lie with the caseworker and his/her suoervisnr nrrc u 
appf: "a.: ih;nh 0 z z ^ t zzgTjg „est,rT,o " e ,he 
meir respective roles are with regard to casework dec s ons (It shm.lri h* „«»^ M, x* 
a ^ d t o ^ e i r ^ e ? T T K " ' l i T r I ? ^ ^ « ^ " ™ « 
w o ? ™ £ S a n d t l S a " J S ^ T " " " « — ' " ^ * h * 
10 
m -uu.u«n, ^ wooers she oe supponed in their decisions by Dv i administration when they 
have made a good faith effort to discharge their duties.- "CPS work necessarily requires workers to 
make many difficult judgment calls. While it is important to learn from cases where mistakes are 
made or problems/tragedies occur, workers will feel more empowered and free to trust their own 
judgment if they do not feel that they will be unfairly criticized for their decisions if something later 
goes wrong in the case. (It should be noted that the fatality review committee recognizes their need 
to be supportive m this area as well.) 
3
- PCFS rtonld work wifh the medical community in ensuring that r W t ^ , arft p r n p p r ly ^ 
9 recowiTft child abyse and to take appropriate action Doctors should be trained on recognizing 
the signs of child abuse and should be educated on how to address child abuse issues (i e makine 
a referral, working with CPS, contacting the Child Protection Team for consultation, etc.) 
4
- PCFS should ensure that worker's caseloads are held to
 a man?creahle nnmlw DCFS should 
assess worker's caseloads and, to the extent possible, should ensure that workers have adequate time 
to perform their duties in compliance with relevant law and policy. 
II 









ortion. That's what I observed in Breanna. 
In your opinion, doctor, would Breanna 
have died of pneumonia in the absence of 
f physical trauma that she also suffered? 
I don't believe so. ] 
Would you explain that? 
Again, it's unlikely. It is possible, but 
a — normal healthy kids can fight off 
infections such as pneumonia, Obviously, that's not 
100 percent true, or as I stated earlier, we wouldn't 
have somewhere between six or ten infants coming into 
our office dying of pneumonia. But most normal 
healthy kids who develop infection in their lungs 
classified as pneumonia are able to fight that 
infection and become healthy once again. 
Q 
cause an 
Doctor, as you perform an evaluation of the 
d manner of death, you also determine the 








And did you make a determination as to 
Yes, I did. 
What's your opinion as to when Breanna 
.died? 
', 
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likely mechanism of that bruise? 
A That could be a push or blow or something 
that creates pressure in that area of her back. 
Q Could you express any opinion as to the age 
of that bruise? 
A I described it as light brown, so it's been 
there a while and it has been there for a few days, 
Q What else is significant on State's 
Exhibit No. 16? 
A 16 also shows the degree of diaper rash that 
Breanna had, at least from the posterior aspect. 
State's Exhibit 17 shows the degree of diaper rash 
that she had on the front aspect of her genitalia. 
Q What is your opinion as to the cause of the 
diaper rash? 
A She had a history of diarrhea; and with 
improper care or incomplete care of that area, as far 
as changing diapers frequently, keeping the area 
clean, relatively dry, and applying medication, this 
is one of the more significant diaper rashes I have 
seen. 
Q Is this particular condition consistent with 
the claim that the baby's diaper was changed 
frequently? 
A I don't believe so. 



























one other location. Go ahead. 
Q Why don't we just finish with the arms. Do 




cause those kind of periosteal damage? 
A grabbing and twisting of the extremity 
do it. So if you grab the child by the arm and 
pull it somewhere, or your grab, pulling, and twist 
would cause a shear of the periosteum to occur from 
the surface of the bone. Any type of act that would 







Would this be something that would be likely 
1
 normal everyday care of a baby? 
Should not be. I mean, if the kid is handled 
ly and lifted up, you wouldn't see this. 
Do you see this in any kind of accidental 




There would have to be a mechanism where the 
pinned and the body twists; so,syou know, is 
ossible? Yeah, it would be possible, maybe, on 





tities, I'd say that greatly decreases the 
hood of accident. 
Can you talk about how much force would have 
applied in this twisting action? 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 66 
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A It's just described as a rapid twisting type 
of action. You know, you'd have to have some degree 
of squeeze there to apply the pressure so the forces 












twisting motion to cause the shearing to 
Would these be consistent with someone 
the baby up by one arm and the baby's body 
the twisting motion? 
Yes, it could be. 
Would you then label what you've drawn as to 
and right arms? 
(Witness complies). 
What other fractures did you find, Dr. Leis? 
There was also a similar type of elevation of 
the periosteum of the tibia with the shin bone on the 
left. And also in looking at that particular bone, 







, meaning as the bone broke orvwas fractured, 
fracture line didn't just go straight across 
, it had kind of a spin or spiral to it. 
What's the significance of that finding? 
Again, the spiral type of fracture and the 
of the periosteum would be a twisting type of 
motion or, force applied to that particular extremity i 


























producing the fractures. 
Q Can you think of 
would cause that twisting 
A 
arms of 
any type of mechanism that 
force to a baby's 
Similar as to what we described in 
the grabbing the 









Is this particul 
children who are 
No. 
Are any of these 
not yet walking? 
extremity, pulling 




it in the 
ar fracture a common thing to 
not yet walking? 
fractures common 
No. Given the mechanism of forces 




ey are consistent 
Could you express an opinion as to 
the arm fractures 
fracture? 
A Again, seeing --
visualize the periosteum 
days . 






being able Up actually 
raise would be at 
Kt least two to four weeks would be 





As to all the fractures? 
Yes. 
Thank you. You 
least ten 
a fair 
may resume the witness stand. 
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1 suspicious leading up to the death, then we would 
2 certify the cause of death as SIDS. 
3 Q Concerning those types of cases, was I to 
4 understand from your discussion that there are some 
5 young children that come in and it's originally 
6 diagnosed as a possible SIDS case and later that 
7 pneumonia is found and explains the death? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q Now, from what you've told me about SIDS 
10 cases, seems like these cases of pneumonia would be 
11 young children, there was no prior indicators that had 
12 pneumonia, the parents just went out and find them in 
13 the crib? 
14 A Usually about the most significant symptoms 
15 we find, they might have had some sort of upper 
16 respiratory infection so that they had runny nose or 
17 sniffles. 
18 Q Bronchitis? 
19 A Usually not, but there may be a physician 
20 recently made a diagnosis such as that. 
21 Q So basically what you're saying, there are 
22 some SIDS cases of pneumonia that you're aware of 
23 where there wasn't any situation where the child was 
24 showing any effects as to the extent that when the 
25 child canle in it was diagnosed as sudden infant death 





be a sudd 








Initially, it presented as if it 
en death syndrome death. And then 
ompletion of our test we certified 
as pneumonia. 
probably similar to this case. Yo 
into sudden death syndrome in this case, di 
That would be considered in the different 
diagnosis before we start, yes. 
Q And so 
questions about 




of time a 
ledge, do 
when there was some follow-up 
what you would normally expect as 







nd situations such as that, you have to 
n't you, that there are cases when 













SIDS and then you find pneumonia? 
it 
those cases where you 'found the child 
of pneumonia, have you analyzed it to 




evidence of an 
routinely the same cultures that I did 
Breanna. And we may or may not find 
organism based upon those tests. 
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1 Q And in some of those, have you found any 
2 cases where there was a combination of the viral and 
3 the pneumonia that caused sudden pneumonia to have its 
4 onset? 
5 A Usually we only find one organism, but it 
6 would be possible to have more than one. 
7 Q Now, in the frequency -- just to get the 
8 statistics down a little bit -- was that you 
9 personally that you see six infants per year, or was 
10 that your entire office? 
11 A That's probably more representative of the 
12 entire office. 
13 Q What is the statistics basically for SIDS 
14 death in the last two or three years? 
15 A In our office we are getting between 30 and 
16 40 deaths to be classified as SIDS each year. 
17 Q 30 to 40? And some of those have -- okay, 
18 and originally some SIDS have been classified as 
19 pneumonia, so they wouldn't be included in that 30 to 
20 40? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q All right. Thank you. 
23 Now, I would like to ask you some questions 
24 about some medical records. 
25 At this time, your Honor, I have marked as 
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1 Q You had no indication of any follow-up tests? 
2 And the follow-up test would be a fluid serum test 
3 which would test the same thing, but possibly look for 
4 different -- categorize it differently? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Thank you. I'm now placing on the projector 
7 what I've referred to as a blood test of January 30th, 
8 1996. Do you recall receiving that document? 
9 A Yes, I do. 
10 Q And I'm going to slide it down on the screen 
11 so we can see the top portion. Does any of your 
12 copies have any writing -- handwriting on the 
13 right-hand side? 
14 A Yes. The copies that I received at the ME's 
15 office does. The exhibits do not. 
16 Q And did you interpret that to mean, "Call 
17 patient. Lab results show viral illness"? 
18 A That's what it says. 
19 Q What is a viral illness? 
20 A That would be an infection because of some 
21 sort of viral agent or virus. 
22 Q And would that include something like upper 
23 respiratory tract problem, a virus? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q And I have heard some discussion about one 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 124 
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1 pneumonia. 
2 Q Secondary infection on top like plus four 
3 Pseudomonas? 
4 A Pseudomonas could be an organism, yes. 
5 Q Thank you. So the fact that the child has 
6 bronchitis does increase the likelihood that the other 
7 bacterial infections could spread to the lungs? 
8 A Could you repeat that? 
9 Q The fact that a child has bronchitis, does it 
10 increase the likelihood that the infection may spread 
11 to the lungs and develop pneumonia? 
12 A It may. 
13 Q Concerning the ear drainage, did you ever see 
14 an indication that the ears were draining? 
15 A Yes. I saw the dried exudates in both ear 
16 canals. 
17 Q Would the drainage of the tubes that were 
18 placed in January ever drain out in the area of the 
19 lungs? 
20 A That's possible. 
21 Q And I think you previously discussed an 
22 opening known as eustachian tube? 
23 A Correct. 
24 Q And that would be drainage into the back of 
25 the mouth area? 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 139 
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A Yes . 
Q And that could be a source for the spread of 
bacterial organisms possibly down to 'the lungs? 
A It's possible. 
Q The phrase "purulent rhinitis" -- I really 
murdered that one -- could you help me with that 
phrase again? 
A Purulent rhinitis. 
Q What does that mean to you? 
A Drainage from the nose that appears to be 
infected. 
Q All right. And now, some drainage is clear, 
is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And there's also some drainage that is 
colored? 
A Yes. 
Q As far as this child is concerned, did you 
see that there was a colored drainage? 
A The coloration of the exudates in the ear 
canals I saw was colored. 
Q The phrase that I just couldn't speak, did 
you see that in the reports of the physicians? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What was the date of that? 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 140 
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A January 12. 
Q And does that indicate to you that there was 
an infected mucus -- was infected? 
A That would indicate that she's got what 
appears to be infectious drainage coming from her 
nose. 
Q Is that a possible cause of pneumonia? 
A It could be. If she sniffles and swallows 
some of that material, it could wind up trapped in 
lung tissue or could be inhaled. 
Q All right. What about the pacifier? You're 
aware that young children sometimes use pacifiers? 
A Yes. 
Q And I suppose if there was some drainage on 
to the pacifier, the child is sucking the pacifier, 
that would be a pretty likely mechanism into the 
lungs, wouldn't it? 
A It's a possible route. 
Q Did you ever inquire whether this child did 
use a pacifier or anything such as that? 
A I don't recall specifically. 
Q Even if not a pacifier, what about bottles if 
the child was being bottle fed? 
A Same possibility. 
Q Do you recall me asking you questions about 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 141 
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1 A At least the one I'm looking at here, they 
2 didn't plot out her weight. They plotted out the head 
3 circumference. There was some mentionings in the 
4 report that she had lost some weight. 
5 Q Is that a common thing with a child under the 
6 age of one? 
7 A Should not be. 
8 Q And explain that, please. 
9 A Normally the child should continue to grow 
10 and continue to gain weight. 
11 Q Would that be an indication that something 
12 was wrong with Breanna? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And what would you think would be the 
15 possibility there? 
16 A She could either be sick and have a decreased 
17 appetite from that, or she could be limited on the 
18 amount of food that she has available to her. 
19 Q Was there anything that you saw in the 
20 medical records that indicated that she would be 
21 unable to metabolize food? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Mr. McCandless asked you some questions about 
24 the lividity. Let me go back to your original opinion 
25 and just ask if anything that he had asked you about 
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1 A Yes, 
2 Q And again, the -- I think that you even 
3 indicated that that could be caused by pulling on the 
4 ears, the lesions I think you described them as. 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Thank you. Now, going also in that note --
7 this is December 18th of 1995 -- it talks about a 
8 clear rhinitis. Does that have anything to do with 
9 discharge from the nose? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And that clear would mean something as 
12 opposed to a colored situation, is that right? 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q Which would show there's more of a disease, 
15 clear or colored? 
16 A Colored. 
17 Q And then going on to January 12th of 1996, 
18 there is a phrase white mucopurulent drainage coming 
19 from her nostrils? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And that would be the more -- the situation 
22 where there would be some more indication of some type 
23 of an infection? 
24 A Correct. 
25 Q And again, just for reference, the phrase 
NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR 172 
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REPORT OF EXAMINATION 
Name: LOVELESS, Breanna Case #: 96-0224 Age: 9 mos Race: White Sex: Female 
Date/Time of Death: 2 / 2 2 / 9 6 00:26 Date/Time of Autopsy: 2 / 2 2 / 9 6 08:30 
Examination by: E d w a r d A . Leis , M . D . Investigative Agency: Mil lard C o u n t y Sheriff 
Witnesses: Charles E. Stewart, Millard County S.O. 
Manner of Death: Undetermined. 
Immediate Cause of Death: P n e u m o n i a 
Other Significant Conditions: Musculoskeletal trauma, recent and healing; myocarditis. 
FINAL PATHOLOGIC DIAGNOSES 
I. Pneumonia, bilateral, extensive. 
II. Myocarditis, right heart, focal. 
III. Blunt force injuries to the head: 
A. Contusions, face, multiple, recent and resolving. 
B. Abrasion, posterior to right ear and left scalp. 
C. Upper frenula tear, mouth. 
D. Abrasion/superficial laceration below lower lip, healing. 
III.Blunt force injuries to the torso: 
A. Contusions, upper and lower midline of back. 
V. Extremity injuries, including: 
A. Periosteal elevation and calcification, right radius and ulna, left radius. 
B. Right clavicle fracture, mid-shaft, with healing callus. 
C. Left tibia, periosteal elevation and partial spiral fracture. 
D. Abrasion, posterior right elbow. 
E. Contusion, left wrist and and palm. 
E. Contusions, left thigh and both knees. 
F. Contusions, linear, parallel, posterior right thigh. 
Report of Examination 
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VI. Otitis, bilateral with dried exudates in both ear canals and residual exudates 
noted in inner ears. 
VII. Excoriations, labia, perineum, and buttocks. 
VIII. iNo congenital abnormalities. 
OPINION: This nine month old white female, Breanna Loveless, died of pneumonia. 
Infection was identified in all lung lobes. The extent of this disease process is sufficient 
to explain death. Although the infection had not apparently spread into the 
bloodstream, (post-mortem blood cultures showed no growth), there was also evidence 
of an infection and inflammation in the heart. This was limited to a focal region of the 
right heart, but potentially may have been sufficient, in and of itself, to be fatal. 
The deceased had several injuries that were apparent externally and by radiographs. 
These were confirmed by gross and microscopic examination. The cutaneous injuries 
include ecchymoses and some abrasions of the face, extremities, and back. The 
contusions grossly appeared of varying ages based upon their variation in color. 
Histologically, there was a variation in the inflammatory response, also consistent with 
variation of the age of these injuries. The abrasions were crusted and healing. Some 
contusions were patterned. The contusions to the posterior right thigh were parallel 
and the contusions of the left cheek were curvilinear and suggestive of a bite mark. 
The injury to the frenulum appears recent. According to the hospital record, this 
area was noted to be excoriated and slightly bleeding and was felt to be secondary to 
attempted intubation. Microscopically the tissue was necrotic and inflamed, consistent 
with injury to this area previously and while alive. 
Fractures and periosteal bone elevations were identified in several areas. The 
fracture of the clavicle had a well formed callus, indicative of healing. The location of 
the fracture of this bone is seen in both accidental and inflicted injury. There is no 
historical explanation of the injury and in the presence of other fractures and injuries 
seen in this child, I believe non-accidental trauma is a more likely etiology. 
The tibia fracture and the upper extremity periosteal elevations are strongly 
suggestive of non-accidental trauma because of the twisting mechanism that imparts 
such injury. Radiologic dating is consistent with these injuries inflicted 2-4 weeks prior 
to death. The histologic features of these injuries exhibit features consistent with this 
time frame. Although some attempts of microscopic dating of bone injuries appear in 
the literature, the rate of healing is quite variable, particularly in children. Microscopic 
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features from the clavicle and the long bones of the extremities, overlap in their stages 
of healing despite different mechanisms that would lead to the injury. The microscopic 
features cannot distinguish between the injuries occurring in or around a single 
episode or several separate episodes of abuse occurring over a span of a week or two.. 
Another important histologic finding in the sites of bone fracture, as well as non-
injured bone remote from sites of injury, is that there is no indication of abnormal 
bone development or "brittle bone" disease. The injuries identified are secondary to 
non-accidental trauma and are not pathologic fractures. 
Edward A. Leis, M.D. 
Assistant Medical Examiner 
EAL/anj Date signed: U . n ? - C;L> 
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EXAMINATION PROTOCOL 
EXTERNAL EXAMINATION — OME Case # 96-0224 
The body is that of a normally developed white female infant, received with separately 
submitted personal effects in a plastic bag. The personal effects include two one-piece 
sleepers and a section of ace wrap. Personal effects are submitted as evidence to the 
Millard County Sheriff's Office. 
The body has the following measurements: weight 7120 grams (approximately 10th 
percentile for age), length 71 cm (approximately 75th percentile for age), crown-rump 
length 53 cm, head circumference 44 cm, chest circumference 41.5 cm, and abdominal 
girth 43 cm. 
The body is cool. Rigor is present and fixed. Lividity is posterior, red-purple, and fixed, 
except in areas exposed to pressure. 
The-scalp hair is light brown. The anterior fontanelle is depressed and approximately 
1.5 cm in maximum dimension. The eyes are blue with 0.3 cm symmetric pupils and 
petechiae are absent. There are several contusions of the face as described below. There 
are dried crusted tan-green exudates present in both ear canals, the left to a greater 
extent than the right. Injuries to the mouth are as described below. No teeth have 
erupted. The neck is normally formed and free of external evidence of injury. 
The chest is symmetrical and free of external evidence of injury. The abdomen is 
distended, but soft, and free of distinguishing markings or scars. 
The upper and lower extremities are normally developed and symmetrical. On the 
posterior medial right elbow is a 1.1 X 0.6 cm oval red-brown based abrasion. The 
remainder of the right arm is free of evidence of injury. On the palm of the left hand is 
a ill-defined area of apparent purple ecchymosis. On the back of the left wrist/forearm is 
a 4.8 X 1.7 cm bandlike area of ecchymosis which is wider at its posterior-medial aspect. 
In this larger area, the center retains a red-purple color fading to a brown with a yellow-
brown discoloration at the most peripheral margins. 
Small circular light yellow-brown ecchymoses are present on the anterior left thigh and 
left knee. Just above the right knee are slightly larger yellow-brown contusions, and 
brown contusions with yellow margins are present below the right knee. There is no 
distinct swelling of any of the extremities or shortening observable. 
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The back is remarkable for light brown to yellow-brown ecchymoses at the base of the 
neck and the upper back along the midline. Two of these are incised disclosing 
discoloration of the subcutaneous tissue. Similar light brown ecchymoses are seen in 
the upper lumbar region of the back towards the midline. These are also incised and 
disclose subcutaneous changes. A 'control' incision is made in an area of lividity on the 
posterior left with no subcutaneous discoloration identified. 
On the back of the right thigh, just below the buttocks, are two parallel markings. One 
consists of a speckled light brown ecchymosis and separated by a 3.3 cm expanse of non-
injured skin, is a 2.5 cm long by 0.6 cm wide light brown ecchymosis. 
The external genitalia are those of a female infant. There is no evidence of sexual 
assault with the hymenal opening appearing unremarkable. The anal opening is 
similarly unremarkable. In the area of the pubis and the labia majora, over an 8.0 X 3.8 
cm area, are multiple small patchy to confluent red-brown to light brown based 
excoriations. These continue on to the buttocks on both sides of the gluteal crease and 
are on the exposed portions of the buttocks and do not lay within the fold. 
DESCRIPTION OF INTURIES 
I. BLUNT FORCE INTURIES TO THE HEAD: Multiple contusions of varying 
appearance, intensity, and size are noted on the forehead. There are two above the right 
eyebrow, and one on the left upper forehead which is brown with yellow margins. 
Immediately above the left eyebrow are light brown geographic contusions without 
color change of the margins. Faintly discernible light brown ecchymosis is present on 
the left forehead, just to the left of the midline, and measures 2.5 cm maximum. On the 
left scalp, above the left ear, is a 1.2 x 0.5 dry red-brown based abrasion with marginal 
ecchymosis. 
There is red-purple discoloration at the medial aspect of the left lower eyelid which 
fades to a brown color laterally. On the right cheek, over the area of the right zygoma, is 
a light brown ecchymosis. Anterior to both nasal openings, the skin of the nose is dried 
and crusted red-brown. There are no lacerations or tears noted of the tissue of the nose 
or immediately within the openings. 
Just anterior and inferior to the right ear are two faintly discernible small yellow-brown 
ecchymoses. Just lateral and above the mouth, on the lower right cheek, are red-purple 
ecchymoses without discernible fading. On the lower right jaw are light brown 
ecchymoses having yellow margins. 
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On the lower left cheek, just lateral to the left side of the mouth, are light brown 
ecchymoses with slight yellow margins oriented in a slightly ciirved pattern, suggestive 
of a bite mark pattern. Some dried crusted tissue is located at the left angle of the 
mouth. Below the lower lip is a 1.8 X 0.6 cm dried and crusted red-brown based 
abrasion /superficial laceration. 
The oral cavity discloses sloughing of the mucosa of the upper gingiva and tearing of 
the frenulum. The sloughed mucosa extends to the inner aspect of the inner lip. A 
section is taken for microscopic examination. 
RADIOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION: Total body x-rays are obtained. There is a fracture 
of the right midclavicle which has indiscernible callus formation on x-ray. The right 
upper extremity discloses elevation of the periosteum along the shaft of both the right 
radius and ulna. Similar changes are noted on the left radius shaft. There is also an 
angled fracture interrupting the cortex on one side of the left tibia. 
INTERNAL EXAMINATION 
BODY CAVITIES: The body cavities are opened by the usual Y-shaped and 
intermastoid incisions. No adhesions or abnormal collections of fluid are present in 
any of the body cavities. The organs of the thoracic and abdominal cavities are located 
in their normal anatomic positions. The subcutaneous fat layer of the abdominal wall 
is 0.5 cm thick. 
HEAD: The scalp is reflected in the usual fashion disclosing purple ecchymosis on the 
inner surface of the scalp corresponding to the left forehead and right forehead 
ecchymoses. A sample is taken from the left forehead ecchymosis for microscopic 
examination. A portion of the calvarium is removed and is free of skull fractures. The 
dura mater and falx cerebri are intact. No epidural or Subdural hemorrhages are 
present. The brain weighs 870 grams and is placed in formalin for examination at a later 
date. The spinal cord is removed by the anterior approach and is placed in formalin for 
examination at a later date. Following removal of the brain and stripping of the dura, 
no basilar skull fractures are seen. The inner ears are opened with tan exudates found 
bilaterally. 
BRAIN AFTER FIXATION: The cerebral hemispheres are symmetrical without 
evidence of swelling. The meninges appear slightly cloudy, white and bubbly on the 
superior surface. There are no external signs of trauma or developmental abnormality. 
With sectioning, congestion of the intraparenchymal vessels is found. The inferior 
white matter of the right frontal lobe has a 0.3 cm red area. No other significant 
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findings are noted. The external and internal inspection, of the spinal cord is 
unremarkable. 
NECK; A serial dissection of the neck musculature is undertaken with no 
intramuscular hemorrhages found. The hyoid bone is intact. The larynx does not have 
any fractures. The tongue is removed, serially sectioned, with no evidence of 
intramuscular hemorrhage. There are no hemorrhages along the paraspinus muscles 
noted anteriorly, and the upper cervical spine appears normally aligned. An incision is 
made from the base of the head along the upper portions of the spine posteriorly. There 
are no hemorrhages in the paraspinus muscles identified. 
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: The heart weighs 42 grams. The pericardial sac 
contains an appropriate amount of fluid and is free of adhesions. The coronary arteries 
have a normal distribution and arise from normally placed and configured ostia. The 
myocardium is red-brown and firm without evidence of recent or old injury. The 
ventricular chambers are appropriate size and the walls are not thickened. The atrial 
and ventricular septae are intact. The valves have the usual number of cusps and are 
free of abnormality. The aorta and its branches arise normally. There is no coarctation. 
The ductus is closed. 
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM: The lungs weigh 99 and 81 grams, right and left, 
respectively. Both lungs are expanded and appropriately lobated. The pleural surfaces 
are smooth and glistening. The parenchyma varies from red to a slightly darker red-
purple on the posterior dependent regions with no focal lesions or areas of 
consolidation present. The pulmonary artery and its branches are free of occluding 
thrombo-emboli. The trachea and main bronchi are free of obstructive material. The 
mucosal surfaces are tan and smooth throughout without evidence of ulceration or 
hyperemia. 
LIVER AND BILIARY SYSTEM: The liver weighs 338 grams. The hepatic capsule is 
smooth and intact. The parenchyma has a uniform reel-brown congested appearance 
with no focal lesions noted. The gallbladder contains a small amount of green, slightly 
mucoid bile free of calculi. 
ALIMENTARY TRACT: The esophagus is lined by smooth gray-white mucosa. The 
gastric mucosa is normally rugated and the lumen contains approximately 20 cc of 
white curd-like material. There are no ulcerations or erythema noted of the mucosa. 
The small and large intestine are continuous, free of obstruction or lesions. The 
appendix is present. The pancreas is appropriately positioned and consists of lobulated 
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pink tissue. 
GENITOURINARY TRACT: The combined weight of the kidneys is 43 grams. The 
renal capsules strip with ease from the underlying superficially lobulated, red-brown 
cortical surfaces. The cortices are sharply demarcated from the medullary pyramids. The 
calyces, pelves and ureters are unremarkable. The urinary bladder is devoid of urine; 
the mucosa is unremarkable. The uterus and ovaries are unremarkable for age. 
RETICULOENDOTHELIAL SYSTEM: The thymus weighs 9.4 grams. The position and 
lobation is appropriate. Petechiae are absent. The spleen weighs 20.5 grams. The spleen 
capsule is intact encasing semi-firm dark red-purple parenchyma with prominence of 
the white pulp. Regional lymph nodes appear normal. The bone marrow is red-brown 
and moist. 
ENDOCRINE SYSTEM: The thyroid and adrenal glands are appropriately positioned 
and unremarkable. The adrenal glands in aggregate weigh 4.2 grams. 
MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM: There is a large callus surrounding the right clavicle 
at the point of fracture. The long bones from the right forearm, the left tibia, the left 
radius are removed. There is no hemorrhage noted in the surrounding tissues 
associated with these bones. They are placed in formalin and decalcified before 
submitting tissue for microscopic examination. On the proximal portion of the shaft of 
the left tibia, there is a raised irregular bulge, consistent with a fracture noted on one 
surface. Along the lengths of the forearm bones there is no obvious gross deformity. 
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MICROSCOPIC DESCRIPTION 
Slide Key: 
A. Upper back contusions 
B Lower back contusions 
C. Frenulum 
D. Left Forearm contusions 
E. SA node, right ventricle 
F. Trachea, right lung 
G. Left lung 
Brl. Meninges frontal lobe 
Br2. Left inf trontal red area 
H. Liver, pancreas 
I. Kidney, bladder, adrenal 
J. Spleen, thymus, lymph nodes 
K. Left of ventricle 
L. Contusion inside left scalp 
M. Vertebral body 
N , 0 . Clavicle fx 
Br3. Hippocampus 
Br4. Corpus callosum 
P. Clavicle growth center 
Q,K. Right ulna 
S,T. Right radius 
U,V. Left radius 
VV,X,Y. Left tibia 
Br5. Spinal cord 
Br6. Cerebellum 
SKIN, BACK: Sections of the upper back contusions disclose extravasation of red blood 
cells between fat lobules in the deep subcutis. There is no associated inflammation. No 
iron pigment is seen on H & E stained slides or with properly controlled iron stains. 
The lower back contusions have larger areas of hemorrhage in the adipose tissue 
and .in deep layers of connective tissue. The hemorrhage is without associated 
inflammation. In some of the adipose tissue, there is some indication of fat cell 
degeneration and foamy macrophage infiltration. A few cells containing iron pigment 
are identified with special stains. 
FRENULUM: Two small fragments of tissue are sectioned. Both have foci of intact 
epithelium on the surface. The larger section also displays denudation of the 
epithelium and a neutrophilic infiltrate into necrotic tissue. There appears to be some 
mild chronic inflammation in the underlying dermis. There is no hemorrhage. A 
properly controlled GMS stain reveals no yeast or fungal elements. 
SKIN, FOREARM: The epidermis and dermis is intact. Immediately below the dermis 
there is some residual hemorrhage and inflammatory cells. The infiltrate consists of 
neutrophils and macrophages. Similar hemorrhage and inflammation is found in the 
deep connective tissue strands. There are a few gold-tan refractile particles in the 
dermis, consistent with iron pigment. Special stains for iron do not confirm this 
finding. 
SKIN, SCALP: There is no epidermis present. The main tissue fragments are composed 
ed 
is present but mild, consisting of 
of fat and connective tissue with some muscle. There is hemorrhage with intact r
blood cells in both sections. Inflammation 
neutrophils. There is no discernible iron. 
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HEART: Sections from the SA nodal region and the right ventricle have a few foci of 
inflammation in the myocardium. There is some degeneratibn of myocytes with an 
infiltrate of neutrophils and lymphocytes. An occasional foamy macrophage is also 
noted. Sections from the left ventricle have a normal architecture with no 
inflammatory cell infiltrate identified. 
LUNGS: All sections have a fulminant infiltrate of neutrophils into alveoli. There are 
also macrophages and sloughed pneumocytes in the alveoli. The mucosa of the airways 
remains intact. The vasculature is unremarkable. A section of trachea is free of 
inflammation. 
LIVER and PANCREAS: There is a normal basic hepatic architecture. There appears to 
be a slight increase in the number of white blood cells of the blood in the sinusoids. The 
pancreas is unremarkable. 
KIDNEY: The kidneys are unremarkable. There is no inflammation of the bladder. 
ADRENALS: Normal architecture without depletion of cortical lipids. 
RETICULOENDOTHELIAL SYSTEM: There is a depletion of lymphocytes in the 
thymic cortex. Follicle formation is normal in the spleen and lymph nodes. There is 
some central degeneration of the lymph node tissue. 
GASTROINTESTINAL TRACT: Sections disclose various degrees of autolysis. Intact 
areas of mucosa disclose normal maturation. There is focal chronic inflammation of 
the lamina propria but this does not appear excessive. There are no significant 
pathologic processes in the bowel walls. 
BRAIN and SPINAL CORD: The meninges are not inflamed. In the depths of a sulcus, 
some blood has leeched into the adjacent cortex. This does not appear to represent 
injury and there is no tissue reaction to the site. There is no evidence of anoxic injury. 
BONE, VERTEBRAL: Development and maturation of all three hematopoetic cell 
lines are demonstrated in the section. There is no evidence of abnormal bone 
development. 
BONE, CLAVICLE: Adjacent to normal appearing bony trabeculae with marrow 
elements within the spaces, are the ghost outlines of degenerating trabeculae without 
cellular elements. There is some fibrin in the marrow spaces. In the peripheral fibrous 
tissue, there is differentiation into cartilaginous nests with associated osteoid 
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development. Neovascularization is also noted. There is no inflammatory component 
to the injury noted. Hemorrhage is also absent. 
At the growth center at the end of the clavicle, remote from the fracture, a normal 
progression of bone development is seen. The chondrocytes are normally aligned and 
of normal thickness, development of bone trabeculae is normally formed and marrow 
elements are complete. There are no fractures of the trabeculae. 
BONE, RIGHT RADIUS: There is focal thickening of the periosteum in the cross-
sections examined. The periosteum is normally a thin layer of spindle shaped cells at 
the periphery of the bone. The periosteum normally abuts bone tissue with a transition 
of small lacuna dipping into the underlying bone. These lacuna, or spaces, are filled 
with fibro-connective tissue. The lacuna are separated by bony trabeculae, tortuous 
arms that link the periosteum with the dense cortical bone near the center of the shaft. 
In the sections examined, the subperiostal trabeculae are more elongate and less 
tortuous. The periosteum dips deeper into the bone with dense fibro-connective tissue 
between trabeculae. In the depths, the fibro-connective tissue is loose, the spaces 
between trabeculae are widened, and large dilated vascular channels are prominent. 
There are some trabeculae fused with the cortical bone. At approximately midway 
between periosteum and compact bone, the trabeculae are no longer continuous. Large 
spaces filled with similar dilated vascular channels in loose connective tissue fill the 
gaps not crossed by bony trabeculae. 
Focally, the layer of bony trabeculae are replaced completely by cells that are plumper 
and more eosinophilic, with differentiation into cartilaginous elements, which is not 
characteristic of normal bone development and signifies a response to injury. 
BONE, RIGHT ULNA: There is some focal thickening of the periosteum but it is not as 
dramatic as in sections from other bones described. The abnormal length of trabeculae 
and a discontinuous pattern to the underlying cortical bone is again seen. Cartilaginous 
islands of tissue are not present. 
BONE, LEFT RADIUS: Cross sections disclose eccentricity in the thickness of the 
periosteal layer. Focally the periosteum consists of a fairly thin layer of spindled cells 
with eosinophilic cytoplasm and elongate nuclei. There is a progressive thickening of 
the periosteum with enlargement of the cells and larger, more tortuous and 
hyperchromatic nuclei, consistent with differentiation of the periosteum. Eccentrically 
distributed elongation of the trabeculae are again noted as is differentiation of 
cartilaginous elements. 
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BONE, LEFT TIBIA: There is irregularity in the thickness of the subperiostial bone 
development. Trabeculae lengths vary from short to elongate. Amid some of the 
thickest trabeculae, a few islands of cartilage persist. In the depths of this same general 
area, there is discontinuation of the cortical bone. From periosteum to marrow, large 
lacunae are seen continuously without interruption by compact bone. There is a pocket 
with dead necrotic bone trapped within. Medullary elements contain the complement 
of hematopoetic elements. 
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REPORT OF AUTOPSY 
Toxicology Findings 
Caset 1960224 N^77/e: Loveless, Breanna Ase: 9M/0D White/Female 
Date of Death: F e b 2 2 , 1 9 9 6 Date/Time of Autopsy: Feb 22, 1996 08:30 hrs. 
Prosector: Edward A. Leis, M.D., Assistant Medical Examiner 
Drug Screen Results: 
Blood Drug Saeen (ADX-Opiate, BE, Amphet) was NEGATIVE. 
Blood Drug Screen (GC-ABN) was NEGATIVE. 
Blood Drug Screen {GC-Volatiles} was NEGATIVE. 
Drug Quantitation Results: 
Cyanide: <0.5mg/l, Blood (Heart) 
/V<^ rp^u^ 
D. Kevin DeGraw, P.C. (6714) 
1060 S. Main, Suite 101B 
P.O. Box 910445 
St. George, Utah 84791-0445 
Telephone: (435) 688-9533 
Facsimile: (435) 652-8475 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
:ss 
) 
1. I am a physician currently licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah. 
2. I received my M.D. degree from the University of Utah in 1986. 
3. I did my residency training in Pediatrics at the University of North Carolina Medical 
Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina from July 1986 to July 1989. 
4. I am board certified by the American Board of Pediatrics and am a fellow of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics. 
5. I have been a practicing pediatrician since August 1989. 
6. I was previously licensed to practice medicine in the State on New Mexico; however, my 
New Mexico license is currently in inactive status. 
7. I am a certified Pediatric Advanced Life Support Instructor and have specialized training 
in advanced Pediatric Life Support and in the detection and evaluation of child abuse. 
8. I was the chairman of the Child Advocacy Committee from August 1989 to March 1994 
and am currently a consultant on the prevention and treatment of child abuse. 
9. I have reviewed the Report of Examination of Breanna Loveless attached as Exhibit 1 to 
this document (referred to as the "Autopsy Report") and I have been provided with 
information regarding Breanna's medical history. The opinions expressed herein are based 
on my review of the Autopsy Report and the information I received about Breanna's 
medical history. The documents and information I reviewed are of a type reasonably 
relied by experts in the medical field. 
10. Based upon my review of the Autopsy Report, I agree with Dr. Leis' opinion that Breanna 
died of pneumonia. My opinion is based on the finding that all section of the lungs had a 
fulminant infiltrate of neutrophils into alveoli and that there were macrophages and 
sloughed pneumocytes in the alveoli. It is my medical opinion that the stage of pneumonia 
noted in the autopsy report, while not always fatal, was certainly sufficient to cause death 
even in a child who had been otherwise perfectly healthy. 
11. I can state with medical certainty that the presence of neutrophils in the alveoli indicates 
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that Breanna probably had bacterial pneumonia rather than viral pneumonia. 
12. I can state with medical certainty that it can take as little as two days for pneumonia to 
progress from the stage where symptoms of the disease are first detectable to the 
potentially fatal stage of pneumonia revealed by Breanna's autopsy report. 
13. I can state with medical certainty that nine-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly 
healthy get pheumonia. 
14. I can state with medical certainty that Breanna's pneumonia was not caused by the blunt 
force and skeletal injuries noted in the Autopsy Report. Pneumonia is caused by a viral 
and/or bacterial invasion of the lungs and is not caused by blunt force trauma to the body. 
15. Based upon my review of the autopsy report, I also agree with Dr. Lies' opinion that 
Myocarditis, which is a viral and/or bacterial infection of the heart, may have been the sole 
cause of Breanna's death; however, it is impossible to know whether the Myocarditis was 
in fact the cause of death because of the advanced stage of pneumonia that was present. 
The finding in the autopsy report that there was an infiltrate of neutrophils and 
lymphocytes in the heart indicates that the Myocarditis was significant. It is my medical 
opinion that even though the pneumonia was a more likely cause of Breanna's death given 
the advanced stage of the pneumonia that was present, Myocarditis cannot be ruled out as 
the primary cause of Breanna's death. It is also my medical opinion that Myocarditis 
would have been the most likely cause of Breanna's death if the advanced stage of 
pneumonia had not been present. 
16. It is my medical opinion that the stage of myocarditis revealed by Breanna's autopsy was 
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sufficient to cause death even to a child who had otherwise been perfectly healthy. 
17. I can state with medical certainty that Breanna's Myocarditis was not caused by the blunt 
force and skeletal injuries noted in the Autopsy Report. Myocarditis is caused by a viral 
and/or bacterial infection of the heart and not by blunt force trauma to the body. 
18. I can state with medical certainty that nine-month-old children who are otherwise perfectly 
healthy get myocarditis. 
19. I can state with medical certainty that Breanna did not die as the result of the blunt force 
and skeletal injuries noted in the Autopsy Report. All blunt force and skeletal injuries 
noted in the Autopsy Report were external injuries that were insufficient to cause 
Breanna's death either individually or collectively. While blunt force or skeletal injuries 
can result in death, such deaths occur as the result of internal injuries or complications 
associated with the blunt force or skeletal injuries and not as the result of the type of 
external injuries noted in the autopsy report. There were no such internal injuries or 
complications noted in the Autopsy Report that would be sufficient to explain Breanna's 
death. In particular, the autopsy found no evidence of gastrointestinal or intracranial 
bleeding. 
20. The Autopsy Report indicated a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus. Dr. Leis 
indicated that healthy thymus for an infant her Breanna's age should weigh between 20 and 
30 grams while Breanna's weighed just over 9 grams. However, Breanna was not a 
healthy child. Breanna was not only suffering from two potentially life threatening 
infectious diseases at the time of her death, but her medical records indicate that she had 
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suffered chronic and persistent infectious illnesses in the months preceding her death. 
These illnesses included numerous ear infections, a significant sinus infection and 
bronchitis. Breanna also had a blood test taken on January 12, 1996 which indicated the 
presence of an infectious disease. A follow-up blood test on February 11, 1996 indicated 
that the infection was not only remained present but had increased in severity. Breanna 
also had a fever on February 11, 1996 which also indicates that she was suffering from an 
infectious disease. Breanna also suffered from chronic and persistent diarrhea and 
experienced a weight unusual for a child her age in the months immediately preceding her 
death. The weight loss might indicate that Breanna was receiving inadequate nutrition. 
In addition, there is evidence that Breanna's caretaker often failed to seek timely medical 
treatment for Breanna's infectious illnesses and failed to administer or even fill prescribed 
medications. 
I can state with medical certainty that a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus affects the 
ability of the body to fight infectious diseases. 
Based on Breanna's medical history, it would not be unusual to find a depletion of 
lymphocytes in Breanna's thymus at the time of her death. This could be explained solely 
from the fact that Breanna was suffering from pneumonia and myocarditis at the time of 
her death since both of these diseases cause a depletion of lymphocytes in the thymus. 
Even if the depletion of lymphocytes is not completely explained by Breanna's pneumonia 
and myocarditis, the depletion of lymphocytes could also be explained solely by the 
pneumonia and myocarditis combined with Breanna's medical history of chronic infectious 
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illness, failure on the part of Breanna's caretaker to seek timely medical treatment, and the 
failure of Breanna's caretaker to administer prescribed medications. 
23. Based on all medical factors that were present at the time of Breanna's death, it is my 
medical opinion that it is more likely than not that Breanna would have died of pneumonia 
or myocarditis even if she did not have the blunt force trauma injuries that were described 
in Breanna's autopsy report. 
Dated this j^day of December, 1999. 
Si 
Martin J. Ny$u#d, M.D. 
Utah License #94-270722-1205 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORD this ^ _ day of December, 1999 
0, 7(. 2 
0 . KEVIN DEGRAW 
Notary Public 
Stale of Utah 
2180 Windom Place, St. George, UT 84790 
\ My Commission Expires OctT 21, 2002 
Notary Public 
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Telephone: (435) 688-9533 
Facsimile: (435) 652-8475 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
1. I am over 18 years of age and competent to testify concerning the things contained in this 
affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am the paternal grandmother of Breanna Marie Loveless who was born on May 22, 
1995. 
3. Beginning approximately 6 weeks after Breanna's birth, my son, who is Breanna's natural 
father, and my son and I began having regular and extended visitations with Breanna. 
4. I soon began seeing signs neglect including medical neglect. 
5. Beginning as early as September 1, 1995, Breanna would be brought to us with serious 
untreated illnesses. These illnesses included yeast infections, serious diaper rash, and ear 
infections. 
6. On many occasions, the Breanna's mother had not take Breanna to the doctor even though 
Breanna was in obvious need of medical attention. On those occasions, I or my son would 
be required to take Breanna to the doctor's office for treatment. 
7. Breanna had continual ear infections from approximately September 1, 1995 to the time I 
last saw her on February 11, 1996. 
8. Breanna also had chronic and persistent diarrhea and severe diaper rash from 
approximately September, 1995 until the time I last saw her on February 11, 1996. 
9. I would often observe that the Breanna's mother failed to administer Breanna's prescribed 
medications. On at least one occasion, the Breanna's mother brought me an unfilled 
prescription that was at least a week old. On another occasion, Breanna was brought to 
us with the seal still on a prescription bottle that my son had purchased at least a week 
earlier. 
10. Based on my own personal knowledge, Breanna was continually ill with diarrhea, yeast 
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infections, severe diaper rash, ear infections, sinus infections and/or bronchitis from 
approximately August, 1995 until that date of her death. 
Dated this 6> day of December, 1999. 
/ 
Matadeen Sanders 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORD this £ h day of December, 1999. 
"^Vy ~ T A . W—V I—-
Notary Public 
NOTARY PUBLIC"! 
{ ' ^ J ^ STATIC: V ^ K I 
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ORIGINAL 
BARBARA E. OCHOA - 4102 
Assistant Attorneys General 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone:
 N(801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY LEE SANDERS, 
individually, and in his ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION 
capacity as the personal : FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
representative of the estate 





 Civil No. 980901895 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES, BOBBIE DAWN : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
WIDDISON, and TRAVIS WIDDISON, 
Defendants. 
The Division of Family Services1 Motion for Summary Judgment 
came before the Court for oral argument on December 20, 1999, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. Plaintiff was present 
and represented by counsel, D. Kevin DeGraw. Defendant was 
represented by Barbara E. Ochoa, Assistant Attorney General. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of the parties and 
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, now rules as 
follows: 
Breanna Loveless died of pneumonia on February 22, 1996 at 
the age of nine months. Her mother, defendant Bobbie Dawn 
Widdison, was subsequently convicted of first degree murder, 
three counts of felony child abuse and three counts of 
misdemeanor child abuse. Her boyfriend, defendant Travis 
Widdison, was also convicted of felony child abuse and two counts 
of misdemeanor child abuse. 
Plaintiff's cause of action against the Division alleged 
that defendant was negligent in failing to protect Breanna from 
both the medical neglect and physical harm inflicted by Bobbie 
Dawn Widdison and Travis Widdison. Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment claimed it was immune from suit under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act because Breanna's death arose out of an 
assault and battery. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a three-step approach to 
determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Ledfors v. Emery County School 
Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). The parties agreed that 
2 
the first two steps in the analysis were satisfied. The third 
prong of the test asks whether there is an exception to the 
general waiver of immunity which acts to preserve immunity. The 
parties agreed that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act preserves 
immunity "if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: . . . (2) assault [or] battery." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(2). The issue for the Court is whether Breanna's death 
arose out of, in connection with, or resulted from a battery. 
The testimony of Robert H. Kirschner, M.D. was accepted into 
the record. Dr. Kirschner!s testimony established that Breanna 
Loveless was a physically abused child, that the abuse caused her 
immune system to be depressed, and that she developed pneumonia 
as a direct result of being an abused child. Dr. Leis, the 
State's Chief Deputy Medical Examiner, testified that he didn't 
believe Breanna would have died of pneumonia in the absence of 
the effect of the physical trauma she also suffered. 
In Taylor v. Qgden School Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that the phrase "arises out of" 
within the assault exception to the waiver of governmental 
immunity is a phrase of much broader significance than "caused 
by." The Court concluded that there need be only some causal 
3 
relationship between the injury and the assault. Plaintiff's 
expert, Martin J. Nygaard, M.D., does not go far enough to refute 
the existence of a causal connection between the pneumonia which 
caused Breanna!s death and the physical abuse she suffered. 
Defendant has established a causal connection between 
Breannafs pneumonia and the physical abuse she suffered. 
Plaintiff's expert did not refute that causal connection. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore well taken. 
Being now fully advised in the premises, and for good cause 
shown, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Defendant Division of Family Services' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff's complaint against the 
Division is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 
Against Defendant The Division of Family Services is denied as 
being moot; 
3. The Court entered the defaults of Bobbie Dawn Widdison 
and Travis Widdison on December 20, 1999. There is no just 
reason to delay entry of judgment in this case and the Court 
4 
certifies this as a final order under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
DATED this J^\ day of 7 > ^ ^ / 2 000. 
T$£sTBE; COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
D. Kevin DeGraw 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
V'/fiomer F. Wilkinson 
'Third D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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